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Foreword
James Manor
In the early 1990s, all but one Master’s degree programme on human rights in 
the world approached the topic from a narrowly legal perspective. They were 
mostly located in departments or schools of law. They had great virtues, as 
I had discovered when interacting with the programme at the Harvard Law 
School during the mid-1980s. But they largely omitted scholars from other 
disciplines – the social sciences, history, philosophy, etc. – who could offer 
crucial insights for a rounded understanding of human rights. 
With this in mind, I began investigating the possibility of launching a 
multi-disciplinary Master’s programme at the Institute of Commonwealth 
Studies in the University of London where I then taught. The sole exception 
to those law-based programmes was located not far away, at the University 
of Essex. But we had one major advantage over Essex. We had a rich array of 
human rights organisations on our doorstep, in London. Indeed, just one part 
of London – Islington – contains more headquarters for international rights 
organisations than does Vienna, Geneva, Paris or quite possibly New York. 
That implied that a Master’s degree programme in London could benefit 
enormously if practitioners from these organisations would share their 
rich experiences with students. So our setting argued not just for a multi-
disciplinary approach to understanding human rights, but also for a degree 
programme that paid great attention to the problems and opportunities that 
arise for practitioners who focus on securing human rights. Out of this grew our 
MA programme in ‘Understanding and Securing Human Rights’. 
Our idea for such a programme received a warm welcome from Pierre 
Sané who then presided over the international headquarters of Amnesty 
International, which was within walking distance of the Institute. He agreed 
to provide practitioners, free of charge, to explain their work to students. In 
exchange, the Institute agreed to take on as students, free of charge, practitioners 
from Amnesty. Other human rights organisations in London – and certain 
organisations which engaged with rights as part of larger activities (such as 
the Trades Union Congress) – also agreed to send practitioners for seminars. 
This enabled us to mount a complete set of weekly seminars with practitioners 
throughout the academic year.
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Several of these organisations were also willing to allow our students to do 
voluntary work as interns. Those arrangements started small since the numbers 
of students in the early years were rather limited, but they have blossomed 
mightily over the years as student numbers have expanded.
Some students, after completing their degrees, managed to find employment 
in these or other rights organisations. Others have obtained jobs in government 
agencies around the world, and in international organisations which deal with 
a broader range of issues, but for whom a background in human rights is 
highly relevant. At a dinner in Myanmar, in early 2015, I encountered a young 
woman from the staff of the United Nations Development Programme who 
offered perceptive assessments of changes in that country. When I asked where 
she had studied before joining UNDP and she replied that she had done the 
MA in Understanding and Securing Human Rights at the Institute. 
It has attracted many able and committed students over the years. This 
was true from the start. During the MA’s first year, we organised a party at 
the Institute in the depths of January, mainly as a morale booster amid the 
short days and the wretched weather. It was attended by Sir Robert Fellowes, 
a member of the Institute’s board and the principal Secretary to the Queen. 
He was impressed by the idealism and intelligence of the students, and a few 
days later, they were invited to attend one of the summer garden parties at 
Buckingham Palace. That has become unworkable in more recent years as 
student numbers have risen, but the quality of the students has remained high. 
I have often been asked why an Institute of Commonwealth Studies should 
have created an MA in human rights. This is actually not at all strange. Consider 
three things. 
First, it was in the Institute that the Commonwealth Human Rights 
Initiative had been established, and when the MA got started, its main office 
was still within the walls (it later moved its headquarters to New Delhi). 
Second, the Commonwealth, as an organisation, was then deepening its 
commitment to rights and to democratic politics. It was in that era that a 
Commonwealth Secretary-General led discussions at a Heads of Government 
Meeting in which the presidents of three member states with illiberal one-party 
regimes rose to announce, one after another, that they were relaxing constraints 
and adopting competitive multi-party systems. 
Finally, the MA was established in the period when Nelson Mandela was 
elected President of South Africa. That carried especially potent meaning for 
the Institute. For decades, it had run a famous seminar series on southern Africa 
where leading scholars in the anti-apartheid movement exchanged insights on 
the way forward. Albie Sachs, a prominent figure in that movement and later a 
justice on the new South Africa’s Constitutional Court, had been in residence 
– drawing together ideas that went into his country’s new Constitution with 
its strong commitment to rights. And most startlingly, a safe in the Institute 
library had been the secret repository of Mandela’s papers throughout his time 
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in prison – including the text, in his hand, of his historic speech from the 
dock in Rivonia. Events in South Africa created a special sense of hope in the 
Institute which made it seem an appropriate place for an MA in human rights. 
Hopes have dimmed somewhat since those days. In 2013, the 
Commonwealth betrayed its record as a force for human decency when it agreed 
to hold its Heads of Government Meeting in Sri Lanka which was then ruled 
by a squalid clique that was brazenly contemptuous of human rights – although 
voters there later shamed the Commonwealth by throwing the abusers out. In 
Britain, the Blair government eroded the freedoms of speech and of assembly, 
the right to a jury trial, and habeus corpus. It also sustained a change made by 
the Conservatives that undermined the right to silence by persons under police 
questioning, which brought the presumption of innocence into question. It did 
all of those things before 11 September 2001. Thereafter, excessive responses to 
terrorism by the Bush administration and others eroded rights still further. 
Several important countries have become increasingly contemptuous of rights: 
Hungary, Russia, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, and most of Southeast and Central 
Asia. China has intensified its assault on rights, and its baleful influence is felt 
across much of the developing world – not least in Africa. 
As the challenges have grown, so has the need for the kind of work that is 
done in the MA programme – and latterly, in the Human Rights Consortium 
that grew out of it. This book celebrates the work in recent years, but more 
importantly, it demonstrates a firm resolve to persist.

1Introduction
Corinne Lennox
It has been a great pleasure to put together this edited volume to commemorate 
the first 20 years of the MA in Understanding and Securing Human Rights. In 
doing so, I have been able to reach back to the earliest days of the programme to 
learn how it developed in close cooperation with staff at Amnesty International 
and other human rights NGOs. Surprisingly, the programme of three core 
modules, namely ‘Understanding Human Rights’, ‘Securing Human Rights’ 
and ‘Translating Human Rights into Law’ have constituted the structure of the 
MA since its inception. It was thus appropriate to choose these three pillars as 
the framing themes of the book. 
I was also keen to highlight the achievements of the graduates across time, 
space and field of specialisation. I’m pleased that we have been able to feature 
the work of alumni in varied aspects of human rights, from classic civil and 
political rights like the right to a fair trial (Shah), to the use of poetry for 
human rights (Sumpton), the protection of the environment (Venisnik), the 
burgeoning field of business and human rights (Dhanarajan) and human 
rights in the digital age (Marcus). The authors were invited to submit ‘think 
pieces’ drawing from their own work, both academic and practitioner-based, 
and using the skills developed on the MA. It is a credit to the programme 
that the chapters are rich with critical analysis, legal expertise and innovative 
approaches. 
Understanding human rights
The book begins with a set of essays that help us in ‘Understanding Human 
Rights’ by considering the construction of rights from a social and political 
perspective. Short opens with a brief history of how two key disciplines, Sociology 
and Anthropology, came to offer insightful and often critical examinations of 
the evolving human rights regime. In particular, these disciplines show us that 
rights are contextual and socially formed. In Barreto’s chapter, we take one step 
back to think about why scholars have sought to elaborate a theory of human 
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rights in the first place. He posits several possible motivations but comes to rest 
on the argument that human rights theory is solidarity, which resonates nicely 
with Short’s review of the ‘activist’ strand of social science scholarship.
Ojulari offers an excellent illustration of this social constructionist 
perspective. She examines the case of the emerging rights corpus for people of 
African descent in Colombia, drawing from critical race theory to show how the 
domestic laws promulgated have been more constraining for Afro-Colombians 
than emancipatory. This is a helpful reminder that we cannot understand 
human rights laws at face value: instead, we must ask, in whose interests do 
these rights operate? Souter’s chapter takes a similar tack in his examination 
of the concept of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P). He argues that the 
norm has been too narrowly interpreted, usually in the interests of states, but 
also reflected in the limited understandings of R2P articulated by advocates. 
He encourages advocates to push the normative boundaries of human rights 
concepts in his focus on reparation rights for refugees in host countries. The 
final chapter in this section also looks at fast-moving normative boundaries, 
bringing us into the ‘digital age’ of human rights. Marcus summarises some 
of the many implications that changes in information and communication 
technologies can and are having for existing human rights or for creating new 
rights. 
These chapters demonstrate that we can expand concepts of rights beyond 
the often narrow and restrictive policy interpretations that are currently 
hegemonic. Moreover, rights need to respond to changes in social reality. 
Indeed, if they do not so respond, they risk becoming moribund. We all have a 
role to play in shaping new ‘understandings’ of human rights. 
Securing human rights
This leads nicely to the second section of the book, ‘Securing Human Rights’. 
I currently teach this module and have had the privilege to listen to the 
reflections, advice and frustrations of many practitioners over the years. I like 
to remind students that the information conveyed in those sessions is like ‘gold 
dust’ – extremely valuable to gather when practitioners have a brief moment 
to share it. In this way, the MA classroom has thus served also as a small oasis 
for our guest lecturers, who have the opportunity in constructing their lectures 
and in responding to student questions to reflect on the implicit strategies in 
their daily work. 
We begin this section with a new and emerging tool for activists to do this 
reflection more systematically as a key stage of the programme planning cycle: 
‘theories of change’. Theories of change demand a much more critical and 
nuanced consideration of our own assumptions of how to secure human rights. 
Gready’s chapter usefully contrasts the theories of change prevalent in the work 
of human rights actors and development actors. In doing so he underscores 
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some broad differences in approach that help to explain why state actors have 
often been more receptive to development practitioners than human rights 
advocates. These points are taken up by Klirodotakou in her chapter on support 
to women’s human rights. She discusses how development funding is being 
channelled to women as change agents, without full consideration of the most 
effective process of change needed. Support has moved away from grassroots 
women’s movements towards top-down approaches, despite contrary evidence 
that change is more likely through women’s empowerment and mobilisation at 
a local level. Holt’s chapter on conflict prevention shows how a human rights 
‘informed’ approach can be more instrumentally valuable in situations of inter-
cultural conflict than strict advocacy on international human rights law. The 
theories of change implicit in human rights may not always be appropriate for 
conflict transformation and prevention, particularly where the norms per se are 
resisted by local actors. 
Other chapters in this section look at new avenues for securing human 
rights. Burrows discusses her work in the tax justice campaigns of ActionAid. 
Tax has been a too-long neglected dimension of human rights advocacy, 
perhaps because of blinkered understandings of financing for human rights. 
Dhanarajan dives into the business and human rights field, where non-treaty 
based systems of regulation are proliferating. This raises the important question 
of whether non-legally binding regimes can be more effective than law in 
securing human rights. Hamdan considers the role of Technical Cooperation 
Programmes (TCPs) delivered by the UN at the invitation of states. TCPs are 
considered the softer approach to norm compliance for UN agencies and his 
examples from Saudi Arabia show that advancements can be made through 
socialisation processes such as training, network construction and dialogue. 
Sumpton describes how poetry can be a powerful tool for securing human 
rights, both in transforming meanings of rights but also in empowering rights 
holders through new forms of self-expression and recovery from human rights 
violations. 
Translating human rights into law
Finally, the third section of the book brings us to reflections on ‘Translating 
Human Rights into Law’. Shah opens this section with her chapter on cuts to 
legal aid in the UK and the far-reaching effects. This reminds us that access to 
justice is contingent on a number of factors even in countries with an otherwise 
strong rule of law. Ball extends this discussion with her chapter on the experience 
of supporting cases from Australia to the UN treaty body system. Among her 
key points is the important role that NGOs can play in enabling cases to be 
heard, echoing Shah’s discussion on UK civil society support to those newly 
excluded from legal aid. 
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The following chapters from Cantor and Sait examine the role of human 
rights law when intersecting with other legal regimes. Cantor offers some 
suggestions on how international human rights law could complement 
refugee law in situations of extra-territorial protection of refugees. Sait shares 
insights from his study on property rights for women under Islamic law, rights 
which he argues are instrumental for the realisation of other human rights for 
women. He shows the contribution that rights-based approaches can make to 
transforming meanings within cultural and customary legal systems. 
This collection of essays is also an important reminder of the limitations 
of the law used in isolation from other strategies of advocacy. Litigation and 
legislation are just one component of socialisation and persuasion in achieving 
changes in behaviour of states (or increasingly non-state actors). Engstrom’s 
chapter on the Inter-American Human Rights System illustrates the political 
and social dimensions that impact on the strength of that regime. On litigation 
in the Inter-American system, he argues that it has not always served the direct 
interests of the applicants, being used often instead for wider legislative and 
policy aims that may neglect more specific remedies for individuals. Venisnik 
makes a related plea in her chapter to ensure that litigation achieves ‘power to 
the people’ rather than being a strategy imposed by outsiders. Nevertheless, 
her case studies from Southeast Asia show that litigation in various guises 
can have a useful impact for communities. Waiti illustrates the value of the 
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) for achieving legislation and policy change. 
He describes the promulgation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities into national law in the Marshall Islands following UPR 
recommendations. This processes was important not only for legal change but 
also for building civil society and for socialisation on disability rights. 
Conclusion
I hope this edited book serves as a useful legacy of the MA in Understanding 
and Securing Human Rights. We are pleased to be able to offer it also as an 
open access online resource via the School of Advanced Study. I would like 
to take this opportunity to thank the contributors for producing excellent 
chapters under a tight time frame and whilst juggling their difficult day-
jobs. I would also like to thank the current MA students who have assisted 
in the editing of the book and the organisation of the MA 20th anniversary 
conference, including Genna, Danni, Chucks, Justine, Emily, Ana, Christian, 
Megan, Minah, Joe, Iyanu and Anabel.  
There are more than 700 alumni of this programme working around the 
globe towards the full implementation of human rights for all in very different 
ways. They each have a unique story to tell of what brought them to the study 
of human rights in the first place. A few have shared those stories here. I hope 
that in doing so they will help to inspire future students of human rights. 
Part 1
Understanding Human Rights 

2Researching and studying human rights: interdisciplinary 
insight
Damien Short
Since 1948, the study of human rights has been dominated by legal scholarship 
that has sought to investigate the development of human rights law, emerging 
jurisprudence, regional systems, the decisions and recommendations of human 
rights mechanisms and institutions and to a lesser extent the ‘compliance gaps’ 
between state commitments and actions. Even so, in all of these spheres there are 
elements that cannot be fully understood through a purely legal lens, moreover, 
if we understand ‘human rights’ more broadly, and look into the practical world 
of human rights work and human rights discourse, advocacy and activism, then 
we need to go beyond legal analysis. Indeed, to understand the world of human 
rights in both theory and practice requires interdisciplinary insight, as it covers 
an enormous range of social, political, economic and environmental issues. In 
this chapter, I will outline the contributions of two disciplines that were slow 
to contribute to the field of human rights but which offer vitally important 
insights that can guide both academic research and human rights advocacy. 
Sociological insights 
Sociology was initially sceptical with the normativity that is attached to human 
rights along with the claim of universality, which saw a sociology of citizenship 
effectively act as a substitute for a sociology of human rights. In a series of 
seminal contributions in the 1990s, Bryan Turner argued that the concept of 
citizenship, however, is closely linked with the modern nation state, a political 
form that has been infected with the problems of imperialism, globalisation, 
migrant workers, refugees, and Indigenous peoples (Short 2009). In a key essay 
for the journal Sociology, Turner (1993) suggested that globalisation has created 
problems that are not wholly internal to nation states and that consequently 
we should extend sociological inquiry to the concept of human rights. While 
few sociologists have attempted (like Turner) to develop a foundational social 
theory of human rights, there is now a growing body of research that embraces 
a more social constructionist view of human rights. 
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From a social constructionist perspective universal human rights should be 
seen as ‘historically and socially contingent, the product of a particular time, 
place, and set of circumstances, and a work in permanent progress’ (Morris 
2006, 26). A sociological approach to rights discourses, practices, and struggles 
is necessary to identify the mechanisms that translate social phenomena into 
rights disputes. Yet, viewing rights this way suggests that we must pay due 
attention to the social actors involved in their invention/construction if we are 
to understand rights regimes fully.
Within this broad social constructionist sociology we can see an important 
dimension of sociological enquiry begin to emerge, i.e. the role of power 
in the domain of human rights. Human rights scholar Michael Freeman 
(2002), in a major interdisciplinary contribution to the area, identifies rights 
institutionalisation as a social process and he also displays an acute awareness of 
the role of power in that process, which he sees as perhaps the major sociological 
contribution. He writes:
The institutionalisation of human rights may ... lead, not to their 
more secure protection, but to their protection in a form that is less 
threatening to the existing system of power. The sociological point is 
not that human rights should never be institutionalised, but, rather, 
that institutionalisation is a social process, involving power, and that it 
should be analysed and not assumed to be beneficial (Freeman 2002, 
85).
Freeman further argues that the social sciences have been ‘excessively legalistic’ 
and overemphasised the UN system whilst neglecting to look deeper into the 
role of powerful global institutions and global power politics, most notably 
the G7, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the foreign policy of the US, in 
both the violation and construction of human rights (Freeman 2002, 177). 
The discipline of sociology is well placed to investigate the role of power in this 
regard.
Social research has shown how rights should be viewed as instrumentally 
useful strategic resources invoked by social actors in competition for power in 
domestic and international arenas (Short 2009). Rights can be constructed 
through the interplay of domestic and international forces and will be 
reinforced as long as otherwise powerless social actors find no other alternative 
but to engage in rights talk. Sociology may be the discipline best equipped 
to discuss the social forces that underline the genesis of such rights and the 
social struggles from which they materialise (Short 2009). A primary task for 
sociologists is to become intimately familiar with the advocates, their claims, 
and the social processes through which rights are constructed, while being 
careful to balance claims for universal applicability with the empirical reality of 
social and cultural diversity in the world. Sociological researchers are also well 
placed to examine the ‘considerable gap between the recognition of the need 
for protection and its achievements in practice’ (Morris 2006, 3). Sociological 
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researchers should ask some very important questions such as: How are rights 
socially constructed—by whom, for whom, and in what social context? How 
and why do particular social actors and groups claim and access rights? How 
are rights affected by the social, political, and economic context in which they 
emerge and operate? What role is played by social structures—are they enabling, 
constraining, or both? To what extent are rights guaranteed or limited by the 
law? Have power relations affected the construction and functionality of rights? 
Whose interests do rights actually work to protect?
In summary, the discipline of sociology is well equipped to expose, discuss, 
and possibly amend obvious limitations in existing conceptions of rights, 
especially the formal legalistic dimensions, the limitations of which, as we 
shall see later, are something that social anthropologist Richard Wilson is also 
concerned to ‘move beyond’ (1997). Such sociological research is now gathering 
pace. Indeed, the British Sociological Association now has a ‘Sociology of 
Rights’ study group, from which has already emerged a major contribution 
to the subfield entitled ‘Sociology and Human Rights: New Engagements’ 
(Hynes, Lamb, Short, and Waites 2011). 
Anthropological insights 
The issue of cultural relativism has of course influenced both sociological and 
anthropological perspectives on human rights. It was a major factor that led 
sociology to take such a long time to engage with the phenomena at all; while 
anthropology, on the other hand, was an influential voice at the outset of the 
international codification of human rights norms (Short 2009, 97).
The discipline of anthropology has evolved to be concerned with the 
study of the entire range of cultures and societies in the world. Given such 
scope, there are significant points of convergence between anthropology and 
sociology. Yet in the early stages of its development the discipline tended to 
focus on non-Western ‘primitive’ societies, which led to important differences 
between the disciplines (Short 2009, 97). Sociology historically tended 
to focus on Western societies, which thus generated methodological and 
theoretical differences between the two disciplines. For example, when Western 
sociologists studied their own society they could take much context for granted 
before hypothesising about their data, while anthropologists studying other 
cultures could make few safe assumptions and consequently developed an 
holistic methodology that emphasised that each social entity or group has its 
own identity that is distinct and not reducible to individual constituent parts. 
Consequently, anthropology would not assume that all cultures shared the 
same values, which is the fundamental ontological position that guided the 
discipline’s early attitude towards the notion of universal human rights.
Consequently a key school of thought for those anthropologists seeking 
to engage with the world of human rights sought to use the discipline’s 
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ethnographic methodology to explore and investigate the ‘social practice of 
human rights’ or, as Richard Wilson puts it, ‘the social life of rights’ (1997). 
Wilson, a social anthropologist, agrees with the main thrust of the sociological 
approaches that were discussed above, arguing that social scientists should be 
primarily concerned with analysing rights as socially constructed phenomena. 
He writes:
The intellectual efforts of those seeking to develop a framework for 
understanding the social life of rights would be better directed not 
towards foreclosing their ontological status, but instead by exploring 
their meaning and use. What is needed are more detailed studies of 
human rights according to the actions and intentions of social actors, 
within wider historical constraints of institutionalised power. (Wilson 
1997, 3–4)
Taking up this call, researchers began to focus on an increase in negotiations 
and claims made by various social groups in a language of ‘rights’. A trend began 
to emerge in which long-established theoretical debates about concepts such 
as rights, justice, and citizenship began to engage with empirical ‘data’ that 
contextualises rights-claiming processes (Short 2009). Anthropologists started 
to advocate the need to explore how exactly universal concepts were being used 
in local struggles. In essence, the relationship between culture and rights was 
seen as an issue to be studied empirically. The thrust of this approach is thus 
descriptive and makes no claim to endorse the universality of human rights. 
It is an effort to uncover how human rights actually function in an empirical 
sense, to uncover what they mean to different social actors in different social 
contexts. More attention was gradually being paid to empirical, contextual 
analyses of specific rights struggles. This intellectual strategy sought to record 
how individuals, groups, communities, and states use rights discourse in the 
pursuit of particular ends, and how they become enmeshed in its logic (Short 
2009, 98). 
Anthropology’s relativistic perspective was borne out of a detached 
scientific methodology that frequently observed a plethora of value systems 
in its research ‘subjects’. This ‘detached’ approach, however, did not last as the 
dominant perspective. While many anthropologists were able to maintain an 
‘objective’ detachment from their research subjects, increasingly this approach 
gave way to immersion and empathy, which in turn led to political activism on 
behalf of the subjects. 
Those who advocated such an approach argued that anthropological 
understandings of specific cultural processes, which are embedded in wider 
(what sociologists would term ‘structural’) social power relationships, should 
be used to bolster specific endeavours for social change and/or to assist specific 
marginalised peoples, populations, or groups in resisting threats to their survival 
(Short 2009). This approach views human rights as a useful tool for serving an 
ethical commitment towards threatened peoples and cultures. The effectiveness 
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of human rights as a tool in this sense can be greatly improved through more 
expansive and inclusive definitions. Thus, there is a normative suggestion 
within this approach that anthropologists should work to expand the definitions 
of human rights so as to increase their effectiveness for marginalised groups 
and cultures—an approach termed ‘emancipatory cultural politics’ (Short 
2009, 98). This approach, which encourages anthropological engagement with 
human rights discourse as a political strategy for the protection of threatened 
populations, was perhaps the first major disciplinary current to emerge in the 
anthropology of human rights. Perhaps the most notable recent research within 
this broad approach is that of Shannon Speed, which she has termed ‘critically 
engaged activist research’ (Speed 2006, 66). This approach is concerned to 
embrace the issues raised by the social actors, not shy away from engagement 
and commentary, and in fact warns against an overly detached anthropology 
of human rights (Speed 2006, 66). The focus of the research is not just about 
research on human rights in the particular site—Chiapas, Mexico—but also 
advocacy for human rights there. Consequently, it could be suggested that such 
research does not fall into the trap of forgetting the ‘human’ in human rights. 
For the social actors suffering injustice, human rights are much more than an 
academic curiosity (Short 2009).
Conclusion 
We have seen how from an initial position of scepticism there is now a growing 
body of research emerging from both sociology and anthropology that seeks to 
explore the construction, meaning, use and functioning of rights, and for some, 
the secondary goal is to use this data to work for the protection of human rights 
through critically engaged activist research. It is this latter approach which has 
informed all of my teaching on the MA Understanding and Securing Human 
Rights at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies. Furthermore, in addition 
to the knowledge gleaned from legal, philosophical, and political approaches 
to the study of human rights, when I teach our Understanding Human Rights 
module, I strongly urge students to embrace interdisciplinary and, in particular, 
anthropological and sociological studies that explore the ‘social life of rights’, 
since it is only through such studies that we can hope to understand fully the 
practice of human rights in the modern world.
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3Human rights theory as solidarity
José-Manuel Barreto
‘The state of mind is that of 
passionate sympathetic contemplation (θεωρία), 
in which the spectator is identified with the suffering God,
dies in his death, and rises again in his new birth’
F.M. Cornford, 
on the meaning of the word theory in the Dionysian cult
‘I have had no other interest but this:
to liberate [the Indians] from the violent deaths
which they have suffered and suffer… 
through compassion at seeing multitudes of people 
who are rational’
Bartolomé de las Casas, in his will
Let’s formulate some questions that are important for those who are engaged 
in making theory of human rights but which are rarely thematised: Why do 
legal theory? Why are scholars interested in elaborating a theory of human 
rights? A number of answers come to the tip of the tongue: in order justify and 
advance the cause of human rights; as a way of fulfilling political or ideological 
commitments; as a result of a commitment to justice or to the enforcement of 
rule of law; to learn about the phenomenon of the law; because it is part of the 
business of the academy; out of a professional duty and as a way of earning a 
living; due to the pleasure of fiddling with theories and abstract thinking. It can 
also be the consequence of the combination of some or all the above motives. 
Above all, let’s try a different track to answer these questions. Baxi has 
complained about how recent and sophisticated Western theories of democracy 
and human rights ignore the materiality of the violation of human rights or the 
voices of those who suffer, in a well-established feature of academic common 
sense that he describes as the ‘cruelty of theory’ (2002, 14). In a similar way, 
Horkheimer’s critique of Kantian morality did not only attack the metaphysical 
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way of thinking but it also pointed to the theorists themselves. Horkheimer did 
not criticise the metaphysical ‘forgetting of being’ as Heidegger did, but the 
immoral character of the forgetfulness of the suffering of the wretched of the 
earth and their struggles in history (Brunkhorst 1993, 78). For Horkheimer, 
metaphysicians and theorists are scarcely ‘impressed by what torments 
humanity’ and, while their reflections on history and society are irreproachably 
‘objective’, ‘suffering or even outrage over justice, or sympathy with victims’ are 
foreign to them (Schmitt 1993, 29).
This inability to look at those who suffer and the retreat of philosophy, 
critical legal theory and human rights theory ‘from the scenes of the battlefield’ 
has to do with their immersion in the intellectual modern culture. A theory 
indifferent to suffering and obsessed with objectivity or justification is just the 
expression of the platonic and modern conception of philosophy as theory of 
knowledge or epistemology. In modernity, to think philosophically supposes 
a search for objectivity for the conditions that must be present to ensure 
knowledge can aspire to truth. The question confronting the philosophical 
effort is that of how the subject can get access to the object in such a way that 
ideas or concepts attained during this process apprehend the object as it is. This 
was the hegemonic form that philosophy adopted from the historical dawn of 
modernity. Having its remote antecedents in Plato, philosophy as epistemology 
acquired a dominant position with the emergence of transcendental 
subjectivism. Philosophy dwelled and remained imprisoned within the vicious 
circle of the relationship between subject and object, which constitutes the 
plane inhabited by the doubts of Descartes’ cogito that aspires to certitude. It 
is in this realm that the subject takes distance from the empirical world and 
from common sense and advances towards the transcendental pure a priori, as 
in Kant. This is also the case of the sphere in which Hegel’s dialectic between 
subject and object occurs and leads to absolute knowledge. 
Later, in the context of the 20th century Anglo-North American 
philosophical tradition, a survey of the ways in which philosophy developed 
under the Neo-Kantian hegemony shows philosophy as consisting basically 
of conceptual analysis, explication of meaning, examination of the logic 
of language and of the structure of the activity of mind (Rorty 1979, 12). 
In all of these forms of philosophical work, it is also the question of truth 
and meaning that drives the task of thinking. Thus, the way of thinking 
inaugurated by the Socrates-Plato partnership, re-launched by Descartes and 
pursued by Neokantian analytical philosophy, marks modern philosophy with 
its epistemological character (Rorty 1979, 156–64).
In the human rights arena the epistemological ethos of modern philosophy 
turns, as in Kant, into a sustained reflection on human dignity, which is deduced 
from the universal maxims that rule human conduct, namely the different 
instantiations of the categorical imperative. Turning from anthropology to 
pure reason, ethical norms are reached by a process in which moral reason takes 
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distance from any empirical experience. This ‘metaphysics of morals’ guarantees 
the construction of a priori laws, which are necessary and universal and 
therefore are to be obeyed by all (Kant 1978, 5–6). In one of its formulations, 
the imperative of pure practical reason prescribes that human beings should 
never be treated as means alone but also as ends. The consequence derived from 
the categorical imperative is the principle according to which being human is 
to be understood as an end-in-itself. This principle sustains the dignity of all 
human beings that, in turn, becomes the foundation of human rights. The 
epistemological orientation of modern philosophy has also led the tradition 
to conceive of the theory of rights as conceptual analysis, in order to make the 
concept of human rights clear and to define their meaning (Freeman 2002, 
2). It also points to an engagement with ‘the truth of human rights’, namely 
with a reflection on topics such as the characterisation of human nature, the 
‘existence’ itself of human rights and the definition of what precisely they are 
(Donnelly 1985, 1).
Rorty believes that the task of thinking should rest on our relations with 
other human beings and should not be constructed ‘in terms of our relation to 
non-human reality’ (1985, 25). Platonism and Kantianism have weakened the 
ability of our culture to ‘listen to outsiders’ and to be sensitive to those ‘who 
are suffering’ (Rorty 1991a, 13). A philosophy overwhelmingly concerned 
with truth and epistemological subjectivism distracts or distances us from 
our fellow human beings and blurs our sense of solidarity (Rorty 1999, xv). 
This is due to the fact that our readiness to note and to become involved with 
those subjected to pain and humiliation is not cultivated or simply neglected. 
When philosophy consists basically of a reiterative formulation of metaphysical 
or epistemological questions, it is natural to forget or to relegate human and 
social suffering as secondary matters, assuming that they are just appearances 
or the product of a common sense way of looking at the world (Rorty 1996a, 
74). In this intellectual climate suffering becomes an odd topic or even a non-
philosophical theme. 
Rorty’s critique of Platonic and Kantian epistemological philosophy 
supposes a prioritisation of ethics over theory of knowledge, and the inclusion of 
the quest for knowledge within the ethical endeavour. In a move that resembles 
Levinas’ priority of ethics over ontology, Rorty asserts a precedence of ethics 
over epistemology: knowledge is basically orientated by an ethical and political 
interest in solidarity (1991b, 24; 27). The specifically epistemological duties 
of a philosophy as solidarity are those of putting together and generalising 
our intuitions, always with a practical aim, which in some cases could be that 
of how strengthening the self-awareness, power and efficacy of human rights 
culture (Rorty 1994, 117). 
Rorty attempts, as Dewey did before, a critique of the vision of philosophy 
as theory of knowledge out of a longing for less cruel and less unjust societies 
(1979, 13). Anti-foundationalism is, in this sense, a move from philosophy 
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understood as epistemology to philosophy understood as solidarity. In this 
framework, objectivity is not the goal of inquiry but the alleviation of the pain 
others are enduring. The force driving the intellectual adventure is not that 
of a quest for truth, a love for knowledge, a will to know or a ‘desire for an 
epistemology’ (Rorty 1979, 163). Rather, it is an impulse or ‘desire for solidarity’ 
(Rorty 1991, 21), for answering the plea of fellow human beings. Our impulse 
to think and the spontaneous inclination to do philosophy or legal theory 
come from our ‘openness to strangers’, from a concern, a preoccupation or an 
intuitive apprehension for those who are victims of violence. That openness 
allows us to be witness to the suffering of others and to cultivate inside us 
a fellow feeling (Rorty 1979, 9). In this perspective the pursuit of freedom, 
solidarity, and human rights and the struggle against oppression, humiliation 
and cruelty are the forces driving philosophical inquiry (Rorty 1989, xiii). 
The ethics of sympathy developed within the ambit of Critical Theory 
can also be drawn into this discussion on the nature of theory. If the basic 
interest of Critical Theory is, according to Horkheimer, that of ‘striving to 
reduce suffering’ (McCarthy 1993, 138), theory acquires an ethical drive and 
takes the form of an ‘existential judgement’ (Brunkhorst 1993, 72). It is said 
that Adorno was also close to this impulse, as sympathy with the suffering of 
the victims of violence acted as motivation of his thinking (Morchen, cited in 
Garcia-Duttmann 2002, 6). If the experience of individual suffering is at the 
basis of social criticism (McCole 1993, 18), then the main object of theory is 
not the search for truth but rather the practical aim of the alleviation of pain. 
But again, such an object is not defined in abstract or rationalistic terms: the 
relief of the suffering — which is human, both individual and social, and that 
of past, present and future generations — becomes the teleology of morality 
and theory, and the political motive of the critical theorist.
The idea of philosophy as solidarity has, as a consequence, a partisan 
conception of philosophy. In an epistemologically orientated theory the subject 
is in front of the object — society or the world — and just in front of it, being 
in this way a spectator. To step outside or to remain at a distance from the 
society with which we are dealing is assumed to be a necessary condition for 
objective knowledge. This would allow the analysis of a particular society from 
a universal or transcendental point of view. This does not occur in a philosophy 
built out of a feeling of sympathy or solidarity. In this scenario, the one who 
knows is a participant who reflects upon the situation and acts upon it (Rorty 
1979, 18–19). Those developing theory are engaged in a relation with those 
under scrutiny, occupied in learning how to deal with the situation in which 
others are involved, and eager to make a contribution to that community. 
Theory is conceived of as ‘cooperative human inquiry’ and the Neopragmatist 
philosopher is seen as a ‘partisan of solidarity’ (Rorty 1991, 21; 24) — as 
somebody who serves the community (Rorty 1996b, 17).
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The implications of such a conception of philosophy are present in Rorty’s 
theory of human rights. Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality, Rorty’s 
only piece entirely dedicated to reflect on human rights, begins with the image 
of a Muslim man being physically and psychologically destroyed on the orders 
of his Serbs captors in Bosnia. This text later develops into a meditation about 
long term cultural strategies that ensure this kind of atrocities do not happen 
again. In a more traditional tone, Michael Freeman’s Human Rights begins with 
a story about the fate of a Pakistani teenager who is raped, handed by the 
police to her family and finally murdered as a punishment for dishonouring 
her tribe. Maintaining that ‘the analysis of the concept of human rights… must 
be combined with a sympathetic understanding of the human experiences to 
which the concept refers’, and assuming that ‘we sympathise with the victims’, 
Freeman goes on to develop his chapter on Thinking about Human Rights (2002, 
2–3). In a similar sense Costas Douzinas describes his The End of Human Rights 
as ‘a critique of legal humanism inspired by a love of humanity’ (2000, vii). 
The rhetorical devices used here to begin the analysis give us a clue about the 
origins or the compulsion that leads the theorist to think about human rights 
in the first place. 
Rorty’s Neopragmatism ends up as being a ‘philosophy of solidarity’ as 
hope, freedom and human rights substitute knowledge, truth or objectivity as 
guides of thinking (1991, 33). Theory is not created by a love of knowledge. It 
is openness to others and a desire for solidarity that makes us to think of rights. 
The theory of human rights is developed by theorists witnessing the pain of 
others and out of a desire to reduce their suffering. The human rights scholar 
wants to get involved and to intervene, and to take the side of the victim — of 
all victims — against all perpetrators. To be in front of those who are victims of 
cruelty, humiliation and oppression, and to look at the face of those who suffer 
are the experiences that give birth to the theory of human rights. Theories in 
general and legal theory in particular are consequences of sympathy. Human 
rights theory is solidarity.
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4The social construction of Afro-descendant rights in 
Colombia
Esther Ojulari
Afro-descendant people make up around 30 per cent of the population of 
Latin America and the Caribbean, some 150 million people (IACHR 2011). 
In a context of mestizaje and the myth of racial democracy, Afro-descendant 
rights were not institutionalised in many Latin American states until the end 
of the 20th century. This reflected an invisibility at the international level 
where a specific normative framework on Afro-descendant rights did not begin 
to emerge until the beginning of the 21st century. Through multicultural 
citizenship reforms in the 1980s and 1990s several Latin American states 
recognised rights for their Afro-descendant populations; however, these tended 
to be subsumed into the existing indigenous rights framework, thus neglecting 
the specific situations of Afro-descendants. 
Using theoretical concepts from the sociology of human rights and 
critical race theory (CRT) this chapter poses some key issues for analysing 
the institutionalisation of Afro-descendant rights in Latin America and, in 
particular, in Colombia. It draws on literature from the social constructionist 
perspective on human rights, which demonstrates how rights emerge in 
particular historical and political contexts and are institutionalised through 
processes of negotiation between states and civil society, often influenced by 
powerful economic and political interests (see Waters 1996; Freeman 2002; 
Morris 2006; Samson and Short 2006; Short 2007; Miller 2010; Haynes et 
al. 2011). 
Critical race theory (CRT) places the issues of race and racism at the centre 
of analyses. With roots in critical legal studies, CRT critiqued US civil rights 
laws for failing to lead to significant change and rather serving the wider 
political and international interests of the State and white elite (see Bell 1995; 
Ladson-Billings and Tate IV 1995; Ladson-Billings 1998; Taylor et al, 2009; 
Delgado and Stefancic 2012). The chapter combines social constructionist 
theories with CRT concepts of structural racism, ‘interest convergence’ and 
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‘model minorities’ to explore the discourses, interests and processes which 
influenced the institutionalisation of Afro-descendant rights in Colombia. 
Afro-descendant rights in context
Historic context: invisibilising racism 
CRT views racism as structural, institutional and endemic to society in the 
United States (US), underpinning and informing all social relations (Taylor 
2009; Delgado and Stefancic 2012). As part of post-independence, nation-
building projects, many countries in Latin America promoted mestizo national 
identities that supposedly celebrated the racial and ethnic diversity of the nations 
(Andrews 2004). States espoused an idea of ‘racial democracy’ asserting that, in 
contrast to the Jim Crow segregation laws of the US, Latin American societies 
were characterised by harmonious race relations and racial equality (Gates Jr. 
2012; Telles 2004; Cottrol 2001). However, the ideology of mestizaje has 
served to assimilate Afro-descendants and indigenous peoples denying their 
histories, cultures and contributions to their nations (de Friedman and Arocha 
1995). Rather than removing racial categories, the ideology of mestizaje actually 
reconstructs categories re-establishing a basis for racism (Wade 2004). Both 
mestizaje and the myth of racial democracy were extremely influential in shaping 
racial discourse throughout the region, denying the existence of racism and 
creating barriers for Afro-descendant movements to make claims for racial justice 
(Safa 1998; Htun 2004; Reichmann 1999; Ng’weno 2012; Morrison 2012). 
It has since been argued that racial democracy is a ‘myth’ as racism and racial 
inequality are very real problems throughout Latin America (Alberti and Araujo 
2006). A wealth of literature shows that Afro-descendants are disproportionately 
represented among the most marginalised groups in the region and while often 
equated to class, the socio-economic inequalities they face are underpinned 
by structural discrimination and racism (Hasenbalg 1996; Safa 1998; Sanchez 
and Bryan 2003; Htun 2004; Murillo 2011; Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights 2011; Leighton 2012; UNDP 2012; Telles 2014).
Political context – a space for model minorities?
The CRT concepts of ‘model minorities’ and ‘differential racialisation’ explore 
the ways in which different minority groups are racialised by mainstream 
society. For example, the stereotyping of certain minority groups in the 
US as ‘successful’ in education and employment based on hard work, often 
downplays experiences of racism and exclusion and is used to legitimise the low 
achievement and inequality of other groups, blaming them for their own lack 
of success (Delgado and Stefancic, 2012). 
In Latin America, outside of the Brazilian context, the ideology of mestizaje 
was based on a binary between white European and indigenous peoples, 
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promoting romantic celebration of an indigenous past, while excluding 
Afro-descendants (Paschel 2010; Wade 1997). This ‘indigenous inclusion, 
black exclusion’ (Hooker 2005) translated to a lack of policies and legislation 
recognising the existence and rights of Afro-descendants. 
Towards the end of the 20th century, as indigenous rights were 
institutionalised at the international level, many countries in Latin America 
underwent multicultural citizenship reforms adopting new constitutions 
which recognised, the multicultural nature of their societies. Reflecting the 
language of ILO Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
in Independent Countries (1989), they included rights to territory, culture, 
language, identity, political participation and education for ethnic groups 
(Sieder 1998). 
This ethnic rights discourse, however, provided limited space for inclusion 
of Afro-descendants, who had traditionally been imagined along racial rather 
than cultural/ethnic lines (Wade 1997). Only some of the States that adopted 
new constitutions included rights for their Afro-descendant populations, and 
these were much more limited in scope than those provided for indigenous 
peoples (Hooker 2005). 
The Colombian 1991 Constitution contains several provisions on 
indigenous peoples’ rights but only one provisional article (PA55) on Afro-
descendants, which led to the adoption of Law 70 of 1993: ‘In Recognition 
of the Right of Black Colombians to Collectively Own and Occupy their 
Ancestral Lands.’ The differences in scope of rights for the two groups are 
stark. For example, constitutional law provides a quota system to guarantee 
two seats in the Senate (Constitution 1991, article 171) and one seat in the 
House of Representatives for indigenous peoples (law 649 of 2001, article 1) 
who officially make up 3.4 per cent of the population (DANE 2005; 2010). 
Conversely, Afro-descendants who make up 10.5 per cent1 of the population 
are guaranteed just two seats in the House of Representatives (Law 70, article 
66; Law 649, article 1). 
The model minority concept is useful here for analysing the differential 
racialisation of Afro-descendants and indigenous peoples. Popular comparisons 
between the two groups often emphasise how indigenous movements have 
been more organised and articulated in their demands, while fractions and 
tensions within the Afro-descendant movement are often cited as reasons for 
their continued lack of success. Such distinctions fail to unpick the historical 
and continued differential discourses and treatment that have fed into these 
differences. 
1 It is important to note that due to issues of self-identification and capacity in 
census taking, these figures are often considered to be underestimates of the true 
population size. 
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Framing rights claims for inclusion 
The language used in the construction of rights is essential to analyse how 
rights are institutionalised and implemented in practice. O’Byrne asserts that 
through the study of the language of rights sociologists can understand the 
‘institutional frameworks within which meanings are negotiated and practices 
formalised’ (2012, 832). 
The ‘indigenous inclusion, black exclusion’ paradigm has meant that Afro-
descendant communities that have gained recognition and rights tend to be 
those that articulate their claims within the indigenous rights framework around 
territory and culture (Hooker 2005).2 Some Afro-Colombian civil society 
organisations point out that presenting a case based on racial discrimination 
can have little audience, while emphasising cultural difference is more effective 
(Wade 2009; Paschel 2010). 
Thus, the political space that opened up through the multicultural 
citizenship reform made room for those groups who articulated their claims 
within the ‘ethnic rights’ language. Cultural and identity rights had long been 
an important demand of the Afro-Colombian movement (Pisano 2014). 
However, Restrepo (2013) argues that the lead up to the drafting of the 
Constitution involved an ‘ethnicisation’ of Afro-descendant claims in which 
organisations, mainly from the rural, Pacific region of the country had to 
emphasise demands for cultural, territorial and identity rights. During the 
actual drafting of the Constitution no Afro-descendant organisations were 
included in the Constitutional Committee and their interests were therefore 
represented by two indigenous participants and a number of anthropologists 
who also tended to take an ethnic rights approach (Wade 2009; Paschel 2010). 
Reflecting this, PA55 and consequently Law 70 of 1993 apply to 
comunidades negras (black communities) which are defined as:
… the group of families of Afro-Colombian descent who possesses its 
own culture, shares a common history and has its own traditions and 
customs within a rural-urban setting and which reveals and preserves a 
consciousness of identity that distinguishes it from other ethnic groups 
(Ley 70, 1993, article 2, para.5). 
Thus, the law that provides rights to collective land titles, autonomy, political 
participation and ‘ethno-education’ (culturally relevant education) applied 
only to those Afro-descendants considered distinct, traditional ethno/cultural 
groups, mainly in the pacific region. This raised questions of its applicability to 
Afro-descendants outside of this context (Restrepo and Rojas 2012).
2 For example, Garífuna, communities in Central America have been successful in 
gaining collective titles to land through multicultural provisions in their country’s 
constitutions (Thorne 2004; Anderson 2007). 
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Interest convergence 
The social constructivist perspective of human rights demonstrates that 
political authorities institutionalise rights only when they perceive them to be 
in their own interests and when they do not threaten existing power structures 
(Waters 1996; Freeman 2002; and Miller 2010). Rights should therefore not 
be assumed to be automatically beneficial to the rights holders. Similarly, the 
CRT concept of ‘interest convergence’ argues that legal liberalism cannot be 
considered as objective, neutral or ‘colour-blind.’ Therefore civil rights laws and 
court decisions, such as rulings on desegregation or affirmative action, cannot 
lead to real racial justice, but rather serve wider political and economic State 
interests (see Bell 1995; Ladson-Billings and Tate IV 1995; Ladson-Billings 
1998; Dudziak 2009; Delgado and Stefancic 2012).
In Colombia, the framing of Afro-descendant rights as rural, Pacific ‘ethnic 
group’ rights effectively enabled the State to evade obligations towards the rights 
of Afro-descendants who do not fit the criteria. Law 70 does extend beyond the 
Pacific region, for example, establishing political participation mechanisms for 
Black Communities from throughout the country (article 45). Further, several 
Constitutional Court rulings have expanded the scope of specific areas of the 
law.3 However, there are still many barriers to proper implementation. 
In the area of education, for example, my initial research in urban contexts 
demonstrates how ethno-education has been concentrated in majority Afro-
descendant communities who more closely resemble a distinct ethnic group, 
excluding those Afro-descendants that live in more multicultural contexts. 
In the areas of collective land titles and participation, Afro-descendant 
communities face barriers realising these rights in part because their status as 
an ‘ethnic group’ had been questioned (Ng’weno 2012).4
After generations of neglect of Afro-Colombian ancestral territories in the 
Pacific region by the State, they are now the object of State and private palm 
oil cultivation, mining and other large-scale development projects (Murillo 
2011). In the context of these neo-liberal interests, it may have suited the 
State to concentrate the Afro-descendant rights framework on these regions 
(Wade 2009). The Afro-descendant rights framework establishes mechanisms 
for free, prior, informed consent in development projects in the region. From 
an ‘interest convergence’ perspective this can be seen as enabling the State 
3 See for example Constitutional Court rulings T-422/96 which applied education 
rights to black communities in the city of Santa Marta on the Caribbean Coast; 
and C-169/01 which expands Law 169 on political participation to include 
Raízal communities from San Andrés y Providencia in the definition of ‘black 
communities’. 
4 See Constitutional Court ruling T-823/12 in which a black community brought 
a case against the Departmental Government of Valle de Cauca for failing to fulfil 
their right to participation in accordance with article 45 of Law 70. 
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to legitimise development activities within the multiculturalist framework, 
effectively reconciling its neo-liberal interests with its multicultural rights 
obligations. 
From a CRT perspective, the ethnic rights focus ‘de-racialises’ (Paschel 
2010) Afro-descendant rights. Law 70 contains only one mention of racism 
(article 33) and does not specify ‘any concrete proposal, sanctioning of 
racist acts, or clear policies’ to address racism (Paschel 2010). Therefore the 
framework effectively denies the role that structural racism plays in the human 
rights violations and exclusion of Afro-Colombians.
Conclusion: using international human rights to gain domestic 
recognition 
The consolidation of a rights framework for Afro-descendants in Colombia 
represents a significant advancement towards social justice, which would 
not have been possible without the tireless lobbying and activism by Afro-
descendant civil society. However, the social constructionist and CRT 
frameworks enable a critical analysis of the institutionalisation of these rights, 
demonstrating their limitations. The restriction to ‘ethnic rights’ meant Afro-
descendants would have to demonstrate they fit the category of an ‘ethnic 
group’ to be subjects of these rights. Further, de-racialising the rights effectively 
perpetuated the myth of racial democracy by denying the role that racism plays 
in the human rights violations of all Afro-Colombians, whether in the rural 
Pacific or other contexts.
Rights become institutionalised at the domestic level through a combination 
of State interests, pressure from social movements and the consolidation of 
frameworks at the international or regional levels. At the time of the adoption 
of the Colombian Constitution, there were no specific international or regional 
mechanisms on the rights of Afro-descendants. However, since the 2001 Third 
UN World Conference against Racism, a normative framework on the rights 
of Afro-descendant has begun to emerge.5 This has expanded Afro-descendant 
rights from focus on traditional ethnic groups with territorial and cultural 
5 This is contained in: several paragraphs in the World Conference outcome document, 
the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (Declaration paras. 13–14; 32–
35; and 103; and Programme of Action paras. 4–14); General Recommendation 
34 on racial discrimination against people of African descent of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD); specific mention in the 
Inter-American Convention against Racial Discrimination (preamble) as well as an 
increasing number of observations and recommendations from the CERD, the UN 
Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent and the Inter-American 
Commission´s Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons of African Descent and against 
Racial Discrimination.
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claims, to wider racial justice issues including racism in the media, racial 
profiling by security forces and structural discrimination. 
These norms, which were largely made possible due to the activism by Latin 
American Afro-descendant civil society (Htun 2004; Lennox 2009), have in 
turn opened up new spaces for claims for racial justice at the domestic level. 
In this new context, anti-racism has become an increasing part of rights claims 
by civil society and, in 2011, Colombia adopted Law 1482 against racism 
and discrimination. Social media in Colombia is now abuzz with discussions 
on racism, linking it to wider issues of socio-economic inequality, cultural 
identity, territory and autonomy. This growing discourse and awareness is 
essential for ensuring that Afro-descendant communities can access and use 
legal mechanisms to make claims both for their cultural rights as ethnic groups 
and for racial equality by denouncing structural and institutional racism.
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5Bringing human rights home: refugees, reparation, and the 
responsibility to protect
James Souter
Human rights, it is often observed, have become a common global language 
for making moral claims. One consequence of this is that there is a huge range 
of ways in which states, organisations and other actors draw on, invoke and 
mobilise human rights in different locations and contexts. The vast array of 
campaigns, treaties, laws and policies which fall under the umbrella of human 
rights means that human rights talk will be continually contested and, to 
some extent, fragmented, contradictory, and inconsistent. In Richard Wilson’s 
phrase, human rights discourse will remain strongly marked by ‘ideological 
promiscuity’ (Wilson 2006). Given that human rights talk and practice are 
partly shaped by power, these inconsistencies will inevitably, at least to some 
degree, reflect power relations and dominant interests within and across states. 
The existence of inconsistencies in some of the ways in which human 
rights are framed and put into practice has become more and more apparent 
to me in the years since I completed the MA in Understanding and Securing 
Human Rights in 2009. Liberal democratic states, such as the UK, profess their 
strong commitment to human rights principles. However, such states seem to 
tend towards the view that much of the business of human rights protection 
is something that should, or even can, only or mainly be provided beyond 
their borders. As Dan Bulley (2010, 43) has discussed, debates in such states 
often construct the ‘human’ in human rights as a subject which can ‘only be 
saved close to its territorially qualified home’, placing human rights squarely 
within the realm of foreign policy. When it comes to opening up the state to 
refugees, however, this commitment to human rights can come dangerously 
close to evaporating, given the range of measures used by Western states to 
prevent the arrival of asylum seekers and to limit the numbers of refugees they 
protect. This, it appears to me, is evident when we consider both efforts to 
achieve reparation and accountability for the harms suffered by refugees, and 
the ways in which states have framed the ‘responsibility to protect’ and sought 
to put it into practice. For the promise of human rights to be truly realised, I 
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will suggest, reparation for refugees and the responsibility to protect need to be 
fully ‘brought home’ to liberal democratic states and linked to the practice of 
granting asylum to refugees. 
Reparation and refugees
Reparation – whether in the form of restitution, compensation or satisfaction 
– is affirmed in international human rights treaties, and by the UN General 
Assembly, which adopted the Reparations Guidelines in 2005.1 Article 2 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), for instance, 
lays down a right to ‘an effective remedy’ for violations of the human rights 
therein. Refugees, fleeing as they often do from severe violations of human 
rights and being subjected to serious harm during perilous journeys, are clearly 
entitled to such reparation. However, where reparation has been linked to 
refugee protection in theory and practice, it has largely been in relation to 
refugees’ states of origin, and in the context of their repatriation (e.g. Bradley 
2013; Cantor 2011). This is partly appropriate, for many of the harms of 
displacement are perpetrated by refugees’ states of origin or by non-state actors 
within those states, and voluntary repatriation and reparations processes within 
these states – such as compensation, property restitution or truth-telling – can 
be the most fitting way of remedying the harms that refugees suffer.
It is a mistake, however, to assume that this is always the case. The static 
conception of protection as something that is possible only at, or near to, home 
has been reflected in what B.S. Chimni (1998, 360) has dubbed an ‘internalist’ 
approach to the causes of forced migration, which assumes that refugees’ states 
of origin are entirely or mainly responsible for refugees’ flight. Yet this internalist 
view ignores the clearly external causes of many contemporary cases of forced 
migration, whether as a result of military interventions, support for oppressive 
regimes, or the imposition of damaging economic policies. Interventions by 
Western states in Vietnam, Kosovo, Iraq and Libya in the past half-century, for 
instance, have produced huge numbers of refugees. 
Once these external causes of displacement are brought into view, it 
becomes much less clear why reparation is something that is owed only within 
refugees’ states of origin. As I have argued elsewhere, reparation for refugees is 
at times owed by states in the form of asylum (Souter 2014). When it comes 
to responsibilities towards refugees, the principle of reparation is often as 
applicable to refugees’ host states as it is to their states of origin. There is, 
however, little evidence that the implications of the principle of reparation for 
1 United Nations General Assembly (2005), Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right 
to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, UN Doc. A/RES/60/147 (21 
March 2006), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/
RES/60/147 (accessed 27 August 2015).
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asylum are recognised by states, save for a few isolated initiatives. In any case, 
these have tended to prioritise refugees who have assisted external states in their 
interventions, such as Iraqi and Afghan translators and interpreters who have 
worked for the US and UK, rather than offering asylum as reparation more 
broadly to those displaced by the receiving state’s own actions.
The responsibility to protect
While refugee protection has been an important part of the human rights 
culture that has developed since World War Two, humanitarian intervention 
has remained a more controversial means of potentially upholding human 
rights in grave humanitarian emergencies. Drawing on existing human rights 
and humanitarian law, states unanimously agreed at the UN General Assembly 
in 2005 that they bear a ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) populations from 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This is 
primarily a responsibility of states to protect their own citizens, but it also 
involves assisting other states to fulfil their R2P, as well as, in the language 
of the World Summit Outcome Document, taking ‘collective action, in 
a timely and decisive manner’ when states are ‘manifestly failing’ to protect 
their populations from these four crimes.2 This may, but need not necessarily, 
involve military intervention.
As with the matter of reparation for refugees, R2P is generally viewed in 
liberal democratic states primarily as a foreign policy issue. In other words, 
although R2P has its roots in the same human rights tradition as refugee 
protection and reparation, they are not generally viewed holistically. While the 
tendency to conflate R2P with military intervention to protect human rights 
has been dwindling in recent years, and a wider range of preventive activities 
– including, for instance, early-warning systems alerting states to impending 
atrocities – have been placed under the banner of R2P, it is nevertheless still 
predominantly viewed as something that ‘we’ do ‘over there’, in far-off states 
wracked by violence. 
Yet the implications of R2P for states’ asylum policies are not difficult to 
make out. When atrocities are imminent or are already being committed, a very 
frequent response by people at risk is to flee. R2P is meant to protect individuals 
at risk from these atrocities, and an obvious means of doing so is through offers 
of asylum (Barbour and Gorlick 2008; Welsh 2014). While there is a strong 
case for seeing asylum as a core element of R2P as a matter of course, making 
this linkage becomes even more important when the traditional understanding 
of R2P as humanitarian intervention is an obstacle to the delivery of effective 
2 United Nations General Assembly (2005), World Summit Outcome Document, 15 
September, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005), paras. 138 and 139, p. 30, 
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60–1–E.pdf (accessed 27 
August 2015).
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protection to those at risk. Military action is not only dangerous – risking as it 
does inflaming already volatile situations yet further and creating a fresh round 
of refugees who are owed reparation – but it is not always politically possible, 
given that it may be vetoed at the UN Security Council, or voted down in 
national parliaments, as we have seen in relation to the on-going crisis in Syria.
The international community’s inaction in the face of atrocities committed 
as part of the Syrian civil war since 2011 has led some commentators to point 
to the failure – or even untimely death – of R2P. Yet this view betrays an 
overly narrow understanding of what R2P is and entails. Only if R2P is solely 
a matter of foreign policy does the current impasse over the crisis in Syria 
signify R2P’s demise. In response to this deadlock, states can approach R2P 
creatively and make the obvious links with the alternative of asylum (Gilgan 
2015). Rather than leaving the responsibility to protect Syrian refugees to 
already overburdened neighbouring states, such as Turkey, European states can 
partly discharge their own R2P to many of those refugees who are now in any 
case seeking to enter Europe in large numbers.
Linking R2P with the principle of reparation can also potentially help 
to make some headway in making R2P’s vision a reality. When R2P falls on 
other states to step in when states are ‘manifestly failing’ to fulfil their primary 
responsibility to their citizens, the fact that R2P is seen by states as a general 
responsibility, that is shared equally among all states, creates a collective action 
problem. This view of R2P as a diffuse, shared responsibility allows each state 
to claim to uphold R2P while not seeing it as its specific role to take action in 
any given situation. Assigning a special responsibility to protect to a particular 
state or states on the basis of the principle of reparation when there is a case 
for doing so can help to overcome this problem, and to ensure that effective 
action is taken to protect those at risk from atrocities (see Pattison 2010; Tan 
2006). For instance, as I have recently argued in an article with Jason Ralph, 
given that the 2003 invasion of Iraq destroyed the Iraqi state and rendered 
Iraqis highly vulnerable to external shock, which then materialised in the form 
of Islamic State in 2014, it is reasonable to argue that the US and other states 
which took part in the invading coalition, such as the UK and Australia, bear a 
‘special responsibility to protect’ that is more demanding than a merely general 
responsibility shared with all states, and includes an obligation to offer asylum 
to a larger number of Iraqi refugees (Ralph and Souter 2015). 
Thinking ‘outside the box’
There is a broader point to be made here about how academics study human 
rights, and the role of political frameworks and policy categories in their 
research. Many scholars in human rights and refugee studies are motivated 
by a desire to alleviate suffering and injustice, and are concerned to ensure 
that their research has a positive impact on efforts to protect human rights, 
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by raising awareness or influencing policy. In order to gain policy relevance, 
understandably academics often speak in the language that politicians and 
policy-makers understand. In doing so, however, there is a danger that they 
replicate and reinforce artificial divisions between elements of human rights 
law, policy and practice, such as those concerning reparation, asylum and R2P 
that I have highlighted here, that are more reflective of states’ interests than the 
needs of those at risk or the situations in which they find themselves. There 
is a danger that the uncritical use of policy categories can distort research on 
human rights and refugees, and limit its progressive potential (see Bakewell 
2008; Turton 2003). Scholars, for instance, have largely left unchallenged the 
view that reparation for refugees is a matter for refugees’ states of origin, or the 
idea that R2P is solely or largely a foreign policy issue. The desire for policy 
relevance needs to be coupled with a critical approach to policy categories and 
frameworks. Only then can academics and researchers help to overcome the 
inconsistencies and blind spots that currently beset some of the current efforts 
to understand and promote human rights.
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6Human rights and the new(ish) digital paradigm
Gaia Marcus
To call the internet and its accompanied increase in computing capabilities a 
‘new’ phenomenon would be something of a misnomer – the internet has been 
in development since the 1960s, and became publically available in August 
1991. However, the globalisation of communications, associated erosion in 
state borders and dizzying acceleration of technological advancement over the 
past two decades have fundamentally changed the citizen-state relationship, 
introducing new actors, new platforms, new opportunities and new threats. 
Whilst it is beyond the scope of the chapter to define this new(ish) digital 
paradigm, several characteristics are highlighted. First, the weakening of the 
nation state both as a concept and as a geographical entity with borders that 
can be protected physically. Second, the ascendance of new global actors that 
dwarf nation states in budget, reach and technological know-how. Third, the 
creation of a globalised communications infrastructure (the internet!) that is 
multi-channel and subject to rapid flux. Fourth, the exponential increase in 
computing capabilities, which opens up new possibilities for data capture and 
analysis- from big data to social network analysis. As noted by Kaku ‘Today, 
your cell phone has more computer power than all of NASA back in 1969, 
when it placed two astronauts on the moon’ (2011, 21). This (thoroughly 
incomplete) chapter is intended to stimulate further thought and debate 
with regards to applying this new(ish) digital paradigm to our understanding 
of human rights and the ways in which human rights defenders implement 
programmes and hold states and other actors to account.
Digital human rights?
The concept of digital rights tends to encompass how the new(ish) digital 
paradigm adds new dimensions to existing rights, and this will be the focus of 
the following section. A separate area of enquiry (not touched upon here) is 
examining whether new rights are created by the new(ish) digitised paradigm 
in which we live. For example, what would a ‘right to the Internet’ look like? 
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There is precedent: internet access is now protected in certain legal systems 
(Lucchi 2011). Similarly, individuals’ right to access information ‘regardless 
of frontiers’ is currently a subset of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR). What might a ‘right to access information’ look like 
as a right in and of itself given the ‘massive blocking, throttling, and filtering of 
the internet’1 and the impact this has upon citizens?
Digital rights: some usual suspects
For Souter (2012) the articles most commonly understood by human rights 
professionals as being affected by the internet are articles 18, 19 and 20 of 
the UDHR – the rights to freedom of conscience, expression and association, 
respectively. 
In the positive, it is now easier to share and access information, with more 
and easier channels for disseminating information and views. The right to 
association can now also be a virtual right, with exchange happening across 
borders, using mediums ranging from text messaging to teleconferences. The 
current Syrian refugee crisis and the Mediterranean crisis have seen both 
refugees using Facebook forums to understand where it is safe to pass and 
where to go, and European citizens using Facebook, Twitter and other online 
forums to self-organise and respond.
1 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human 
rights, encryption and anonymity in a digital age (1 July 2015). Available at http://
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/HRencryptionanonymityinadigitalage.
aspx#sthash.FmDjxYec.dpuf (accessed 9 Oct. 2015). 
Figure 1. Example of state mandated blocking of the internet in Gujarat; screenshot of 
picture shared on Twitter taken by author, all identifying information has been removed. 
See BBC (2015).
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In the negative, an increased reliance on digital channels risks exacerbating 
the marginalisation of those without the digital or technical literacy to 
participate, or even the linguistics or literacy skills to navigate a mainly text-
based interface. For example, moves to shift online all job listings or voting 
systems, or access to state services such as health or pensions, greatly affect 
those who cannot (or do not wish to) use such platforms.
Online threats, offline impacts
New technologies are leading to new and increasingly more covert ways in 
which these rights can be curtailed. These include the blocking and intercepting 
of communications and channels (Figure 1), and can entail wholesale 
interception of all communications. While this is in theory possible with any 
remote method of communication – from intercepting post to scrambling 
radio signals – digital methods mean that far more can be done with far less 
man-power. 
Online threats to rights such as the freedom of expression can have far 
more serious offline repercussions to human rights defenders and citizens 
given the enhanced potential for surveillance and locating actors using digital 
methods. These, sometimes deadly, threats can come from both state and non-
state perpetrators. A recent case involved Mexican militia locating human 
rights defenders who were active online using both social media and offline 
pressure. The murder of the Mexican Valor por Tamaulipas journalist featured 
a particularly gruesome twist: her own social media accounts were used to 
announce and broadcast her murder (BBC 2014). Where states are involved, 
online surveillance can lead to mass state suppression, such as following the 
‘Arab Spring’ in Egypt (McPherson and Alexander 2014). The very threat to 
life and basic freedoms places new responsibilities on human rights defenders 
and other actors, as the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and 
expression, David Kaye, highlights:
We live in a world in which mass and targeted surveillance, digital 
attacks on individuals and civil society, harassment of members of 
vulnerable groups, and a wide variety of digital opinion and expression 
result in serious repercussions, including detention, physical attacks, 
and even killings.2 
Digital rights: some more unusual suspects 
New channels lead to new ways in which rights can be violated, some of which 
may not be obvious at first. For example, the rights to non-discrimination and 
to a free and fair participation in society are at risk. Further, data protection 
and the right to privacy and private life are ever more at risk from excessive 
2 Ibid.
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state surveillance and a largely unchecked global data-farming industry 
that is far more advanced in its science than most national governments 
(Venkataramanan 2015).
A tyranny of algorithms?
An overlooked, but potentially fertile line of inquiry would be the way in 
which the internet affects the right to non-discrimination: enter the algorithm.
Almost everything that you see on a responsive website – a website where 
content is not static, but tailored to the user – is a result of an increasingly 
complex set of algorithms. They tend to be geared towards efficiency, which 
often means revenue. This is why sites such as Amazon recommend new 
purchases or books to you, and explains why you are followed around the 
internet by adverts displaying products you have recently viewed. It affects 
your search results, the news you see, your experience of social media and much 
more.
A recent Google scandal highlighted what this means in practice. Datta, 
Tschantz and Datta (2014) found that men were shown adverts that advertised 
roles with large salaries more frequently than women. It is unclear from the 
research ‘where’ the gender based discrimination ‘occurred’, whether within 
the advertiser preferences themselves or within the way in which internet users 
were selected by Google to view the adverts. What the case did highlight, 
however, is the way in which algorithms can tend towards re-trenching existing 
inequalities and associated discrimination. In this case there was a retrenchment 
of societal trends leading to men being more highly paid than women, but the 
basic mechanics are applicable to any bias that has its basis in social structures. 
Recent cases have highlighted how online targeting and interactions – 
driven again by algorithms – can have offline repercussions. Facebook, for 
example, is able to increase voting in a geographical area through increasing 
the visibility of others having voted. Whilst an experiment that increases voting 
may seem like no bad thing, imagine the consequence to our right to free and 
fair elections if this targeting only happened in areas where a certain political 
party was particularly strong. There should be more attention paid to what we 
see on the internet, and the decision making processes or algorithms behind it. 
Nothing we see online is ‘neutral’ and more scrutiny needs to be placed on the 
human rights implications of that. 
Too boring to fight for?
The technicality of the debate can be a key barrier to human rights activists 
and scholars truly engaging with the new(ish) digital paradigm. Concepts such 
as ‘net neutrality’ – the idea that it should not be possible to make it easier or 
cheaper to access certain parts of the internet – have key repercussions on our 
ability to use the internet for free expression and association. For example, the 
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European Commission (2015) currently highlights the way in which service 
providers slow down (or ‘throttle’) service on free Voice over Internet services, 
e.g. Skype, pushing traffic to paid for services. The way in which service 
providers or states (e.g. see Figure 1) are able to control platforms that are 
used by citizens for association and communication is clearly worthy of further 
analysis.
The right to privacy, contained within Article 12 of the UDHR, is 
another field of study that is currently limited to more technologically literate 
commentators and campaigners (Bélanger and Crossler 2011), or those 
specialising in information law and related disciplines. However, this could be 
an interesting area for further research, especially by researchers approaching 
it from a more conceptual angle. Indeed, the right to privacy is now a key area 
where balancing competing rights and principles such as proportionality come 
to the fore. 
Civil society groups such as the UK ‘Open Rights Group’ or ‘European 
Digital Rights’ will focus on the ways in which online surveillance curtails rights. 
However, some element of state surveillance of communications could now be 
seen as being a fundamental component of states preserving fundamental rights 
and public order. What might the correct approach be towards derogating from 
certain rights? How have these played out in different regimes? Further analysis 
could shed interesting light: why do some states take a permissive line such as 
Germany’s, and others a state surveillance heavy line such as the UK? Indeed, 
while the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled against the legality of 
‘the state [collecting] computerised data about a section of the population […] 
in order to identify potential subjects for surveillance’ in 2006 (Youngs 2008, 
331), the UK’s position has led the UN Human Rights Committee to recently 
recommend that the UK ‘should review its counter-terrorism legislation in order 
to bring it into line with its obligations under the Covenant.’3 
Acting and holding actors to account
The new(ish) digital paradigm affords human rights defenders and scholars 
with new ways to hold duty bearers to account and fight for the completion of 
rights. These can range from the methods used to evaluate whether rights are 
being infringed, and how, to new awareness raising mechanisms; for example, 
using websites such as http://www.eyesondarfur.org, or the current trend for 
petitions and associated ‘clicktivism’, or using very widespread web tools such 
as Facebook to respond to humanitarian crises. 
3 United Nations Human Rights Committee (2015). Concluding observations on the 
seventh periodic report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
(advance unedited version) (Geneva: United Nations), available at http://www.
equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/uploads/Pdfs/CCPR_C_GBR_CO_7.
pdf (accessed 9 Oct. 2015).
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Using quantitative data analysis to hold states to account
The statistical analysis of large datasets can offer insight as to the fulfilment of 
rights at a local, regional, national and international level. For example, the 
Centrepoint Youth Homelessness Databank project is creating an open data 
source for the UK about youth homelessness. The aspiration is to collect all 
available data on youth homelessness, open the data up using an interactive 
website, and perform analyses using it. This will allow insight into how rights 
to housing are being fulfilled, and if there are any specific demographic groups 
who are most affected by homelessness. 
Compiling and aggregating data is a useful way of contrasting official 
statistics and rhetoric, and trying to delve into the problem at hand. A little 
data can go a long way. With incomplete data, collected through a Freedom of 
Information request, the databank showed that eight times more young people 
ask the state for help in England and Wales than those who are officially being 
supported with housing by the state – this is equivalent to 136,000 young 
people seeking support and only 16,000 accessing their full legal entitlement to 
housing. This suggests that a significant majority of young people at risk of or 
experiencing homelessness in England and Wales are not adequately accessing 
their ‘right to a standard of living adequate for [their] health and well-being’, 
as per Article 25 of the UDHR.
Using network analysis to understand power structures?
Network analysis is a way of identifying actors and analysing the ties between 
them: kinship, friendship, reporting relationships, money flows and so on. 
Skye Bender-deMoll (2008) provides an excellent overview of the types of 
relationship that can be studied and some network basics. The RSA (Royal 
Society of Arts) has carried out extensive work on using network analysis to 
understand marginalised communities, identifying key actors and then working 
with them to plan local interventions (Rowson et al. 2010; Marcus 2011).
As a tool, network analysis allows the researcher to shed light on some 
of the key tenets of the human rights based approach: understanding 
underlying power structures; highlighting who the most disenfranchised are; 
and schematising how the intervention will affect social and other structures. 
Further, when analysing human rights violations, it is critical to understand the 
relationship between various actors and the networks of command or control 
that underpinned them. 
Whilst network analysis is a burgeoning field in its own right, it can often 
feel daunting and time consuming to the newcomer. New tools that use tablet 
computers to store, code and analyse the data, even without internet access 
are becoming more viable. Any human rights scholar interested in pursuing 
this further should look into two open-source projects currently looking 
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for collaborators: Rand Corporations ‘EgoWeb’ project or the University of 
Kentucky’s ‘OpenEddi’ project.
Crowd-sourcing data and social media research
The ability to crowd-source a large amount of data, rapidly, can lead to better 
project planning, implementation, evaluation and monitoring. Live data can 
be used to understand where problems are worse, to track ongoing progress 
and to evaluate change over time. Sourcing data from social media can be used 
to hold duty bearers to account, for example, mapping human rights violations 
or humanitarian crises.
The Ushaidi project, for example, was initially deployed in Kenya in 2008 
to map reports of post-election violence that were compiled from individual 
text messages and verified. The Peta Jakarta project, whilst using a similar 
method of collecting, verifying and mapping citizen reports (this time through 
Twitter), is used by Jakartan authorities and citizens alike to map flooding and 
make decisions on resource allocation and disaster responses based on real-time 
data.
Whilst the potential for using big data sources such as social media is 
clear, the ethics of using social media data are far murkier (McPherson and 
Alexander 2014). What does informed consent look like? How far can we trust 
the data – verifying reports is complicated, costly and sometimes inconclusive? 
Is it justifiable to collate and keep data without specific consent from the data 
subjects? 
More starkly, what do we do with the data we are collecting: might we 
be putting people at risk through poor encryption or anonymisation (see 
McPherson 2014, and the Human Rights in the Digital Age project)?4 This 
problem is at all levels: as highlighted by the UN Special Rapporteur on 
freedom of opinion and expression, there is currently no safe way of individuals 
contacting the UN to report violations.5 Human rights institutions do need to 
play technological catch-up to retain their relevance. 
Human first, digital second
This chapter has provided an incomplete overview of questions and challenges 
when applying our new(ish) digital paradigm to the international human 
rights regime. It has been squarely based on my own expertise and context, 
without seeking to look at the bleeding edge or darker corners of technology: 
4 Centre for Governance and Human Rights, Human Rights in the Digital Age, 
available at http://www.cghr.polis.cam.ac.uk/research-themes/human-rights-in-
the-digital-age-1 (accessed 8 Oct. 2015).
5 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/29/32 (22 May 2015).
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block chain technology, artificial intelligence, semantic or natural language 
processing, drones, the dark web, and others. 
I have suggested some avenues for investigating digital rights, and new 
methods that can be used to both analyse the fulfilment of human rights and 
to hold rights bearers to account. This is a field in constant flux, and a field 
that sorely needs more scrutiny from those interested in the human first, digital 
second. Please do join us!
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7Theories of change for human rights and for development1
Paul Gready
Few human rights agencies work with an explicit theory of change. It is much 
more common for agencies to have an implicit, partially formed theory of 
change. Eyben et al. (2008, 202–3) place an ‘archetypes framework’ in this 
category – change is implicitly thought to come about through some taken-
for-granted conventional wisdom (enlightened elites, new laws, people in 
the streets, a good example, a shock to the system, etc.). The objective of this 
chapter is to explore what might be gained by bringing these implicit, partially 
formed theories of change to light within human rights practice. 
A theory of change sets out ‘underlying assumptions about the relationships 
between desired outcomes and the way proposed interventions are expected 
to bring them about’ (Aragón and Macedo 2010, 89, italics in the original). 
Developing a theory of change can be perceived as producing an output that 
describes how activities lead to outcomes, or as a process with an emphasis 
on conceptual thinking and on-going reflection or learning designed to 
articulate and interrogate the relationship between activities and outcomes. 
A good theory of change provides a specific and measurable description of a 
social change initiative that forms the basis for strategic planning, decision-
making, evaluation and on-going processes of learning. It is important to 
note that theories of change can apply to a specific project or programme, 
an organisation’s approach or philosophy, a wider collaborative campaign or 
policy initiative, and the impacts of an entire field such as transitional justice or 
humanitarian assistance. ‘Systemic’ theories of change are underpinned by the 
idea that ‘there ought to be a systemic relationship between our understanding 
of the conditions that are needed for social change to be able to emerge in 
a given context, and the ‘internal,’ organisational conditions that might best 
allow us to support that change’ (Aragón and Macedo 2010, 91). The breadth 
of understandings of theories of change in development, where such theories 
1 This chapter draws on the following publications: Gready and Vandenhole (eds.) 
(2014) and Vandenhole and Gready (2014).
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are well advanced, range from perceiving them as a highly technical planning 
tool linked to a donor-driven ‘results agenda’ – for example, an extension of the 
assumptions made in a logframe– to a participatory and politicised approach to 
understanding how particular actions impact on sets of power relations to yield 
impacts. As such, theories of change are understood in very different ways, and 
play various roles in practice.
This chapter compares human rights and development theories of change 
for a number of reasons. As noted above, theories of change in development are 
more advanced, originating in the literature on monitoring and evaluation. In 
human rights practice, theories of change are virtually non-existent. Will human 
rights feel the need to articulate theories of change? If so, will organisations 
simply borrow from neighbours such as development organisations or generate 
their own theories of change? Whatever transferable lessons there may be 
one would also expect differences between the two fields to be reflected in 
their theories of change, despite recent convergence brought about by more 
serious work on economic and social rights, human rights-based approaches to 
development, etc. Development work is essentially evidence based, for example 
moving forward from concrete problems and dilemmas, whereas human rights 
activism is more usually governed by laws and norms (as such human rights 
practice often starts from laws and works backwards). Development actors 
frequently work in partnership with governments, and in some cases will work 
with governments which human rights agencies regard as oppressive. Such 
differences will surely inform theories of change. In sum, development work 
has traditionally been more evidence based, preventive, pragmatic, and non-
confrontational, while human rights work is still norm-based, principle-led, 
and more reactive and adversarial.
Five entry-points to theories of change are addressed in this chapter: 1) The 
state. 2) The law. 3) Transnational and international collaboration. 4) Localism 
and bottom-up approaches. 5) Complicated and complex methods.
Three important issues will be highlighted in this discussion about the 
state and theories of change. 1) The responsibilities of the state with regard 
to change. 2) Optimal relations between various actors – other states, inter-
governmental organisations (IGOs), NGOs, etc. – and a given state. 3) Links 
between roles and relationships, and how changing relationships can modify 
roles. With regard to the state, three key tensions between development 
and human rights theories of change can be identified. The first is whether 
there is a development-human rights trade off, especially at the early stages 
of development. This tension relates to the classic debate about whether a 
state should sacrifice civil and political rights at the early stages of economic 
development. Second, while human rights organisations often have an 
adversarial relationship with governments, development actors, in part because 
they are much more dependent on governments as donors and in part because 
of the less politically contentious nature of their work, more usually work in 
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partnership with governments. Finally, the neo-liberal era of the shrinking, or 
‘hollowed out’, state, raises the question of what role should NGOs play in 
service delivery. For example, should NGOs only deliver services when also 
building the capacity of the state to assume its responsibilities?
There are basically two views on the role of law in contributing to social 
change. One view is that the law leads, i.e. it may trigger, facilitate or speed 
up change; a second view is that the law follows change, i.e. it legally codifies 
and thus consolidates the change that has taken place. Under the former view 
the law is considered proactive, under the latter reactive. While it may be 
premature to draw any firm conclusions, it is clear that human rights law, 
more than any other branch of the law, can be seen as a potential lever for 
change. That potential has been explored in particular in strategic litigation. 
Empirically, it has become clear that the effectiveness of litigation in bringing 
about change needs to be contextualised, qualified and linked to broader policy 
provisions. Only when certain conditions are met, may human rights litigation 
have the direct and indirect impacts looked for.
Two main models for transnational and international cooperation are 
dominant, each with its own theory of change: 1) North-South partnerships, 
which continue to characterise much development work. 2) Transnational 
advocacy networks, which are an important point of reference in the human 
rights literature. The latter literature relates to theories of change in that it 
seeks to understand changes in state compliance with international norms, 
and suggest processes or pathways through which actors such as NGOs and 
IGOs can help facilitate this goal. By identifying methods beyond the purely 
adversarial, the transnational advocacy literature helps to build bridges between 
human rights and related fields such as development. In contrast the North-
South partnership theory of change takes neither the state nor international 
norms as its point of departure, but rather tries to empower and build the 
capacity of local actors in the belief that this will enable change to be locally 
owned, legitimate and sustainable.
If transnational and international collaboration can be critiqued for being 
a top-down theory of change, more locally driven, bottom-up alternatives do 
exist. The main development modalities that focus on local context, power and 
politics prioritise participation, empowerment and citizenship, while an actor-
oriented perspective serves a similar function within human rights. Perhaps 
the main area of tension between development and human rights in this 
context is the relative priority to be given to process versus outcomes criteria. 
Localism and bottom-up approaches champion not just a particular direction 
of change but also particular ways of working, which may take precedence 
over pre-conceived outcomes (such as the contents of national legislation or 
international treaties). As such, organisations and communities may define, 
prioritise, and champion rights that are not legally recognised.
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Much of the above discussion indicates the importance of complicated and 
complex methods in both development and human rights. Such methods are 
in part a function of history – and history depositing a layered archaeology from 
past political eras, priorities and cycles of donor funding. But such an approach 
is also an active choice in the present, and a statement that complex problems 
require complex interventions and solutions i.e. a rejection of simplistic linear, 
cause and effect, theories of change. Rogers (2008) makes a useful distinction 
between complicated and complex interventions. Complicated interventions 
have lots of parts (multiple components, multiple agencies, multiple causal 
strands). Complex interventions have uncertain and emergent outcomes 
(multidirectional causal relationships, ‘tipping points’, intractable problems). 
Using complicated and complex approaches has implications for the skills 
required to undertake development and human rights work and the strategies 
employed, but also raises difficult questions about prioritisation, sequencing, 
the relationship between different kinds of intervention, and appropriate 
divisions of labour between various actors or professional sectors.
Both development and human rights are characterised by diverse theories of 
change, and intersections between the two fields are adding to the complexity. 
The five entry-points to theories of change outlined above are not mutually 
exclusive – local struggles against oppression can resonate though transnational 
and international networks, for example – and indeed may be more powerful 
in combination, but neither can they all be embraced without contradiction. 
Some are focused and narrowly construed, others are more ambitious and 
wide-ranging. The entry-points raise questions about appropriate divisions of 
labour and relationships between the state and other actors; the role of law in 
bringing about broad-based social and policy change; the formation of optimal 
change alliances and networks; choices to be made with regard to top-down 
versus bottom-up as well as process- versus outcome-led approaches; and how 
organisations and sectors should prepare for a complicated and complex world. 
Despite their differences, theories of change in human rights and development 
will focus on broadly similar challenges: who to work with, how to legitimise 
the activities undertaken, the level of ambition, how to prioritise, etc. It is also 
clear that the overlaps between human rights and development are growing 
– raising a broader meta-question relating to the desirability of the growing 
overlap in philosophy and methodology in the social justice sector (often driven 
by human rights), and its implications for organisational identity and practice. 
To conclude, this chapter argues that there are gains to be achieved by 
making implicit, partially formed theories of change in human rights work 
more explicit. By providing a roadmap to change, theories of change serve 
various goals: showing a causal pathway by specifying what is needed for goals 
to be achieved; articulating underlying assumptions which can be tested and 
measured; telling a story about how change happens that can be developed with 
and articulated to others; changing the way of thinking about an intervention 
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from a focus on what is being done to the change that is sought; and facilitating 
cycles of learning. There is one main caveat to this argument: the value and 
contribution of theories of change will depend on how they are embraced and 
made explicit. Theories of change may shift human rights in the direction of top 
down, donor driven, technical, quantifiable objectives or they could prioritise 
bottom up approaches, context and local constituencies, challenges to power, 
and qualitative measures of change. For the latter to occur, human rights will 
need to not just embrace theories of change but also to transform them.
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8Shifting sands: a paradigm change in the development 
discourse on women’s human rights and empowerment 
Catherine Klirodotakou
International human rights declarations, conventions and protocols such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), are 
universally recognised as constituting the basis for demanding and achieving 
gender equality. They ‘set a vision of a world where there is justice’ (Cornwall 
2015) and today it is widely acknowledged that the normative approach to 
development should be rights based, even if it’s not the norm in practice. 
This discord is particularly evident in the women’s rights development 
discourse. Securing women’s empowerment has increasingly been dominating 
the international development agenda, but many consider the model being 
disseminated as de-radicalised, removed from its feminist activist roots and 
pursuing an apolitical ideology (Cornwall and Molyneux 2006). This in turn 
promotes and supports a very narrow definition of empowerment; one that 
does not seek wholesale substantive and transformative change for women and 
society, but seems to be content to work within and even embrace the existing 
socio-economic framework.
A blueprint for securing rights and empowerment
2015 marks the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the Beijing Declaration 
and Platform for Action (BPfA). It was and remains a bold and progressive 
blueprint, drafted and agreed by 189 governments, to advance women’s rights 
and empowerment globally. It ushered in an era of important global pacts 
such as the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), which 
recognised the impact of conflict on women, and their central role in building 
peace. However, despite this progress, the world has changed significantly 
since the adoption of the BPfA; conflict, extremism, climate change, natural 
disasters and the global financial crisis, to name but a few, have all contributed 
to a climate in which there are growing attempts to water down previously 
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agreed international obligations and commitments. Perversely, this threat 
comes at a time when women’s empowerment has never been more popular 
with governments, donors and civil society organisations alike. The prevailing 
rhetoric is that women’s human rights, women’s empowerment and gender 
equality are central to the international development agenda. 
New actors but a shrinking space
Women – and girls in particular – seem to be the panacea to all our development 
woes. Get more women into the workplace and your economy will be thriving; 
educate girls and the whole community prospers; turn women into politicians 
and peace and security will prevail. One would consider this a victory: women’s 
rights are finally on the agenda like never before, but there is something not 
quite right with this picture. We are witnessing an era where the agents of 
this change are not women themselves and women’s rights organisations, but 
increasingly mainstream international development agencies and multilateral 
and bilateral development institutions. The women’s rights movement – which 
was key to raising consciousness and building momentum for gender equality 
in the past – is not driving this process. Many may consider that this is how 
it should be: women’s human rights and gender equality should not be the 
domain of the few but be embraced, supported and mainstreamed. But this 
mainstreaming of the women’s human rights and gender equality is going 
hand in hand with a fundamental shift in what is considered and practiced as 
empowerment; both as a goal in itself and as a process. 
Critics of this agenda view efforts to secure women’s human rights and 
empower women as increasingly being co-opted into an instrumentalist, 
apolitical, results-based, cause and effect paradigm. In short, securing women’s 
rights becomes a means to tackle poverty under a neoliberal economic model. 
In this scenario violence and discrimination against women become bitesize 
tangible dilemmas, which are compartmentalised and tackled in time-bound 
projects. Andrea Cornwall (2007) has coined this type of piecemeal approach 
to development as empowerment lite – the focus is on numbers, alleviating the 
symptoms of poverty and oppression, but not addressing the power imbalance 
nor contributing to any meaningful transformative empowerment for women. A 
form of empowerment lite in action can be seen in the Millennium Development 
Goal 3 (MDG3),1 which focussed on a narrow definition of empowerment; one 
based on education, employment and political participation and did little to 
1 The Millennium Development Goals are the eight international development goals 
to be achieved by 2015, that were established following the Millennium Summit 
of the United Nations in 2000, following the adoption of the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration. MDG3 is to ‘promote gender equality and empower 
women’.
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consider the multi-dimensional aspect of inequality, how to address patriarchy, 
or pursue transformative forms of women’s agency (Kabeer 2005).
Challenging patriarchy, transforming societies
Reclaiming the discourse on empowerment as a way to challenge patriarchy, 
transform the structures and institutions that reinforce and perpetuate 
discrimination and inequality, and enable women to gain access to, and control 
of, resources (Batliwala 1994) is one of the biggest challenges we face as women’s 
rights activists and practitioners. Having frameworks to call States and other 
duty bearers to account is an important platform that underpins the work of 
women’s rights organisations. The lack of commitment towards substantive 
progress on achieving women’s human rights, however, is impeding efforts in 
securing long-term transformational changes in the lives of women and girls. 
The increasing instrumentalist focus on women as a means to an end and the 
overwhelming focus to articulate poverty and inequality as one-dimensional 
cause and effect, reflects a de-politicisation of women’s empowerment and 
gender equality. Increasingly women’s rights organisations are facing the 
dilemma of either adapting to this paradigmatic shift or potentially facing 
extinction. 
The de-politicisation of securing women’s rights 
In this context it has become increasingly hard to articulate women’s inequality 
and discrimination as manifestations of power over access to and control of 
resources. Legal reform alone is not enough to tackle social norms, attitudes 
and practices that perpetuate women’s subordination; projects that do not take a 
holistic approach to addressing violence, discrimination and inequality cannot 
bring about substantive changes in securing women’s rights. For instance, 
women’s rights organisations in Ghana such as the Gender Studies and Human 
Rights Documentation Centre and Women in Law and Development in Africa, 
recognise that quotas alone will not get more women into politics, and that 
there is a need to work at different levels from the personal to the international. 
Their approach looks at creating women only or safe spaces for women, to 
gain confidence, skills and knowledge, before they even start to consider taking 
on leadership positions. Simultaneously they recognise the need to create an 
enabling environment which accepts and supports women’s participation 
and they do that by engaging with different actors such as traditional leaders, 
community members, local authorities, the media and politicians. What 
these organisations inherently understand is that unless they tackle structural 
inequality and focus on women’s voice and agency, then any gains will be short 
lived and will not contribute to a transformation of society. 
A recent study has reaffirmed the catalytic role that women’s rights 
organisations play in such interventions. The four-decade research programme 
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which looked at 70 countries found that the mobilisation of women’s 
organisations and movements is more important for combating violence 
against women than the wealth of nations, left-wing political parties, or the 
number of women politicians (Htun and Weldon 2012). Yet despite such 
evidence there are numerous examples of the disparity between rhetoric and 
practice. In Sierra Leone a local women’s rights organisation lost vital funding 
from an international NGO when they chose to support a mainstream civil 
society organisation instead, to deliver work on addressing violence against 
women and girls (VAWG). Two years later that same INGO, which considers 
women’s rights one of its main areas of work, profiled their ex-partner in a 
report about the increasing marginalisation of women’s rights organisations. 
One Zimbabwean women’s rights organisation – recognised internationally 
for its efforts to address women’s civil and political participation – described 
how they are increasingly being forced into carrying out work that takes a 
power and even gender neutral approach to tackling women’s exclusion. They 
see the personal transformation element of their approach as key, but donors 
seem not to. Building a strong sense of self and agency in women appears not 
to be easily measurable and not immediately clear as to how it contributes to 
good governance. Instead their work has to be framed in demanding provision 
of basic social services and livelihood skills development. The rhetoric appears 
to be apolitical; poverty and exclusion are presented as a product of women not 
being economically empowered, thus all women need is access to resources and 
the rest will follow – seemingly a win-win for development and for women. 
But we need to be questioning whether these are mutually reinforcing. Despite 
evidence pointing to the need to collectively address empowerment, equality 
and rights, there are numerous examples of empowerment initiatives that 
circumvent the other two. Take Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) 
programmes for instance: in recent years they have been increasingly presented 
as a means to reduce VAWG. Resources are being poured into this type of 
work, despite evidence pointing to the fact that there is no tangible reduction 
in VAWG (Fulu, Kerr-Wilson, and Lang 2014). 
2015 and beyond
In the Sustainable Development Goals, which will replace the MDGs in 
2016, we have an opportunity to try to redress the situation and bring power 
back into empowerment work. A strong commitment to human rights is 
key but within a framework that seeks transformation and is robust enough 
to address the deep rooted and persistent structural gender inequalities that 
exist. Women’s rights organisations need to be in the driving seat and the 
development agenda must meet the actual needs and concerns of women at 
the local level. It has to recognise that in today’s globalised world there are new 
actors, such as transnational corporations, financial institutions and private 
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foundations, that we need to be demanding accountability from and it has to 
foster women’s collective action to monitor and remedy the shifting sands of 
the rights and development discourse. This means reclaiming Batliwala’s (1994) 
notion of empowerment of challenging patriarchy, transforming structures and 
institutions and enabling women to gain access to, and control of, resources.
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9The role of human rights in diversity management and 
conflict prevention1
Sally Holt
Diversity along ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic lines exists as a matter 
of fact within all our societies as a result of migration of people across political 
boundaries or the changing of those boundaries themselves. Such cultural 
diversity2 is not a new phenomenon. This chapter argues that States should 
take active steps to effectively manage the diversity within their jurisdiction 
and sets out a ‘human rights-informed’ approach for doing so. It examines 
the different roles that international human rights law (IHRL) can play in 
managing diversity, while also acknowledging its limitations. It aims to show 
how the approach complements and builds on rights-based approaches by 
acknowledging the relevance and potential of other normative frameworks 
and principles in addition to those of human rights in processes of diversity 
management.
The argument for diversity management
Regardless of the level of a country’s development, the nature of its political 
system or whether it is essentially peaceful or on the brink of (or in the midst of ) 
violent conflict, diversity requires proactive management in policy, legislation 
and practice for both principled and pragmatic reasons. In democratic societies 
founded on majority rule, the culture of the majority (or otherwise dominant 
group) tends to enjoy privileged status within the State whether due to formal/
1 This chapter draws on the following sources: S. Holt and Z. Machnyikova (2013) 
‘Culture for Shared Societies’, in M. Fitzduff (ed.), Public Policies in Shared Societies: 
A Comparative Approach (New York: Palgrave), pp. 167–214; and S. Holt ‘Managing 
Diversity: Culture’, Conflict Prevention Handbook Series, No. 7, Initiative on Quiet 
Diplomacy, forthcoming 2015.
2 The term ‘cultural diversity’ is used here to denote the existence within a population 
of people from a variety or multiformity of ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic 
backgrounds. 
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legal status or simply as matter of fact. Those in a non-dominant position are left 
at a disadvantage. Minority groups may be (or feel) marginalised, discriminated 
against or otherwise face challenges and obstacles relating both to aspects of 
maintaining, developing, expressing and transmitting their distinct cultural 
identities in public and private, and with regard to their full participation in 
the political, social and economic life of the State. In this regard, barriers to 
accessing public services and other resources or opportunities on an equitable 
basis are common.
Unequal societies that leave some groups marginalised and alienated are 
not only unjustifiable from a rights perspective, they are also inefficient and 
damaging for society as a whole because they exclude the talents, resources and 
beneficial contributions of significant sections of the population. Inequality also 
potentially creates resentments and tensions, both in terms of communities’ 
relationships with State authorities and/or between different groups within 
society. Manifestations of frustration by the excluded can provoke or increase 
chauvinism and hostility from the wider society, which may in turn exacerbate 
divisions and tensions and, in some cases, escalate into violence. Diversity is by 
no means inevitably a source of conflict, but such tensions are easily exploited 
for political ends, with fears or prejudices amongst different groups whipped 
up by those intent on engendering conflict for their own gain. In many cases 
cultural identity has a role in violent conflict, not as a root cause, but as a driver 
for political mobilisation to wrest or maintain a hold on power. Once violence 
has started more grievances accrue on both sides and the conflict may continue 
even after initial grievances have been remedied. It is therefore essential to 
address contentious issues before tensions erupt into violence. It is noteworthy 
that the absence of overt tensions or violent conflict does not necessarily signal 
successful management of cultural diversity. A pattern of peaceful enforced 
domination of one group by another is particularly prone to breakdown.
Obstacles and challenges 
Despite increasing recognition of cultural diversity as a feature of all societies, 
in many countries acceptance of this fact has yet to translate into concrete 
policies and practices that effectively accommodate diversity. The first step 
to effective policy lies in official recognition of the existence of diversity and 
of the rights, interests and aspirations of different groups. In practice, many 
States seek to restrict the enjoyment of universal human rights, and particularly 
minority rights, to selected communities. Even where official recognition is 
in place, the implementation of effective policies can be impeded by a lack of 
political will related to common reasons for resistance to change, including: 
failure to understand the need for or the potential benefits of change; fear of 
the unknown; adherence to beliefs and misconceptions about the threat to 
society posed by diversity; and pressure from the media and popular opinion 
based on similar fears and misconceptions. 
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Another major challenge, particularly in States transitioning from 
authoritarian regimes, is simply the lack of knowledge or experience of the 
frameworks, mechanisms and options available for successful diversity 
management. In the experience of the OSCE High Commissioner on 
National Minorities (HCNM) (a regional mechanism dedicated to resolving 
minority-related tensions within and between States) policy and law-makers 
in newly independent States of the former Soviet Union and across Central 
and Eastern Europe were often quite open to receiving specific guidance to 
help them develop effective responses to diversity-related tensions within their 
jurisdictions in line with their international commitments.3
A human rights-informed approach4
A human rights-informed approach recognises that, while societies and situations 
may differ, precluding universal policy prescriptions or ‘recipes’, lessons can 
nevertheless be drawn from an examination of the comparative practice of States 
in implementing their obligations under IHRL and building peaceful cohesive 
societies. Examples of ‘effective practice’ (i.e. generally or specifically successful 
practices proven to work in real situations) include: constitutional guarantees 
of human rights, including minority rights; devolution or other territorial 
arrangements for self-governance; equitable State investment, expenditure and 
resource allocation; positive measures, including affirmative action policies, as 
well as special measures to support and promote various different cultures; and 
policies and measures aimed at improving relations between different cultural 
communities. Lessons can also be gleaned from examples of bad or ‘ineffective’ 
practice, including the unintended consequences of exclusionary or ‘culturally 
blind’ laws and policies. 
Given the diversity of practice between (and sometimes within) States, 
IHRL can provide a useful framework for understanding and managing 
diversity and for preventing violent conflict in several ways:
3 The HCNM provides tailored guidance to individual States. The office has also 
overseen the development of a series of thematic recommendations and guidelines 
on recurrent issues arising in the course of the HCNM’s engagement, including 
matters of language, education, effective participation in public life, policing and 
inter-State relations. The full set of thematic recommendations is available at 
OSCE, Thematic Recommendations and Guidelines, available at http://www.osce.
org/hcnm/66209 (accessed 18 Sept. 2015).
4 The ‘human-rights informed approach’ was initially conceived and implemented 
in practice under the first OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, 
Max van der Stoel. It was further developed and promoted in other regions of the 
world by the Initiative on Quiet Diplomacy (http://www.iqdiplomacy.org/) under 
the leadership of Prof. John Packer, former Director of the Office of the OSCE 
HCNM. 
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1. In the identification of human rights violations that underlie tensions 
and conflict. Crucially, IHRL prohibits discrimination based on race, 
religion, language or ethnicity, among other grounds, and it confers 
specific rights on persons belonging to minorities and indigenous 
peoples who are often disadvantaged by virtue of their cultural 
identity. Where discrimination, exclusion, or marginalisation of 
certain communities or groups is a source of grievance against the 
State and of inter-community tensions it is essential that policy-
makers are able to identify and effectively address sources of injustice, 
including all forms of discrimination where they exist.5 
2. As a source of leverage for both international and national actors 
(including those whose rights have been violated) in holding States 
to account for failing to live up to their obligations under IHRL and 
pressing for measures that will prevent or mitigate conflict. These may 
relate to the need for effective remedy for individual violations, as 
well as structural changes to legislation, policy and practice to prevent 
recurrence of such violations in future.
3. As a principled framework for analysing situations and developing 
appropriate responses. IHRL provides a set of underlying principles 
to be adhered to. Key in this regard are the principles of non-
discrimination and equality, and of participation. Non-discrimination 
and equality includes States’ obligations to take ‘special measures’ to 
address past discrimination (often referred to as ‘affirmative action’) 
and to ensure equality in fact for members of communities who are 
in a (permanently) disadvantaged position by virtue of their group 
identity. Principles of participation including the management 
of one’s own or the group’s cultural affairs are also fundamental to 
diversity management. This implies a degree of self-governance that 
can be realised through various arrangements for the community 
concerned. At the same time, ensuring equal opportunities for 
effective participation in all relevant decision-making processes of 
the State is essential in building peaceful cohesive societies in which 
everyone has a stake. To this end, measures for the recognition, 
protection and promotion of distinct cultural identities must be 
complemented by measures for the inclusion of communities within 
society as a whole, including via political and economic opportunities 
and social relations. The promotion of mutual respect, understanding 
and tolerance between communities, particularly in the fields of 
culture, education and the media — as enshrined in human rights 
(including minority rights) standards — are also essential to this 
process. 
5 For detailed guidance on identifying and addressing discrimination see Hollo (2011).
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In addition to setting out a broad principled framework, IHRL provides 
guidance in determining what is possible and permissible when developing 
policy, legal and institutional approaches to diversity management. It sets 
parameters in terms of legitimate limitations on individual rights and freedoms 
and provides a methodology for mediating between competing interests or 
claims where the rights of one individual or community clash with the rights of 
others or with the wider public interest. This can entail a careful balancing act 
for which the jurisprudence of universal and regional human rights oversight 
bodies provides specific guidance, including factors for consideration, in 
assessing whether a restriction on an individual right related to cultural 
expression has a legitimate aim (i.e. it is in the public interest and/or to protect 
the rights of others) and is proportional to that aim (i.e. is the least restrictive for 
achieving the required result). For example, where a woman’s right to express 
her culture or religion by covering her head or face in public is balanced against 
national security interests in ensuring images on identity documents allow easy 
identification of individuals. Similarly, rights of indigenous peoples to access 
traditional lands, sites or monuments of cultural or religious significance to 
them may conflict with the public interest in economic development that 
(potentially) takes place on the same land.6 
A human rights-informed approach recognises that in addition to the 
normative framework of human rights, principles of good governance can be 
instrumental in identifying potential sources of tension relating to cultural 
diversity and devising appropriate responses to effectively manage them. 
Good governance signifies that governing institutions are committed to 
creating comparable conditions and equal opportunities for all to pursue 
their development and fulfil their aspirations.7 In some cases, there may not 
exist a human right to State support for a certain aspect of cultural life, but 
principles of good governance (and experience) indicate that such situations 
should nevertheless be addressed. They also provide a useful guide for how 
to do so. For example, access to higher education in a minority language has 
been a contentious issue in a number of States. There is no provision under 
IHRL that guarantees State-funded tertiary minority language education, but 
bilingual and multi-lingual initiatives that respond to communities’ demands 
for mother-tongue education, while also ensuring equal access to education in 
6 For guidance in analysing and addressing a range of problematic situations relating 
to cultural diversity using a human rights framework see Holt and Machnyikova 
(2013), Table 8.1.
7 For an overview of the relationships between good governance and human rights 
see United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Good 
Governance and Human Rights, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/
Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.aspx (accessed 18 
Sept. 2015).
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the State languages (and international languages) have helped to defuse tense 
situations, e.g. in the Balkans.8 
A human rights-informed approach also recognises the limitations of a human 
rights framework in reconciling differences around culture. Indeed, it can often 
be the claim or realisation of a right — or the way that right is expressed — that 
becomes a source of hostility or resentment between individuals or groups of 
different cultural backgrounds. For example, one community’s exercise of their 
right to practice their religion by establishing a place of prayer can represent a 
symbolic marking of public space that provokes unease in others, particularly 
where a fear of the unfamiliar or a sense of vulnerability in terms of their own 
identity already exists. Local level disputes can easily become politicised, both 
feeding into and influenced by wider debates around the State’s approaches 
(existing or desired) to the management of cultural difference. In such cases, 
a range of diplomatic means are available for managing tensions, including 
through techniques and mechanisms for dialogue and mediation, with a view 
to achieving outcomes acceptable to all parties.9 
The approach also respects other legal frameworks insofar as these are 
compatible with IHRL. In addition to human rights, humanitarian and refugee 
law and standards pertaining specifically to internally displaced person (IDPs), 
as well as religious, cultural and economic norms (among others) can all play a 
role in diversity management. 
Finally, the approach recognises that in some contexts the use of human 
rights language can be counter-productive. This can be the case where concepts 
of human rights are unfamiliar and/or are regarded by large sections of the 
population as ‘a Western imposition’ irrelevant to the local culture.10 For 
example, ongoing work with women MPs in Tunisia exploring ways to more 
effectively support their participation in politics and wider peacebuilding has 
highlighted the challenges of using human rights discourses where a secular 
(human rights) vs. religious divide permeates politics and society. In this case it 
has been possible to engage meaningfully with women from different positions 
and backgrounds, sometimes using human rights language (e.g. with civil 
society activists who frame their work in these terms), but also by engaging 
Islamic feminist discourses exploring more progressive interpretations of 
Islam,11 as well as practical methodologies for personal empowerment rooted 
8 For recent development in Serbia, for example, see OSCE, OSCE High Commissioner 
on National Minorities focuses on education during visit to Serbia (2 September 2014), 
available at http://www.osce.org/hcnm/123111 (accessed 18 Sept. 2015). 
9 For guidance in this respect, see Collins and Packer (2006). 
10 On the need for more contextualised approaches to promoting women’s rights see, 
for example, British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (2014). 
11 Although the term ‘Islamic feminism’ is also contentious in the Tunisian context.
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in religious and cultural norms prevalent in Muslim-majority societies in the 
region.12
Conclusion
A ‘human rights-informed’ approach to managing diversity and preventing 
conflict provides a structure within which advocates of different positions may 
find a common basis for discussion. It provides both a principled framework 
and a range of practical options and benchmarks for consideration in identifying 
and developing policy, legislative and institutional responses that are context-
sensitive and appropriate. In doing so it draws on examples of individual 
States’ practice in effectively managing diversity in line with their obligations 
under IHRL. The approach in no way diminishes or undermines rights-based 
approaches. Rather, it aims to maximise their potential to practically assist 
policy-makers and conflict prevention actors in understanding and responding 
to the challenges facing them in ways that are both conflict-sensitive and in 
conformity with international law. In also recognising the limitations of using 
human rights language in some contexts, a human rights-informed approach 
supports the possibility (and often probability) of effecting change that respects 
and promotes human rights in fact, but without insisting upon explicit 
reference to IHRL. 
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Why tax is a human rights issue: empowering communities 
living in poverty to hold governments to account for public 
services
Bridget Burrows1
Tax pays for public services
Sitting on the floor the villagers are drawing a map of their area. They’re 
marking all the essential services they use, including those that are provided 
by the government and those that are private. The community map they’re 
creating has little on it. There is no public school, nor public health clinic. The 
water borehole they use was built by an NGO. As the women and men discuss, 
the sense of the government as a provider of public services is almost non-
existent. The access to the local government with the power to make decisions 
is a district official, in the nearest district town, which is a long distance.
1 All views in this article are the author’s own and not those of ActionAid.
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For many decades the centre of the conversation between communities 
such as this one in Uganda, civil society and governments around the world 
has been that the state needs to give money to build a classroom, and pay 
the teachers’ wages, and build a road, for this village. For each interest group, 
the conversation has been that the government needs to give more money to 
particular sectors, often competing, such as education, health, agriculture, 
roads, and security. 
A lot of important work has been done by civil society and activists, both 
to increase national budget allocations to public services, and to ensure via 
participatory community budget tracking that the money is well-spent on 
things that help communities living in poverty, and not lost on corruption. 
This article is about an important third part of the triangle: not how money 
is allocated, or how money is spent, but how money is raised. It is about the 
slippery heart of economic, social and cultural rights: that the government 
must progressively realise them according to ‘maximum available resources’ 
(International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 
2.1). Fundamentally, it is about when governments point to empty budgets, 
about being able to point to reforms in fiscal policy that could provide fairer 
resources, and about the necessity and challenges of supporting communities 
living in poverty to be part of this to ensure it is well spent on public services 
that have a huge impact on people’s rights. 
At the time of writing, the world is getting ready to pat itself on the back 
for a new round of global anti-poverty targets, the Sustainable Development 
Goals. While the goals are successful as a way of building globally agreed 
indicators on the progressive realisation of economic, social, and cultural 
rights, one question becomes increasingly pertinent: to make them a reality, 
where will the money come from?
As development aid budgets come under pressure, two new watchwords are 
emerging in financing for development conversations, both in opposition to 
each other, and representing a wider trend: domestic resource mobilisation and 
private finance. For instance, at the 2014 Global Partnership for Education 
(GPE) funding replenishment conference, developing countries pledged USD 
26 billion to spending on education, committing to help fund it by increasing 
their domestic resource mobilisation. This was ten times more than the USD 
2.1 billion pledged by donors, and represents a dramatic shift of focus for 
development financing. 
The money pledged by developing country governments is basically coming 
from national taxation. Currently, according to the World Bank, ‘tax revenues 
accounted for 10–14 per cent of GDP in low-income countries in 2009 and 
just under 20 per cent of GDP in middle-income countries. This compares 
to about 33 per cent in OECD countries, rising above 40 per cent in some 
European countries’ (ActionAid 2015, 7).
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A 2014 Education for All Global Monitoring Report looked at increasing 
tax revenues to bridge the education financing gap. They showed that if 
governments in 67 low and middle income countries modestly increased their 
tax-raising efforts and devoted a fifth of their budget to education, they could 
raise an additional US 153 billion for education spending in 2015, increasing 
the average share of GDP spent on education from 3 per cent to 6 per cent by 
2015 (Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2014, 1).
One study gives a glimpse of the potential impact of a government’s 
revenue raising on the achievement of the previous set of goals, the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) (Waris and Matti Kohonen 2011). The research 
found that in almost all cases, the more tax a country collected in relation to its 
GDP, the better their realisation of the MDGs. Whether it was the number of 
children dying before their fifth birthday, or the number of teenage girls giving 
birth, or the number of young people that can read and write, the more tax a 
government collected, the better the development results. This could of course 
be a correlation, rather than a cause (governments that are organising better to 
collect tax also may be organising better to achieve the MDGs), but it is likely 
that some of this is because more money is also being spent on essential public 
services that help realise the MDGs. Clearly more research is needed. 
Lost tax revenue
Unfortunately, many developing countries have fairly regressive tax systems 
that depend too much on indirect consumer taxes as a way of increasing the tax 
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take, adding pennies to every purchase made by a poor household. This means 
that it is national citizens, including people living in poverty, who are behind 
a significant part of the money that is spent to finance essential public services. 
This increases the case for national citizens, including those living in poverty, to 
hold national governments to account for delivering on rights. 
A large potential contributor to the tax system is not being captured. Over 
the last two decades, foreign investment has grown considerably as a share of 
the economy of low-income countries, from around 7 per cent in the 1990s to 
over 20 per cent in 2010, but tellingly, corporate tax paid in the same period 
has meandered along in a dishearteningly flat line (ActionAid 2015, 9). In 
short, countries’ budgets are not benefiting much from all this investment.
One of the reasons is that governments are simply giving the tax money 
away. An ActionAid International and Tax Justice Network-Africa study 
(2012) found that in 2009/10, the Government of Uganda gave multinational 
companies USD 272 million in exemptions on their tax bill. To put this in 
perspective, it is enough money at the time to have doubled the health budget 
overnight. Alternatively, with average teacher wages at about USD 1,800 a 
year, it could have paid for 150,000 extra teachers a year, or it could have built 
around 10,500 extra classroom blocks. Remembering our village without a 
public school or health clinic, the amount of tax money being given away could 
be transformational.
Tax can be seen as a technical or economic issue but ActionAid’s focus 
is on justice – on how big companies not paying their fair share of tax 
and governments not spending it on public services negatively impacts 
communities living in poverty, financing for development, and the fulfillment 
of human rights. Globally, ActionAid revealed that USD 138 billion is lost to 
corporate income tax breaks given by poor countries to multinationals every 
year (ActionAid 2013). The amounts are so large, they are enough to school 
all 57 million children who currently don’t go to primary school, provide the 
agricultural investment (USD 42.7 billion) needed to achieve a world free 
from hunger, and meet international goals to reduce ill health more than twice 
over (USD 58.9 billion). This only represents the tax money that governments 
are choosing to give away, and not what multinational companies are avoiding 
through exploiting loopholes in weak tax laws. When we think about maximum 
available resources for the Millennium Development Goals, it becomes clear 
the impact a few simple reforms to create more progressive tax systems could 
have on financing for development. Ironically, the evidence shows that these 
tax giveaways have very little impact on foreign investment in poor countries, 
and that indeed, what foreign investors actually want is access to consumer 
markets, infrastructure and educated workforces – the very things created by 
tax-funded development. 
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Progressive tax, progressively spent
This is part of a much bigger global trend, with increasing global inequality of 
private power and wealth negatively impacting on the ability of governments 
to meet their obligations to fulfill economic and social rights. The problem is 
compounded as the less that governments progressively raise and spend tax, the 
more public services decline, and the more appetite it creates for private actors 
to step into the market and provide privatised essential services. The evidence 
in the education sector in developing countries supported by the Privatisation 
in Education Research Initiative (PERI) shows that these privatised services 
are negatively impacting the accessibility of education rights for all children 
and particularly for girls. When low income parents have to pay to access basic 
services they prefer to send boys.
A fair tax system not only raises revenue for human rights. It can also 
redistribute wealth, reducing inequality and the gap between rich and poor 
within countries and between countries. Taxes are the most reliable and 
sustainable source of government revenue, compared to overseas aid, loans or 
private funding. A fair tax system can increase representation and accountability, 
of the state to citizens, encouraging better governance and more independent 
and responsive policy-making. 
For ActionAid tax justice is: governments having the ability to raise enough 
tax to provide quality public services; governments raising and spending tax 
transparently, progressively, and accountably to citizens; the international 
community helping create transparent and fair global tax rules which help 
governments to access all relevant information and establish fair national tax 
systems; and global companies making fair tax payments where business is 
transacted, resources are extracted, and profits are made. 
Communities holding governments to account for public services
Following our human rights-based approach, ActionAid’s campaign signature 
is of community-led campaigning, particularly by women and marginalised 
people, in defence of their rights. But if you’re from that village in Uganda 
that we started in, with little access to government and few multinational 
companies or their products in sight, what does all this mean to you? 
Many people do not even know that they are a taxpayer through consumer 
taxes, and that they have a right to demand a fairer tax system, or accountability 
for what the government does with the money. Indeed, public services are 
often seen as a gift from government, rather than a right or even a service. 
The communities living in poverty that ActionAid works with experience tax 
injustice directly in two ways. Firstly, through unfair local taxation, such as 
high consumer taxes on essential goods, and multiple taxation where different 
branches of government are taxing the same thing many times. Secondly, 
through the lack of essential public services, such as schools and hospitals. 
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Women, who often fill the gap where quality public services don’t exist through 
providing unpaid care work looking after the sick, the elderly and the young, 
pay not only tax, but also pay with their bodies and time, impacting on their 
ability to seek employment or study. 
It is from these starting points that ActionAid seeks to encourage 
community involvement in building progressive taxation systems. ActionAid 
recently developed a toolkit of participatory exercises to facilitate discussions 
in community groups on the relationship of tax to their lives and their rights. 
Each exercise goes through a few key ideas. One exercise asks community 
members to play characters, such as a woman farmer, a teacher, a national 
business, a foreign chief executive, and a tax collector, and then distributing 
and collecting pebbles to each character asking the group to create a scenario 
that is most ‘fair.’ When asked this question, they do the same as most of 
the world, which is to keep some people richer, and some people poorer, but 
distribute the pebbles far more evenly, creating greater equality. 
ActionAid Uganda and local and national partners working with women 
farmers recently had a success on reducing unfair local taxation. In 2014, 
looking for more money, the Government of Uganda proposed to remove a tax 
exemption on basic farming goods, such as hoes and fertiliser. Analysing the 
budget, national civil society spotted the negative implications for millions of 
farmers, particularly poor women farmers, around the country. 
They mobilised hundreds of thousands of women small-holder farmers to 
sign a petition to keep the tax exemption for basic farming items. The petition 
proposed that if the government needed money it should consider removing 
tax exemptions from large multinational companies instead. The petition and 
demonstrations were a success, and the government backed down. This success 
for the women farmers to assert themselves over tax and budget issues with 
local and national government opens a door to continuing to work on tax 
justice issues with them.
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On the issue of lack of public services, one example comes from how 
ActionAid works with students, parents and teachers to carry out participatory 
rights-based assessments on the extent to which schools are delivering on ten 
key education rights, creating citizens’ reports. The community then advocate 
with school management committees and district officials to create rights-
based school improvement plans, claiming their rights and deepening local 
accountability. The plans, however, such as building separate toilet blocks that 
help girls to keep coming to school throughout the month, have a cost, and the 
fulfillment of rights can fall down at this stage. 
ActionAid is exploring new work to link this evidence from communities 
seeking better schools to national and international level campaigning to finance 
education through tax justice. The work will start with ActionAid Malawi, 
Tanzania, Mozambique and Nepal and nine civil society partners, seeking to 
bring together teachers’ unions, national education, budget tracking, and tax 
justice networks, to hold governments to account for progressive national tax 
reforms that will lead to increased local spending on public education. 
However, for the villagers in Uganda who want a free quality education 
for their children, the tax justice journey is a long one. It assumes that if the 
government is convinced to change tax policy, that the money will be allocated 
to education, and that the money will reach local government and be well-
spent. For women and men struggling for each day’s bread, to stop and take 
action on such issues is a generous use of time. The lifetime of a campaign to 
achieve this may be longer than their children’s education. 
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One of the challenges for ActionAid is to remain aware and cautious 
of ActionAid’s own relative size and wealth, and that our efforts neither 
instrumentalise the communities living in poverty that we work with, or 
remove space from local and national allies. For ActionAid’s human rights-
based approach to truly empower and walk alongside communities living 
in poverty to demand their rights, we hope to support stronger local to 
international links to challenge the power and wealth structures at every level 
that impact on local provision of rights and to hold governments to account for 
quality public services over time. Our work with communities for tax justice 
for quality public services is only just starting.
[All photos courtesy of ActionAid]
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Technical cooperation in the field of human rights
Farid Hamdan
This chapter highlights the contribution of the academic teaching which I have 
received at the University of London within the MA in Understanding and 
Securing of Human Rights in 2002–3.The course content and its themes have 
contributed to strengthening my knowledge and skills for the human rights 
field, which have enabled me to have better opportunities to contribute to 
human rights protection and promotion. Throughout the last years, I have 
worked extensively to transfer the knowledge gained into projects and practical 
programmes in the field of human rights, namely, capacity building through 
Technical Cooperation Programmes (TCPs).1 In this chapter, I will use three 
examples to show the contribution of TCPs in building knowledge and skills to 
promote and protect human rights. The first example will focus on TCPs during 
conflict and insecurity; the second will show building skills during transition; 
and the third will show the country specific programme during stability. 
Building capacities of rights holders and duty bearers during 
armed conflict 
Hawa and Ezz Eldeen were among others from Internally Displaced Persons 
who were trained on training-of-trainers for local communities. As a result of 
a series of training programmes, they were able to know their rights and the 
rights of others. They were also skilled on how to defend themselves and other 
victims during armed conflict. They have become able to understand and use 
human rights related terms. They have also become able to provide victims 
with advice, especially women victims.
1 Technical Cooperation refers to the United Nations advisory service and assistance 
to Governments in the field of human rights. See UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact sheet No.3 ( Rev.1), Advisory Service and 
Technical Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights, Geneva: United Nations (1996). 
Available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet3Rev.1en.
pdf (accessed 17 Sept. 2015).
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TCPs in conflict areas do not focus only on empowering victims but 
have also targeted duty bearers and placed both groups on its programme 
to protect human rights. At the same time, TCPs have targeted duty bearers 
from prison administrations, attorney generals and prosecutors, judges, and 
police investigators to promote awareness on the application of international 
human rights law. They also created forums for dialogue to find the best ways 
to improve the human rights situation in areas that have witnessed conflicts 
and human rights violations. 
Important activities have been carried out in areas living in conflict and 
TCPs have had a positive impact on enhancing the role of victims in protecting 
themselves, albeit without improving the human rights situation or putting an 
end to the conflict. Such activities are varied, including: 
• Organising training and awareness raising workshops on issues related 
to gender-based violence during the armed conflicts; 
• Developing special training programmes to improve native 
administrations’ capacities to respect gender and women’s rights by 
promoting the concepts of equality and non-discrimination; 
• Organising training programmes for governmental institutions, 
officials, prosecutors and judges on their role to respect human rights. 
Implementing capacity building activities during armed conflict is not an 
easy task for many reasons. The activities are intended to target victims who are 
affected negatively by the conflict consequences and they are expecting you to 
provide them with physical protection. The existence of social traditions can 
be problematic; for example, traditions prohibit discussion of issues related 
to sexual violence, and thus you have difficulties to communicate with the 
victims. The last and important challenge is the high level of illiteracy among 
local groups.
In response, you need to exert creative efforts in order to overcome such 
difficulties by adopting innovative methods such as working to: 
• Cooperate with the local administration and build trust with them in 
order to get access to victims; 
• Work cooperatively with international organisations working on the 
ground, especially those who provide relief services; 
• Enhance victims’ participation, which requires efforts to show the 
positive impact of their participation; 
• Adopt a simplified training approach based on role play and showing 
films to overcome the illiteracy issue; 
• Provide pick up for participants from their locations to the training 
venue and provide a secure venue for training; 
• Provide a place for breastfeeding mothers to feed their infants. 
TCPs are not replacing activities of human rights monitoring and reporting 
but rather they complement these. From an individual experience, technical 
cooperation programmes have contributed in building the capacities of duty 
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bearers to know their responsibilities and obligations at the same time it has 
contributed in raising victims’ awareness in understanding their rights and thus 
their ability to defend them.
Training of journalists on a Human Rights-Based Approach 
(HRBA) for media coverage: Middle East and North Africa
In working to mobilise important groups to protect and promote human 
rights, I would like to reflect on my works and engagement with journalists and 
prominent media institutions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region to promote and protect human rights. A training programme has been 
developed in partnership with different media institutions2 and in cooperation 
with the UN Training and Documentation Centre for South West Asia and the 
Arab Region. The programme aimed at building the capacities of journalists on 
how to report human rights stories from a perspective of human rights.
From 2010 to 2015 the partners have organised a yearly programme 
for journalists for the MENA region. They were trained on the content of 
international human rights law, basic human rights conventions and additional 
optional protocols, obligations of the state to respect human rights, and how 
journalists can benefit from the protection provided by international human 
rights law. They were also sensitised to relevant alarming human rights issues 
in the MENA region, like the status of freedom of expression and it’s relation 
to the work of a journalist, the right to access information, and the concept 
of transitional justice, as many countries in the region are going through 
transitional justice processes to deal with past human rights violations and 
crimes. 
Journalists have also been provided a technical training on the content 
of HRBA, as in each story they have to reflect relevant international human 
rights conventions, and the concepts of non-discrimination, participation, and 
promotion of the rule of law. In the beginning, targeting journalists was a 
difficult and challenging task. Many academic and educational institutions do 
not provide human rights teaching for journalists during their university or 
training phases. The majority of teaching and training received has focused on 
building skills for journalistic coverage without linking this to human rights. 
Even a journalist who is not oriented as a human rights defender has a moral 
responsibility to promote and protect human rights. 
The recent approach which has been adopted by many media institutions 
such as the Al Jazeera channel has a tangible contribution in promoting the role 
of journalists in human rights protection. In addition, the presence and belief 
2 These include the Doha Centre for Media Freedom (http://www.dc4mf.org/ar) and 
Public Freedoms and Human Rights at Al Jazeera (http://www.aljazeera.net/news/
humanrights). 
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of persons3 who have a human rights background in addition to their work 
within these institutions has also provided additional opportunities to support 
the involvement of journalists in human rights issues. 
The organisation of continuous yearly training programmes has resulted in 
creating individuals and groups of professional journalists in different media 
outlets in the region who are active contributors in promoting human rights. 
They are active journalists in newspapers like El Ghad, Al Quds, Annahar, 
ALQabas, Al Jazeera channel and other news agencies in Yemen, Sudan, Egypt 
and Algeria.4 
Today, those trained journalists are forming themselves into networks and 
groups using social media to communicate and share information between 
them. They have also produced very strong media reports and stories, covering 
many important human rights issues such as child protection, combating 
trafficking, the status and condition of prisons, rights of women in education, 
the right to health and the right to education. In doing so, journalists have 
reflected clearly the language of human rights by using precise terms and 
making references to many human rights conventions and UN bodies. 
Building national capacities in the field of human rights: Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia 
A TCP entitled ‘Enhance national capacities to promote and protect human 
rights’5 has been signed and agreed between the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia through 
the Saudi Human Rights Commission (SHRC).6 
In its first year, the programme has carried out a series of promotional 
human rights activities that targeted both governmental bodies and civil 
society actors. A five day programme focused on the international system of 
human rights and its protection mechanisms has been carried out and aimed at 
enhancing better engagement between Saudi Arabia and the UN human rights 
system. The launch of the training programme was well received and got proper 
media coverage. It was an encouraging step to go ahead with other planned 
3 A prominent role has been played by Dr. Hassan Mujamer, who is a Producer for 
the Al Jazeera channel, to support the engagement of journalists in human rights 
programmes and activities. 
4 See the El Ghad newspaper in Jordan http://www.alghad.com; AlQuds newspaper 
http://www.alquds.com; Annahar http://www.annahar.com; AlQabas http://www.
alqabas.com.kw.
5 A memorandum of Understanding has been signed between OHCHR and Saudi 
Arabia in 2012. The purpose is to build national capacities through a three-year 
work plan. 
6 The Saudi Human Rights Commission is not accredited by the International 
Accreditation Committee – ICC.
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activities. In Saudi Arabia and other countries, the availability of political will 
is a crucial step to plan and implement activities related to the promotion and 
protection of human rights. 
Other subsequent activities focused on very important issues related 
to combating human trafficking, and the reporting mechanism for the 
UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. The 
first year of the project was concluded by organising a training-of-trainers 
programme which resulted in having 20 trainers, constituted by ten female 
and ten male participants. 
The first year of implemented activities has paved the way for more 
constructive activities. Two training activities have targeted separately 
researchers working in the offices of the SHRC and another workshop for civil 
society activists on how to monitor and report human rights issues in Saudi 
Arabia. At the time of writing these lines, the project is in the last stages to 
organise a three day training workshop on the drafting process of the State 
periodic report for the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 
Conclusion
Technical Cooperation Programmes have an important role in promoting 
and protecting human rights. They could be implemented during the time 
of conflict or in a stable situation. Countries also play an important role in 
fully cooperating with TCPs and not imposing restrictions to hinder its goals 
and objectives. To make TCPs successful, the concerns and needs of victims 
should be considered. This requires a measure to build trust with victims or 
those affected by the conflict. TCPs also should take into consideration social 
circumstances especially when tackling issues and programmes to combat 
sexual violence against women because in some societies discussing such issues 
is a taboo. 
TCPs normally face various difficulties in both stable and non-stable 
countries, especially when there is doubt on the idea of human rights, or 
the idea of human rights clashes with culture, religion and other traditions. 
However, numerous experiences of TCPs should be discussed, studied and 
further researched as part of the requirements of academic programmes. This 
will identify reasons of success and failure especially in countries which are in 
transition or in conflict, because where there is a conflict, there will be victims 
of human rights.
As an individual and in order to achieve success in carrying out tasks 
and responsibilities within TCPs, there is a need to be equipped with a solid 
knowledge of human rights, and have multiple protection skills and a good 
understanding of the international system for human rights protection. In this 
regard, the MA in Understanding and Securing Human Rights has provided 
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me with three main elements: 1) the idea of human rights and its historical 
philosophy and development; 2) techniques and skills for protection; and 3) 
familiarity with the UN human rights system. 
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Poetry for human rights
Laila Sumpton
This is perhaps not the chapter you were expecting to find in this book, for 
how can an art have a practical application in the territory of human rights 
education, campaigning and programming? I would argue that any art can be 
applied with a human rights-based approach, but that the compact, urgent and 
linguistically layered nature of poetry suits human rights work well. 
I will look at ‘Poetry for human rights’ from three perspectives: poetry for 
personal resilience; poetry for human rights education and campaigning; and 
poetry for voice and empowerment, which charts my own journey into this 
area of work. 
Poetry for personal resilience 
Many people turn to poetry in times of crisis. Either they will read another’s 
work or write their own – trying to condense what is happening to them, make 
sense of it and bear witness through writing. Being able to write about an 
experience acknowledges its reality, even when done through metaphor and the 
mirroring of characters. There is always something of ourselves in our writing, 
even when we tell someone else’s story. On a personal level, being able to turn 
to writing has enabled me to process life events that would have otherwise 
disrupted my work and study. 
On a professional and academic level, being able to turn to poetry has 
helped me understand key themes within human rights from genocide, to 
indigenous rights and refugee law, as it forces you to find the essence of injustice 
and explain it in words that can be understood outside the lecture hall. This 
has empowered me as a campaigner, even if the poems I wrote were initially 
just for myself. Being able to do this was particularly important when working 
in Bosnia with arts and human rights NGO Most Mira, firstly as an intern, 
then as a trustee. For the first time in my life I was directly hearing the stories 
of survivors of concentration camps, visiting mass graves, while at the same 
time organising youth arts projects and negotiating with local stakeholders. 
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Compartmentalising my reactions to the very present history not only enabled 
me to deliver projects, but also to find a way to take these stories to poetry 
audiences in the UK who knew little about the conflict. The poems were my 
awareness raising tools and the very act of writing freed the stories from my 
mind, allowing me to switch between Bosnia, my job at the time writing up 
stories about abuse suffered by young homeless people for Depaul UK, and the 
world of my friends and family. 
Building your own resilience in the field of human rights work is crucial; 
everyone will have their own means. Once I had taught myself how to process 
information and transform it into poetry I felt better able to try and teach 
others how to do the same in a way that respects the dignity and agency of 
those you seek to represent. This led me to think about what a human rights-
based approach to creative campaigning could be, and the responsibility that 
writers have to handle their subject matter with care and respect. I feel that 
artists have a responsibility to use their platforms to report the injustices they 
see, and to do what they can to help others raise their voice, whether they are 
the survivors or those who are simply aware and looking for a way to speak out. 
Poetry for campaigning and human rights education 
Whilst studying at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, I was lucky to work 
alongside committed and engaged students who constantly debated human 
rights issues both in and out of the classroom. Wanting to share this outside 
of Senate House was something I was passionate about doing, so I set myself a 
challenge: turning a friend’s dissertation about the refugee crisis on the Italian 
island of Lampedusa into a 30-line poem. How to go about this? The poem 
needed an approach that did not turn to sentimentality, use dry legal language 
or shock tactics, but would reach the people who usually switch channel when 
a news story becomes too distressing. My response lay in mirroring – depicting 
migration and the search for safety and survival as a natural process through the 
image of a turtle dragging herself onto a beech to lay her eggs, titled ‘Landing 
on Lampedusa’ (Sumpton 2014). 
Since writing this poem in 2012, I have led a series of poetry workshops on 
approaches to creative campaigning with museums, youth groups, universities 
and a Quaker group looking at women’s rights, free speech, and refugee rights 
through metaphor, hyperbole, satire and through manipulating legal language 
to make ‘found poems.’ Supporting learners to create well-crafted poetry 
that vividly describe human rights stories without resorting to propaganda 
and soap-box tactics is a campaign tool that helps writers to find their more 
political voices and to learn how to keep their audiences on side. NGOs and 
human rights activists can do more to share their stories with artists who can 
transport these issues to new ears. 
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Being a co-editor of the Human Rights Consortium’s first poetry anthology 
In Protest: 150 Poems for Human Rights (Abelvik-Lawson, Hett and Sumpton 
2013) taught me so much about the many ways in which human rights issues 
can be successfully voiced through poetry. We asked for submissions of human 
rights poetry, not knowing what we would receive, and found ourselves reading 
640 entries from 14 different countries tackling a diverse range of issues ranging 
from land rights in rural India, to child rights in Papua New Guinea, to stories 
of life under Franco’s rule. We set up our own grading scales for successful 
poems that were well crafted, clearly investigated a human rights issue and 
brought a fresh perspective to the debates. Over the past few years, it has been 
great to see how the poetry community can mobilise quickly to fund and create 
new anthologies whether it is responding to the imprisoning of Pussy Riot 
(Lucas 2012), in solidarity with the current refugee crisis (Poems For People 
2015) or for the general election (Piercey and Wright 2015). 
Poets can work as reporters – capturing protests, taking testimony – but 
they can also work as historians by linking up the stories of the past with 
themes in our present. In 2012, I and a fellow member of Keats House Poets 
worked with the Senate House archives to create new poetry for the School of 
Advanced Study’s contribution to the Bloomsbury Festival. We used archive 
material detailing the University of London’s approach to mobilising support 
for Czech student refugees in the early 1950s, and accounts from the newly 
arrived students themselves. Forgotten stories of past support can be bought to 
life through vivid poems to raise awareness of the current refugee crisis and the 
need for higher education bodies to contribute, as they once did. 
Don Patterson, my poetry lecturer at the University of St Andrews, once 
said that the poem is the only art form that you can carry in your mind in its 
entirety. It is with this in mind that poetry can be a powerful human rights 
education tool. Building on several years of writing poems inspired by my work 
with Most Mira, this summer I led a workshop at their peacebuilding residential 
programme for young Bosnian and international campaigners with Humanity 
in Action. The session helped the learners condense what they had learned 
about peace processes and memorialisation at the community level into short 
poems, and also helped them to imagine possible futures through focussing 
on a ruined home that the charity hopes to turn into an arts centre (Sumpton 
2015a). This session gave them the space to reflect personally on all of the visits 
to memorials, reburials and lectures on transitional justice and capture what 
they needed to tell those who had not experienced this learning for themselves. 
Poetry helped these campaigners work together and individually to work out 
what peacebuilding meant to them, and how to use what they had seen to 
evidence their points in an engaging, lyrical and inspiring way. 
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Poetry for voice and empowerment 
At a conference for artists working with young people at London Theatre 
Bubble, one contributor mentioned something which made me question the 
validity and ethics of what I consider to be arts projects for social change. They 
spoke about the danger of artists being accidental therapists in hit and run arts 
projects. With the reality of funding for both arts and human rights projects 
being scarce, a one off session, or three to six week projects with vulnerable 
learners, is becoming common. 
Poets sent into schools, prisons, care homes or hospitals to briefly inject 
creativity into the setting can help learners express themselves and raise their 
voices about the issues that concern them if this is followed up and part of a 
holistic program. Very often there is limited or no training on the support 
needs of the learners of safeguarding, and the artist is presumed to be safe, 
sensible and sensitive. Often we are, but I have been in workshops where the 
boundary between poetry facilitator and therapist is blurred. Well planned 
and supported projects with adequate time funded for reflection, training and 
planning avoid this, along with a good selection process. 
Arts projects can empower learners, helping them express themselves, 
build confidence and sometimes raise their voices as campaigners. Writers’ 
development agency Spread the Word specialises in taking literature to those 
who would not normally be able to access it. The right to participation and the 
right to a cultural life springs to mind as key areas this arts work supports. I 
have run poetry workshops with dialysis patients at St George’s Hospital and 
in the paediatric wards of the Royal London Hospital and seen first-hand how 
moods, communication skills, willingness to work with education and health 
staff and confidence can improve from a few sessions (Sumpton 2015b). 
The concentrated, resource light and narrative aspect of poetry sees it as a 
great tool for helping marginalised members of our society raise their voices 
and feel like they have some agency over how their stories and perspectives are 
told. This year I worked with Sense, the UK charity that supports people who 
are deaf, blind and have multiple and complex disabilities. I was tasked with 
delivering six months of creative writing workshops with learners in Greenwich 
and Spalding on the theme of local heritage and rivers, preparing them for a 
public performance. With the support of excellent freelance project manager 
Poppy Szaybo and some incredible support staff, I learned the basics of sign 
language and learned as I went how to creatively engage learners who had 
never created poetry or stories (Sense 2015). I quickly learned that I would 
need to write songs, as writing was not an option for the majority of learners. 
Yet even with all of these new ways of working I was amazed at the changes in 
confidence, mood management and memory amongst learners. They had never 
been challenged creatively in this way before or asked to imagine characters, and 
students who had never spoken to their peers began communicating. Again, 
85POETRY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
what may have seemed like a ‘decorative’ arts project to some, was actually 
transformative and empowering for the learners. The best advocates are the 
clients themselves, and if arts workshops can help them grow in confidence 
and eventually be able to tell their story in a way that suits them, then more 
campaigns teams should be advocating for these kinds of projects. 
From the various projects I have been a part of I have seen how poetry 
and story writing workshops can help learners understand and feel a sense 
of ownership over their own stories, and sense the validity of their own voice 
when they feel disempowered. Poetry can support human rights projects in 
many different contexts- strengthening voices of protest, voices of witnesses 
and voices of human rights defenders. Going forward I would ask how can we 
protect the right to a cultural life for marginalised people and help artists and 
human rights workers better collaborate? Our work runs off stories and we all 
need to be powerful storytellers. 
Here is the poem I wrote to summarise the experience of the 2015 Project 
on Peacebuilding residential programme and the stories of survival we heard 
from Most Mira founder and Omarska camp survivor, Kemal Pervanic. 
Julys near Omarska
Sleep was hard to find 
for the two hundred men 
locked in a steel mine room- 
only space to crouch and lean 
till bodies thinned, faces dwindled.
In our July, over 20 years on, 
a few miles from that mine 
and the tracks that had towed 
the village apart 
it was hotter than any July  
and sleep was hard to find.
Our well ran dry, sheets dank, 
and flies swarmed in heavy nights 
riddled with rooster caws 
and wartime tales that we 
had woken, that should not sleep- 
should walk pages and paths 
spiralling out of here.
We had flown in from our various towns 
found ourselves at a forgotten stop 
on the most deadly Bosnian road 
where cars swerve and flowers frame dry ditches. 
We left all our shoes at the door 
to contemplate their trails and shelter bugs, 
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as we moved onto the same carpet 
we would unravel together.
We were waking up stories people pass- 
whilst hay is turned, cats creep up on meat, 
and the village rebuilds each year, 
it’s families returning to repaint doors, 
teach children how to tractor lawns, 
learn their accent back, 
wander new old streets.
We paused and circled graves, 
the roll call banners  
in steel, marble, cement 
with a scattering of wreaths, 
stone address cards with only struck out names 
re-etched and welded on a roller-deck of loss.
We look for traces, of what was there before 
turned over leaves, 
found jokes under forgotten bricks, 
laughter where washing was hung- 
birds soaring through invisible walls,  
and rebuilt it all in our various tongues 
to fly and carry home.
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Transnational business human rights regulations and their 
effects upon human rights protection
Sumi Dhanarajan
Contemporary corporate-related human rights abuses are often attributed to 
the processes of neo-liberal globalisation.1 Pressures upon nations to compete 
in the global marketplace, upon suppliers to produce ever-cheaper and ever-
faster, upon workers to accept more precarious terms of employment and 
upon communities to give up land and natural resources, all in the pursuit 
of economic growth have unveiled examples of the darker side of business 
operations within the global economy. Whereas this side was more hidden and 
less susceptible to resistance in a different era, transnational activism in this age 
– with the aid of new forms of communication technology and media – has 
enabled greater public awareness of this miscreant behaviour and the ensuing 
injustices.
Consequently, demands have been placed upon governance systems to 
provide the necessary controls and protections to allay the growing problem of 
human rights abuses occurring as a result of business activities. Transnational 
business human rights regulatory regimes (‘TBHRs’) have emerged as a means 
of managing the human rights impact of global corporate activity. This form 
of regulatory governance is often described as a necessary ‘gap-filler’ (Ruggie 
2013). Promoted as an interim solution to the problem of unfettered adverse 
business human rights impact in the apparent absence of adequate state-based 
measures, it is assumed that TBHRs fill a regulatory void. 
1 I define neo-liberal globalisation as globalisation deriving from the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ that promotes trade and financial liberalisation, privatisation and 
deregulation, openness to foreign direct investment, a competitive exchange 
rate, fiscal discipline, lower taxes and small government. Transnational business 
governance is associated with this agenda by enabling it through self-regulation and 
minimal state intervention (Tabb 2005). The typologies of globalisation and the 
definition of neo-liberal globalisation in the context of human rights are discussed 
extensively in O’Connell (2007).
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This assumption is somewhat misleading. In fact, TBHRs emerge into a 
space already occupied by state-based law and institutions, albeit that these may 
be currently weak or inefficient, or simply untested. Understood in this way, 
the emergence of TBHRs raises questions about the effects and implications of 
the interactions these regulatory instruments have with extant rights-protecting 
laws. Yet the nature and outcomes of the interactions between TBHRs and law 
remain understudied even though they may prove to be a critical indicator 
of how human rights discourse evolves in ‘globalised’ States in which non-
state actors play a prominent role in formulating norms and implementing 
regulation relating to human rights. 
The emergence of transnational business human rights regulation
TBHRs – a form of transnational business governance or transnational private 
regulation – have emerged as a means of managing the unfettered adverse 
human rights impact of global corporate activity, as well as a way to secure 
businesses’ social license to operate in the globalised context. Their application 
reflects a broader trend towards normalising private rule-making across various 
regulatory spheres. In the absence of an ‘overarching global political regime’ 
(Haufler 2000) to manage complex issues such as business-related human 
rights abuses, the shift away from state-based rule-making is seen as inevitable 
(Barendrecht 2013). The ‘regulatory fracture’ of the global economy wherein 
industries involved in highly globalised systems of production are beyond the 
state’s current regulatory reach contribute to this perception (de Sousa Santos 
and Rodriguez-Garavito 2005). 
The emergence of TBHRs thus reflects three drivers. First, a perception 
that states either lack the institutional capabilities and capacities to address the 
problem satisfactorily or, are committed to neo-liberal deregulatory policies 
that demand non-state regulatory instruments (Bartley 2003). Second, the 
corporate imperative to respond efficiently with risk management tools that 
can either quell the ensuing reputational damage or ensure the viability of 
business operations in the face of social resistance, or to deflect state-based 
regulation. Third, pressure from transnational advocacy movements to seek out 
means of holding corporations to account for human rights violations relating 
to their operations. 
We can observe these drivers playing out in many developing, globalising 
States where human rights abuses resulting from business activity are prevalent. 
Key industries harbour systemic human rights challenges, for example, poor 
working conditions in low-cost manufacturing, or disputes over natural 
resources and land resulting in violence, displacements and violations of civil, 
cultural, economic, political and social rights. Existing legal provisions either 
fail to comprehensively cover the facts of the claim or are weakly enforced. In 
these situations, the business-operating environment can permit companies to 
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be less responsive to human rights issues. Further, victims of human rights face 
significant barriers to accessing legal remedies to either prevent further harm or 
to gain compensation or reparation for harm caused. 
In the face of these challenges, transnational advocacy groups have 
supported local civil society in raising awareness at the domestic and global 
level, calling for increased corporate accountability. Under this spotlight, 
multinational corporations as well as larger domestic companies implicated 
in these rights abuses have, in some instances, sought out TBHRs as either a 
superficial means of cover, or in a genuine effort to understand and address the 
problems before they begin to pose material risks to the business. Likewise, 
communities, in tandem with civil society organisations, have also sometimes 
looked to TBHRs as a more accessible means of seeking remedy. 
TBHRs take various forms: self-regulating instruments such as corporate 
codes of conduct that are designed and implemented by companies themselves 
to ensure their own as well as their supply-chain partners’ compliance with 
human rights standards; regulatory regimes implemented through multi-
stakeholder initiatives involving companies and other actors such as non-
governmental organisations (examples include the Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil, the Ethical Trading Initiative or the Voluntary Principles on Security 
and Human Rights); or compliance mechanisms implemented by international 
or regional financial institutions which build in social and environmental impact 
assessment requirements into approval processes for loans and partnerships, 
such as the Compliance Advisory Ombudsman for the International Finance 
Corporation. Ever-new species of TBHRs proliferate to address the variety of 
issues and dynamics in the business and human rights space. 
Proponents of this trend towards transnational private regulation believe 
that these mechanisms bring the benefits of plurality: different types of rule-
making and the increase in rule-making capacity can mean thicker protection 
for human rights (Barendrecht et al. 2013). Further, TBHRs are seen to be 
more efficient and more flexible than state-based regulation, the latter being 
unduly constraining in achieving rights-based solutions when the abuses in 
question involve complex situations (Rees 2012). An often quoted example is 
that of child labour, where mediation-based mechanisms may achieve better 
outcomes by taking into account the reasons why the child is working and 
finding appropriate solutions in ways that litigation may not. 
Those more circumspect about TBHRs question whether these mechanisms 
are accountable to victims, whether the voluntary nature of some of the 
mechanisms prevents enforceability, and whether the imbalances of power 
between the victims and the companies distort the fairness of the processes 
(Deva 2012). Skeptics question the effects of TBHRs upon social change 
asking, for example, if they encourage States to further renege on their duties 
to protect human rights against corporate abuses (Perez 2011).
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In any case, the place of TBHRs within the business and human rights 
landscape is quite secure. Indeed the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011, support 
the use of TBHRs as a means to deliver due diligence as well as access to 
remedy, both being obligations associated with the Principles’ requirements of 
meeting the corporate responsibility to respect human rights and of ensuring 
greater access by victims to effective grievance mechanisms.2 
For better or worse?
The problem, however, is that analysis of TBHRs is focused mainly upon 
investigating whether they are in and of themselves effective regulatory 
instruments (that is, assessing the efficiency of these instruments in ensuring 
compliance or legitimacy) or whether they provide adequate access to remedies 
to victims. In both regards, they are often juxtaposed against state-based laws or 
legal institutions for rights-protection, assessed as either better than, or worse 
than the latter. There are, however, shortcomings in conceptualising TBHRs as 
part of a wider human rights ecosystem whereby their introduction, as a new 
species of regulatory regime, may effect the nature and functioning of other 
existing regimes as well as that of the ecosystem as a whole. 
In effect, TBHRs pluralise human rights protection by introducing into a 
traditionally public terrain alternative private fora for determining applicable 
human rights norms and standards and for adjudicating or mediating disputes 
arising in connection with corporate-related rights abuses. Not examining their 
pluralising effects precludes an understanding of whether the systemic impact 
of having TBHRs is net-beneficial or net-detrimental to protection against or 
remedy of corporate-related human rights abuses. Ignoring the question of 
how TBHRs interact with other rights-related regimes makes it difficult to 
ascertain whether they actually enhance, complement, support, marginalise or 
undermine the latter, or importantly, to assess the implications of any of these 
possible relational effects upon rights discourse and praxis. 
TBHRs, the role of law and the meaning of human rights
The role of law in protecting against and remedying corporate-related human 
rights abuses is in a state of flux. As suggested earlier, TBHRs are most often 
justified on the basis that the law has failed. The relatively slow evolution 
of law to address business and human rights can be, in part, traced back to 
normative and doctrinal barriers to finding non-state actors responsible for 
human rights violations. Consequently, most legal challenges have been based 
2 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 
2011) (by Professor John Ruggie) [hereinafter ‘The Guiding Principles’]. 
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on civil, criminal law, or administrative law,3 rather than claims for breaches 
of fundamental freedoms or rights protected under national constitutions or 
international human rights law. In pursuing such cases, whereas the harm may 
be ‘named’ as human rights abuse, the ‘claiming’ process in the dispute usually 
veers aware from addressing it as such4 (Felstiner et al. 1980). For example, 
in a tort claim, the injury may be presented as trespass to the person or the 
claim framed as negligence. According to McCorquodale, one consequence 
of this phenomenon may be that ‘we lose the powerful, challenging idea of 
human rights’ when legal challenges are framed without human rights-related 
legislation or international conventions.5 
Further, in making these claims numerous doctrinal and evidential obstacles 
present. There are also the overwhelming practical barriers to accessing the 
judicial system ranging from lack of financial resources, to simply lacking the 
capabilities to engage the legal system (Taylor et al. 2009). Having said this, 
there is an ‘expanding web of liability’ (Thompson, Ramasastry and Taylor 
(2009) cited by Zerk 2014, 14) for corporate abuses of human rights and 
there continue to be efforts to test and engage the law’s muscle in addressing 
these contemporary human rights challenges presented by corporate-related 
harms. At the international level, the current process in the UN Human Rights 
Council to explore an international treaty represents one such effort. As the law 
is evolving within a regulatory space occupied – indeed prominently so – by 
TBHRs, it is important to think about what influence or impact these may 
have upon its development. As a human rights advocate, my particular interest 
is in how TBHRs affect the development of law as a counter-hegemonic force. 
There are a number of ways in which TBHRs could affect the role of law 
– and the meaning of human rights – through their presence and interactions 
with it. For example, where the law provides few reference points for their 
decision-making, judges may reference or even show deference to the processes 
and outcomes of alternative dispute resolution proceedings provided by the 
TBHR where these are seen as relevant to a case before them6 and especially 
3 For a comprehensive account of these, see Zerk (2014) and Skinner, McCorquodale, 
and De Schutter (2014).
4 An exception to this may be the Alien Tort Claims Act cases where the US district 
courts have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort where that 
tort is committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. 
5 Presentation by Professor Robert McCorquodale, Director of the British Institute 
for International and Comparative Law at a Seminar on Transnational Corporate 
Human Rights Abuses: Delivering Access to Justice, London, UK, 17 July 2014.
6 Known as ‘legal endogeneity’, the concept developed by Lauren Edelman and her 
collaborators (Edelman et al. 2011) suggests that law acquires meaning from (and in 
this way becomes endogenous to) the social arenas it seeks to regulate. Her research 
considered how organisations that actively participate in the construction of the 
meaning of compliance with the law generate “ideologies of rationality” which in 
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where the norms and standards set by TBHRs become ubiquitous with the site 
or type of grievance.7 
TBHRs may influence rights mobilisation; for example, activists may 
disengage with the legal regime, preferring recourse to TBHR norms and 
processes as a way of confronting or resolving grievances involving affronts to 
human dignity or, alternatively, may be encouraged to pursue litigation having 
had negative experiences with TBHRs. In framing a grievance, activists may 
choose to amalgamate norms from both TBHRs as well as the law so as to 
generate hybrid understandings of rights in their rights mobilisation. TBHRs 
may influence rights consciousness, that is the way individuals and communities 
think about and act towards human rights, affecting the way they understand, 
engage with or use the law to protect their rights (Engel 2012; McCann 2012). 
TBHRs may hamper the transformative or counter-hegemonic potential of 
the law by shifting the articulation of the scope of rights, their protection and 
their remedy from a public into a private space. This could ‘create an illusion 
of accountability and thus reduce the demand for actual change’ (Chesterman 
2011, 63) that may arguably be better secured through litigation. Alternatively, 
they may actually encourage the transformative potential by offering new 
visions of how human rights could be reflected in law.
The point is little light is shed on the interactions between TBHRs and 
legal regimes. Whilst policy-makers actively promote TBHRs in line with a 
paradigmatic shift from government to governance, scant attention is being 
paid to the systemic effects and implications relating to their implementation 
upon the role of law and the meaning of human rights in contemporary 
practice. Deepening our understanding of these would be an important gauge 
of the future of human rights protection in our globalised world. 
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The impact of legal aid cuts on access to justice in the UK
Smita Shah
Lawyers would argue that this is an epochal moment for access to justice in 
the UK. Time will judge in due course; for now it worth simply setting a 
marker down to capture what has passed. The date to note is 1 April 2013: 
this was when the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
(LASPO), an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom, came into affect. 
LASPO changed the landscape of civil legal aid in England and Wales1 not 
only in how and by whom legal aid was administered; LASPO profoundly 
altered what remained within scope for legal aid, taking private family law 
disputes such as divorce and child custody, immigration, housing, debt and 
social welfare and employment out of the provision of legal aid save for those 
cases where ‘domestic violence is involved, life or liberty are at stake or people 
risk losing their home’ (BBC 2013). The cuts were introduced with the aim to 
shave off £350 million from the £2 billion civil and criminal legal aid budget, 
primarily in civil legal aid with proposals for eventual cuts in criminal legal aid. 
For a nation in financially difficult times following the banking crisis of 2008 
and subsequent recession, the retrenchment of the public services was bitter 
surgery the nation would have to endure. Why would the provision of legal aid 
be immune from excision? 
At the time, LASPO faced an avalanche of criticism from: the judiciary; both 
arms of the legal profession (solicitors represented through The Law Society and 
barristers represented through the Bar Council); Citizens Advice Bureaux; Law 
Centres; the advice sector; non-governmental organisations; and eventually 
even the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women2 for the impact such cuts would have on access to justice for the most 
vulnerable members of society. A deferential, conservative and competitively 
1 Scotland and Northern Ireland are subject to their own provisions due to devolution 
and legal aid remains available in Scotland. 
2 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 
Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GBR/CO/7 (30 July 2013).
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divided profession (solicitors and barristers) unified and revolted: the Criminal 
Bar Association aligned itself with criminal law solicitors, while the Justice 
Alliance unified the civil wing of the professions and called for protests and 
boycotts of court proceedings, despite the threat of possible disciplinary action 
by the Bar Standards Board on barristers taking part.3 The government of the 
day countered with accusations of self-interest and self-enrichment on the part 
of the legal profession. 
Self-interest notwithstanding, it is worth taking a step back to consider 
what the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers (1990), sets 
out in its preamble: ‘Whereas adequate protection of the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms to which all persons are entitled, be they economic, 
social and cultural, or civil and political, requires that all persons have effective 
access to legal services provided by an independent legal profession’. The Basic 
Principles set out not only the role of lawyers, their duties and responsibilities. 
Governmental obligations are to ensure that access is equal and effective to all 
persons within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction (Principle 2) and 
that there is sufficient funding to ensure access for those who are disadvantaged 
(Principle 3). Note also a special emphasis upon ‘the important role of lawyers 
in protecting their fundamental freedoms’ (Principle 4). Lawyers are the 
medium and the conduits to ensure access to justice. 
How do LASPO legal aid reforms sit within the commitment the UK has 
to ensure access to justice? International human rights law has much comfort 
to offer here. Access to justice has commonly been thought of as a facilitative 
right, a right without which others cannot be enforced (Articles 2(3), 3, 26 
ICCPR, Articles 5, 6 ICERD, Article 2(2) ICESCR, Article 2 CEDAW and 
soft law in the form of the UN Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid 
in Criminal Justice System (2012)). When placed within the menu of the rule of 
law principles, it has increasingly come to have a value in and of itself. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in considering the American 
Convention on Human Rights, has pronounced that the State’s failure to 
provide legal aid necessary to enable the effective exercise of a form of legal 
3 BBC (2015), Lawyers protesting outside courts over legal aid cuts (6 Jan. 2015), 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25597617(accessed 8 Oct. 2015); 
Owen Bowcott, Peter Walker and Lisa O’Carroll (2014), ‘Courts close across 
England and Wales as lawyers protest at legal aid cuts’, The Guardian (6 Jan. 2014), 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/jan/06/courts-close-england-
wales-lawyers-legal-aid-cuts (accessed 8 Oct. 2015); James Cusick (2015), Legal 
aid cuts: Criminal courts across England and Wales could grind to a halt as lawyers 
protest, The Independent (26 June 2015), available at http://www.independent.
co.uk/news/uk/home-news/criminal-courts-across-england-and-wales-could-
grind-to-a-halt-as-lawyers-protest-legal-aid-cuts-10346409.html (accessed 8 Oct. 
2015); Justice Alliance (2015), Legal aid cuts threaten our very democracy, available 
at https://justiceallianceuk.wordpress.com (accessed 8 Oct. 2015).
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recourse renders that recourse illusory and that this constitutes a violation by 
the state of Article 1(1), 8 and 25 of the Convention (Hilaire, Constantine and 
Benjamin et al v. Trinidad and Tobago Judgement 21 June 2002). 
Article 14 (3) (d) ICCPR and Article 6(3)(c) of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms explicitly set 
out governmental obligations for the provision of legal aid in criminal justice. 
Jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights when considering 
Article 6(3)(c) has elaborated that this has a means (indigence) and merits (the 
interests of justice) test for the provision of legal aid (Artico v. Italy, Judgment of 
May 13, 1980, Pakelli v. Germany, Judgment of April 25, 1983 and Quaranta 
v. Switzerland, Judgment of May 24, 1991). 
What of civil legal aid? In the Airey v. Ireland, Judgment of October 9, 1979, 
the European Court of Human Rights found that Article 6 (1) also implies the 
right to free legal assistance in certain civil cases. Mrs Airey sought free legal 
assistance to institute divorce proceedings against her abusive husband, who 
refused to sign a voluntary separation agreement. While not an absolute right, 
and subject to curtailment in circumstances, the Court ruled that the right 
applies in civil cases when such assistance proves indispensable for effective 
access to the courts, either because legal representation is mandatory under 
domestic law or because of the complexity of the procedure or the type of 
case. The fact is that the case concerned a marital dispute entailing emotional 
involvement incompatible with the level of objectivity required by advocacy 
in court. 
Have these legal aid reforms created institutional, structural and actual 
barriers impeding access to justice? Sadly, many of the dire predictions came 
to pass: an impact assessment by Warwick University in April 2013 entitled 
The State of the Sector warned of advice deserts in patches across England and 
Wales (Byrom 2013). In March 2015, the Parliamentary Justice Committee 
reported on the impact of the changes to civil legal aid under LASPO. The 
Justice Committee was told that nine law centres had shut down (one in six 
of the law centre network members) and ten such centres run by Shelter (a 
homelessness charity).4 Local Authorities have faced cuts in grants from central 
government and they have in turn stopped funding law centres. A Rights of 
Women survey found that 31.3 per cent of respondents reported that finding 
a legal aid solicitor in her area was difficult, with some respondents reported to 
having to travel between five and 15 miles to find a legal aid solicitor. Factors 
such as closure of legal aid law firms, legal aid departments within firms, smaller 
law firms merging or being swallowed by medium to larger law firms all meant 
4 House of Commons Justice Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2014–15, 4 March 
2015: Impact of Changes to civil legal aid under Part 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, available at http://www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmjust/311/31102.htm (accessed 8 Mar. 2015).
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specialist solicitors who carried out legal aid work in areas such as housing, 
family and immigration were not longer available or accessible.
LASPO created a gateway for victims of domestic violence to be able 
to access legal aid, as long as they could navigate the gateway and provide 
evidence to demonstrate their victim status. Evidence accepted by the Justice 
Select Committee suggested that as many as 39 per cent of women eligible for 
legal aid through the domestic violence gateway were unable to access legal aid 
and hence justice. A Rights of Women survey carried out in 2014 reported 
62.1 per cent of respondents were not already in possession of the evidence 
they required, and 77.8 per cent of those respondents reported that they did 
not know who to ask to obtain a copy of it. 22.7 per cent of respondents had 
to wait for longer than two weeks to receive a copy of the required evidence.5 
Women, even those on benefits, were required to pay £50 for a letter from 
the doctor as proof or £60 for a memorandum of conviction. Owing to the 
strict evidence criteria, some of those excluded are victims who reached out 
to women’s support groups, but not to the authorities; women who called the 
police but whose calls were unanswered; or women who did not call the police 
or see a doctor, because they suffered no serious physical injuries (UNHRC 
2015). 
The cuts came against a backdrop marketisation of all areas of the justice 
system, which had been happening by stealth for a number of years (Genn 
2012). Between 2006 and 2009, the legal profession and legal advice sector 
faced a cap in the fees regime. In 2011, there was a 10 per cent cut across the 
board in all areas of legal aid. The Legal Services Act 2007 enabled general 
legal advice to be given by non-lawyers thereby challenging the monopoly the 
legal profession had upon the provision of legal services. The Bar Standards 
Board (BSB) had started to publish a biennial survey of its profession and 
the background of those practising – a taking-stock exercise about the Bar 
and Barristers. In 2011 and 2013, the BSB found that 37 and 35 per cent 
of the profession were female. In 2013 and in 2011, 61 per cent of family 
practitioners were female, the area hardest hit by the legal aid cuts. The BSB 
Biennial Survey indicated that the majority of the white, male and Oxbridge-
educated barristers are in chancery, commercial and privately paying areas of 
law, which have been traditionally difficult for women and BME (Black and 
minority ethnic) candidates to break into. Family, immigration, housing, and 
crime had been traditionally more accessible to candidates from state schools, 
5 Right of Women’s evidence to the Justice Select Committee on the impact of 
changes to civil legal aid under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012 dated April 2014, available at http://rightsofwomen.org.uk/
wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Evidence-to-the-Justice-Select-Committee-on-the-
impact-of-changes-to.pdf (accessed 8 Oct. 2015).
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the Russell group or newer universities and are predominantly legal-aid 
practitioners.6
LASPO embraced a programme of continued privatisation of prisons 
(Poyner 2012), privatisation of the probation service (Travis 2014), cuts to the 
budget of Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service (Hyde 2012; 2015), an 
increase in court fees for employment dispute cases, divorce applications and 
the on-going closure of court houses themselves (157 court houses in 2010 
and a further 91 court houses proposed in July 2015) (Family Law Week n.d.; 
BBC 2015). 
The cuts in legal aid were designed to divert people away from contentious 
litigation and towards mediation and alternate dispute resolution; this did not 
happen for the simple reason that there was no accompanying mass public 
awareness and education campaign. The public became aware that civil legal 
aid was no more and stopped going to see lawyers; they did not, to the horror 
of the courts, stop seeking resolution of disputes through the court. Hence the 
rise in litigants in person and increasing delays in court. Alternate legal services 
providers have sprung up to fill the void, including self-help guides available 
on the internet, over the telephone, or in books; unregulated services such as 
McKenzie Friends (who are allowed to assist but not act as lawyers in court), 
student law clinics and pro bono services by larger commercial law firms. The 
latter remains controversial within the legal profession, the dilemma being to 
legitimise the erosion of access to justice by filling the void left by professional 
flight of experienced legal aid lawyers. 
How does marketisation of the justice system sit within a state obligation 
to ensure access to justice and legal aid? The desire on the part of successive 
governments has been to promote informal resolution of legal disputes, 
diversion away from the formal justice system and privatisation of institutions 
and actors. In order to achieve this, the public are required to engage with 
these different means of resolving legal dispute; the cuts in civil legal aid did 
not have the corresponding change in public behaviour. Perceptions of justice, 
fairness and adjudication still involve lawyers, courts and trials. The difference 
is now qualitative; access to justice has migrated from being an entitlement the 
state is obliged to provide for to an act of charity, fulfilled at the behest of the 
goodwill of unaccountable others. This is a precarious position for any human 
right to be in.
6 Bar Standards Board (2014), Barristers’ Working Lives: a second biennial survey of 
the bar 2013, available at https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1597662/
biennial_survey_report_2013.pdf (accessed 16 June 2015). Bar Standards Board 
(2012), Barristers’ Working Lives: a second biennial survey of the bar 2011, available 
at https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1385164/barristers__working_
lives_30.01.12_web.pdf (accessed 16 June 2015). 
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Remedy Australia: because every human rights violation 
should be remedied
Olivia Ball
‘Any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognised are violated shall 
have an effective remedy ...’
– International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2(3)
In the 20 years the Institute of Commonwealth Studies has been teaching the 
MA in human rights, 40 individual complaints of human rights violations by 
Australia have been upheld by the UN treaty bodies. This places Australia fifth 
of all participating nations for adverse findings by the UN committees (behind 
South Korea, Jamaica, Belarus and Uruguay).1
Yet, even by the most generous assessment, Australia has implemented only 
15 per cent of these quasi-judicial decisions. Some gross violations identified 
in individual communications, far from being remedied, continue unchecked.2
1 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2014), Statistical survey 
of individual complaints dealt with by the Human Rights Committee (Geneva: United 
Nations), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/
StatisticalSurvey.xls (accessed 23 Sept. 2015); UN Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (2014), Statistical survey of individual complaints dealt with by 
CERD (Geneva: United Nations), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
HRBodies/CERD/StatisticalSurvey.xls (accessed 23 Sept. 2015); UN Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (2015), Status of communications dealt with 
by CAT (Geneva: United Nations), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
HRBodies/CAT/StatisticalSurvey.xls (accessed 23 Sept. 2015).
2 The travaux préparatoires of the 2005 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights 
Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (the ‘Van Boven 
Principles’) include a non-exhaustive list of gross violations: ‘genocide; slavery and 
slavery-like practices; summary or arbitrary executions; torture and cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment; enforced disappearance; arbitrary and 
prolonged detention; deportation or forcible transfer of population; and systematic 
discrimination, in particular based on race or gender.’ (T. Van Boven, Study 
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My doctoral research, which looked at the value of UN communications 
to the people who initiate them, may be the first systematic empirical study of 
authors’ experience in dealing with the UN treaty bodies and the long-term 
outcomes of their cases.3 To summarise my findings:
• Exhausting domestic remedies is onerous and often costly. However, 
most authors of individual communications would have pursued 
domestic remedies even without the UN requirement to do so.
• Although the communications procedure is designed to be accessible 
without needing a lawyer, having a lawyer is a big help.
• Authors found the communications procedures and operation of 
the committees difficult to understand and to follow as their case 
progressed, and the committees difficult to contact.4
• UN communications take, on average, more than three years from 
start to finish. Such delays pose difficulties for authors, especially those 
(such as detainees and deportees) experiencing gross violations of their 
human rights while they await an outcome.
• Although Australia has rejected almost all the committees’ final 
views, it has, in most instances, acted on ‘interim views’ from the 
committees. These requests, seeking urgent action where irreparable 
harm is imminent, have most commonly asked Australia not to deport 
an author while their communication is underway. For refugees, this 
may save lives.
concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, UN Doc E/CN4/Sub2/1993/8 
(1993), principle 1.) More than half of the individual communications upheld 
against Australia have concerned arbitrary detention, and some of their authors, 
notably authors of F.K.A.G. et al. v. Australia and M.M.M. et al. v. Australia, are still 
detained. See the UN Human Rights Committee (2014), General comment No. 35, 
Article 9 (Liberty and security of person), UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (16 December 
2014) on what constitutes arbitrary detention.
3 In-depth interviews were conducted with 18 complainants or ‘authors’ of 
communications in which Australia was found to be in breach of its human rights 
treaty obligations – all those authors who could be found and who agreed to 
participate. Only 33 communications had been decided against Australia at that 
point (1994–2013), so over half of all successful authors were interviewed for 
this research. They commented on the risks, time, effort, expense and other costs 
involved in pursuing this form of remedy, relative to the outcomes achieved. See 
O. Ball (2013), All the Way to the UN: Is petitioning a UN human-rights treaty body 
worthwhile?, unpublished doctoral thesis, Monash Law School (Melbourne).
4 Indeed, the treaty bodies sometimes have difficulty contacting authors. Some 
authors had no idea they had won a human rights complaint at the UN – some had 
no memory of even lodging one – until a doctoral student sought to interview them 
about it.
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• A small number of authors suffered significant negative consequences 
connected with their communication, such as hate mail, death threats, 
debt, bankruptcy, loss of employment and declining health, as well as 
opportunity costs while occupied with their communication.
• However, no-one felt any pressure to withdraw their UN complaint 
– either from the Australian government or from third parties. The 
evidence suggests that it is generally safe for people to petition the UN 
committees without fear of reprisal within Australia.5
• As noted above, Australia’s compliance with final views of the treaty 
bodies has been very poor. The great majority of authors has received 
no substantive remedy at all.6 Most people have great difficulty exerting 
effective pressure to obtain compliance with the UN’s views on their 
case. The reasons for this vary, including relative poverty, language 
barriers, incarceration, mental illness, insecure migration status and, 
perhaps most significantly, lack of support from the human rights 
movement.7
• A very limited number of authors report positive outcomes – often 
unexpected or indirect – such as respect among their peers and a 
positive public profile contributing to their professional standing; 
or a sense of achievement and self-confidence in new-found abilities 
developed or revealed in the process of defending their rights. However, 
most authors interviewed reported no positive outcomes from their 
communication.
5 This may help explain the relatively high number of communications brought 
against Australia, along with the generally free access to information about 
communications procedures, the availability of pro bono lawyers willing to assist 
authors and the dominant language of Australia being a UN language. Add to this 
the lack of an interim stratum of a regional court of human rights in the Asia–
Pacific, and people who have exhausted all domestic remedies have nowhere to 
go but the UN. While the risk of reprisal within Australia is low, authors seeking 
asylum may be placed at greater risk in their country of origin if they are identified 
in final views and refouled. Published views have revealed not only asylum seekers’ 
identity, but also details of their family and the basis of their refugee claim. Some 
authors, and apparently some of their representatives, are not aware they can request 
anonymity from the treaty bodies.
6 In a limited sense, the verdict of a court or tribunal as to whether a human rights 
violation has occurred is itself a remedy. But surely the ICCPR’s promise of an 
effective remedy means more than this. It is helpful to distinguish mere procedural 
remedies provided by courts from the substantive remedies which ought to follow, in 
which action is taken to end the violation (cessation), repair harm done (reparations) 
and/or prevent further violations (non-repetition).
7 A notable exception is the Australian human rights lawyers and legal academics who 
have represented authors. Most, if not all, have done so pro bono but few concern 
themselves with pursuing implementation of treaty body views.
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One might expect bitterness. The surprise finding was that most authors 
regard their UN communication as having been worthwhile. Despite the 
negative consequences far outnumbering any positive outcomes, most people 
thought complaining to the UN had been worth it. The value to authors of 
vindication by one of the world’s highest human rights authorities is not to 
be underestimated, especially as it comes after the long journey of exhausting 
domestic remedies and the discouragement of having ‘lost’ their case at every 
prior tribunal.
In short, victims value procedural remedies, even in the absence of 
substantive remedies. Which is not to say they don’t want substantive remedies, 
but they do face formidable challenges in securing them.
The Australian experience suggests authors are more likely to obtain a 
substantive remedy if they are able to secure significant media coverage of 
their UN case; and if they have ongoing, organised support of some kind. In 
Australia at least, most UN communications receive very little media coverage. 
Without public attention on the violation, there will be no public pressure; 
and without pressure exerted on duty-holders, they may be unlikely to provide 
a remedy.
Thus there seemed to be a gap in civil society for an organisation dedicated 
to publicising UN communications as they arrive, monitoring the state’s 
response to them, and exerting political pressure, where necessary, to ensure 
implementation of committee views. Nick Toonen and I founded such an 
organisation and called it Remedy Australia.
Nick Toonen is the author of the very first individual communication filed 
against Australia. Toonen v. Australia was ‘a decision of historic proportions … 
with wide-ranging implications for the human rights of millions of people’.8 
It was exceptional in many ways, not least because it was initiated by a human 
rights NGO as a form of strategic litigation, backed by a long advocacy 
campaign for equality and justice (see box).
Toonen remains unsurpassed as the high-water mark for successful 
implementation of committee views in Australia. It is no accident that it 
resulted in substantive remedies for Mr Toonen and all LGBTI Tasmanians. 
No other author has had the benefit of a dedicated and determined civil 
society campaign to capitalise on his UN win. In contrast, most authors of 
communications against Australia remain disempowered, isolated and without 
remedy. They disappear from view, along with their case. Human rights 
organisations have generally failed to support authors and to capitalise on these 
high-level, independent pronouncements on states’ human rights performance. 
8 N. Pillay (2011) ‘UN Human Rights Chief highlights Australian sexuality case’ 
video address, uploaded by the Australian High Commission for Human Rights 
on its YouTube channel (25 July 2011), available at http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=NT5aBa-1bXs (accessed 17 Sept. 2015).
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Toonen v. Australia (HRC, 1994)
Nick Toonen was a gay Tasmanian in a state where consenting sex between 
adult men in private was still punishable by up to 25 years’ jail. Mr Toonen 
alleged that this violated his right to privacy and that the only effective 
remedy would be repeal of the relevant provisions of the Tasmanian 
Criminal Code. The Australian Government agreed with Mr Toonen, 
noting that homosexuality had been decriminalised in all other Australian 
jurisdictions. The Tasmanian Government defended its laws, however, on 
public health and moral grounds.
The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) found the laws were 
an arbitrary interference with Mr Toonen’s right to privacy and that an 
effective remedy would require the repeal of those laws. It also established 
that the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of ‘sex’ found in 
ICCPR articles 2(1) and 26 includes sexual orientation. Australia enacted 
the Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act 1994 (Cth) to prohibit laws that 
arbitrarily interfere with the sexual conduct of adults in private. Tasmania 
subsequently amended its Criminal Code.
Meanwhile, pressure on the state to provide each successful author with an 
effective and enforceable remedy diminishes over time.
If the UN’s individual communication procedures are to be of practical 
value in preventing and redressing human rights violations, many countries may 
benefit from systematic civil society monitoring of treaty body jurisprudence 
and follow-up activity to ensure implementation of committee views.
Remedy Australia maintains a comprehensive online database of successful 
Australian communications and advocates for implementation of the remedies 
recommended by the committees exactly as stated in their final views. We 
campaign for individual remedies only with the consent of the author and/or 
their lawyer. The treaty bodies usually recommend guarantees of non-repetition 
as well, often in the form of law or policy reform. Thus remedies are not only 
for the individual, but should achieve broader, systemic advances in human 
rights protection.
In our first year, we had a significant win with Horvath v. Australia (see box). 
Working with Ms Horvath’s lawyers, we mobilised thousands of supporters in 
an on- and off-line campaign that secured her a public apology and ex gratia 
payment as compensation, setting a new standard for timely and good-faith 
responses to individual communications, a mere five months after the UN 
Human Rights Committee’s final views. The Police Act has also been amended, 
but Ms Horvath’s lawyers – a community legal centre specialising in police 
misconduct cases – are not satisfied it goes far enough, and thus the Horvath 
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Horvath v. Australia (HRC, 2014)
During an unlawful police raid on her home, 21–year-old Corinna Horvath 
was thrown to the floor and punched repeatedly in the face by a policeman 
until she was unconscious and her nose broken. She required surgery 
for her injuries. The County Court found the police guilty of trespass, 
assault, unlawful arrest and false imprisonment, and awarded Ms Horvath 
compensation, but the police force denied liability and did not discipline 
or prosecute any of the police officers involved. Eighteen years after the 
assault, the HRC found that Ms Horvath’s right to an effective remedy has 
been violated and recommended law reform and compensation.
Nystrom v. Australia (HRC, 2011)
Stefan Nystrom was born in Sweden and entered Australia as a baby only 
27 days old. Mr Nystrom began hearing voices in childhood and has 
suffered psychiatric symptoms throughout his life. From the age of ten, he 
began offending, usually under the influence of alcohol, leading ultimately 
to terms in prison.
At the age of 30, seven years after his last offence, during which time 
he had been law-abiding, steadily employed and recovering from his 
alcoholism, Mr Nystrom’s visa was cancelled on character grounds. An 
appeal to the Federal Court found him to be ‘an absorbed member of the 
Australian community with no relevant ties elsewhere’. The Immigration 
Minister appealed successfully to the High Court, however, and in 2009 
deported Mr Nystrom to Sweden. Mr Nystrom knows no-one in Sweden 
and, due to a learning disability, has little capacity to learn Swedish or 
integrate successfully. Known locally as ‘The Australian’, Mr Nystrom has 
spent years either homeless, in homeless shelters, in prison or in psychiatric 
care.
The HRC found Mr Nystrom’s deportation constituted arbitrary 
interference with his right to family and (in a landmark ruling) his ‘right 
to enter his own country’, which is Australia, despite his not being an 
Australian citizen. Further, his expulsion was arbitrary – occurring so long 
after his offending. In the view of the HRC, he should be permitted and 
materially assisted to return to Australia. Australia has refused to allow Mr 
Nystrom back into Australia, but says it has made policy reforms to guard 
against repetition.
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case is only partially remedied and we continue to campaign for further law 
reform.
Conversely, in the case of Nystrom, Australia has acted to prevent repetition, 
but refuses to remedy the individual violation, which Remedy Australia regards 
as urgent, given the violation is ongoing and given Mr Nystrom’s vulnerabilities 
and parlous existence (see box).
Finally, in addition to publicising committee views and advocating for 
individual and preventive remedies, Remedy Australia seeks to close the loop 
by feeding information back to the UN treaty bodies. Through direct contact 
with authors and their representatives and systematic monitoring, we provide 
the UN committees with independent, accurate and up-to-date information 
on any progress towards implementation of each of its views, complementing 
and supporting the treaty bodies’ own efforts at follow-up.
We welcome the establishment of sister organisations around the world. Is 
there a need for a branch of Remedy where you are?
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Extraterritorial non-refoulement: intersections between 
human rights and refugee law
David James Cantor
How does international law require States acting outside their own territories 
to treat refugees and other persons fleeing harm in their countries?1 This 
question has assumed increasing contemporary relevance in light of heightened 
externalised border controls, such as attempts by States to interdict migrant 
boats on the high seas in the Mediterranean (see, for instance Moreno-Lax 
2012). However, the issue also arises in other contemporary scenarios, such as 
where persons seek protection in diplomatic or consular premises, where one 
State militarily occupies the territory of another, and where a State sets up a 
system for the extraterritorial processing of asylum claims. 
This short analysis addresses the non-refoulement aspect of this 
extraterritoriality problem, i.e. protection against enforced removal to a 
territory where the person fears harm by a State acting outside its own territory. 
Inspired by the human rights focus of the volume overall, the chapter draws 
on current research by the author in order to examine this ever-topical concern 
against recent advances in the field of international human rights law. It not 
only confirms the view that the non-refoulement rule in human rights law applies 
extraterritorially, but also concludes that the resulting procedural implications 
should be taken seriously both for human rights law and for refugee law.
Development of human rights doctrine on ‘extraterritoriality’
The many human rights treaties adopted by the United Nations (UN) and 
regional organisations offer a patchwork of different legal provisions for the 
protection of human rights by contracting States. Rather than reprise the basic 
elements of this framework, as the basis for subsequent discussion, the present 
1 This intriguing question was recently raised by Ralph Wilde in his seminar on ‘The 
Extraterritorial Application of the Non-refoulement Obligation in International 
Human Rights Law’, 5th International Refugee Law Seminar Series, Refugee Law 
Initiative, School of Advanced Study, University of London. 5 May 2015. 
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section instead outlines two doctrinal advances concerning extraterritoriality in 
human rights law: the jurisdiction of States acting extraterritorially (Wilde 2003); 
and the prohibition of refoulement to human rights violations in another territory.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction of States
International treaties governing human rights usually require that a contracting 
State respect and ensure these rights for persons subject to their territorial 
jurisdiction, i.e. who are present on its territory. However, students on the 
MA in Human Rights who have taken the law module in recent years will (or 
should!) be familiar with the idea that these same States will also sometimes 
be required to respect and/or ensure the human rights of individuals outside 
their territory. Indeed, it seems that human rights obligations arise where a 
State exercises certain forms of authority – or ‘jurisdiction’ – outside its own 
territory. This could be on the territory of another State or outside territory 
claimed by any State (e.g. on the high seas). 
The famous judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Al-
Skeini and Others v. UK identifies some scenarios in which such ‘extraterritorial’ 
jurisdiction exists. Firstly, where a State exercises effective control over a zone 
outside its national territory, whether as a consequence of lawful or unlawful 
military action, then it is apparently required to guarantee the full gamut of 
treaty rights to persons in that zone.2 Secondly, where State officials exercise 
control and authority over an individual – whether through diplomatic/ 
consular acts or through the use of force – then this form of jurisdiction requires 
that the State guarantee the rights pertinent to the situation of that individual. 
‘In this sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be “divided and tailored”’.3 
This rationale is largely in line with the emerging doctrine being developed 
by other international courts and treaty body mechanisms. It strongly suggests 
that human rights obligations – or at least in relation to certain rights – will 
remain applicable to States in certain scenarios where certain concrete acts by 
their agents take place, or produce effects, extraterritorially. 
Refoulement to extraterritorial human rights violations
The other main area in which international human rights law has developed 
doctrinally in order to address issues of extraterritoriality is in relation to 
the principle of ‘non-refoulement’. Deriving originally from refugee law, this 
principle prohibits a State from removing an alien (foreigner) from its territory 
where this would result in serious harm to the alien outside that territory. 
However, since the 1980s, this principle has been developed considerably by 
international human rights law.
2 Al-Skeini and Others v. UK, paras 133–7.
3 Ibid., paras 138–40.
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In human rights law, the non-refoulement principle is derived principally from 
the core prohibition on torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
The idea is that if it is illegal for a State to torture a person under its own jurisdiction, 
then equally it must be prohibited to remove him/her to another territory where s/
he would be tortured. The principle finds concrete expression, inter alia, in Article 
3 of the 1984 UN Convention Against Torture and it has been read into most 
other treaties that prohibit torture etc. in more general terms.4
The human rights non-refoulement principle has a strong speculative 
aspect, i.e. it is engaged by the envisaged risk extraterritorially. As such, it 
does not establish the removing State’s responsibility for acts committed by 
others outside its territory. Rather, where the risk of serious abuse awaits the 
alien at the other end, the principle typifies the act of removal – initiated on 
the territory of the removing State – as ‘degrading’ or ‘inhumane’.5 For this 
reason, even where the abuse overseas does not take the specific form of torture 
but rather interference with other rights (e.g. fair trial), the non-refoulement 
principle can prevent removal where the abuse of other rights is ‘flagrant’.6 
Non-refoulement in extraterritorial contexts
Human rights law frames extraterritorial considerations according to two 
distinct rationales, as shown above. In the context of refoulement, the removing 
State’s responsibility is engaged by its own actions on its territory albeit in 
light of the potential eventual consequences extraterritorially. Where a State 
acts outside its territory, human rights obligations bite directly wherever 
jurisdiction is exercised. What, though, is the legal position where both 
rationales apply simultaneously, i.e. where a State acting extraterritorially is 
faced with a situation of potential refoulement?
Applicability of non-refoulement principle extraterritorially?
The doctrinal analysis above shows that States acting extraterritorially will 
sometimes be exercising jurisdiction in a manner constitutive of human rights 
obligations. The question here is whether those obligations encompass the non-
refoulement principle. 
4 Thus, the European Court of Human Rights reads the principle into Article 3 of 
the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights in Soering v. UK; the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights reads it into Article 5 of the 1969 American 
Convention on Human Rights in its Advisory Opinion OC-21/14 on Rights and 
Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration and/or in Need of International 
Protection; and the Human Rights Committee reads it into Article 7 of the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Chitat Ng v. Canada.
5 See the European Court of Human Rights in Soering v. UK, para. 91. 
6 See the European Court of Human Rights in Othman (Abu Qatada) v. UK, paras. 
258–85. 
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In principle, in the first Al-Skeini scenario of a State exerting effective 
control over a zone of another State’s territory, non-refoulement should remain 
applicable alongside other human rights guarantees. Thus, in the example 
of military occupation, human rights law presumably should prevent an 
occupying State from removing a person from occupied territory where the 
risk of human rights abuse at the other end exists.7 
Less straightforward is the second Al-Skeini scenario of the State agent(s) 
exerting control and authority over an individual extraterritorially. In contrast 
to the first scenario, the State agent(s) is/are acting in a context where the 
wider apparatus of their own State is not present and in control. We are thus 
much less likely to be talking about situations involving the ‘removal of aliens’ 
in relation to which much of the human rights non-refoulement doctrine has 
been developed. A broader spectrum of scenarios exists in which the principle 
of non-refoulement is, in the words of the Al-Skeini judgment, more or less 
relevant to the situation of that individual.
Some of these scenarios will have clear and direct parallels with the 
established non-refoulement removal paradigm. This is the case, for instance, 
where a State official attempts to transfer an individual under his/her power 
to another country (whether by kidnap or formal procedure) where the risk 
of harm exists. A similar scenario may be where a State official on a boat turns 
back, or escorts back, a boat full of migrants encountered on the open sea to 
a territory where they face harm. In these scenarios, the direct relationship 
between the act of the State agent and exposure to envisaged harm in another 
territory should bring the non-refoulement principle into play.8
However, in other scenarios, it may be less easy to establish a sufficiently 
proximate link between the extraterritorial official act and the envisaged harm 
necessary to engage the non-refoulement principle. If so, then we may see greater 
jurisprudential development around the legal threshold for such proximity 
in the future. The challenge will be particularly acute in cases that do not 
involve use of force against a person by a State agent but rather revolve around 
diplomatic or consular acts. It will be interesting to see the extent to which 
such developments redraw the international law parameters of diplomatic 
asylum, i.e. temporary asylum granted on diplomatic premises (Noll 2005). 
7 Even if the laws of war apply simultaneously as lex specialis, and thus modify certain 
human rights obligations, the two bodies of law largely march in line in prohibiting 
refoulement. For a more detailed analysis of the position under the laws of war, see 
Cantor (2014).
8 This has been confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights in cases such as, 
respectively, Öcalan v. Turkey and Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy. 
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Procedural implications of the applicability of the non-refoulement 
principle? 
One element that is missing from much of the discussion surrounding these 
themes is the question of whether, or to what extent, procedural guarantees 
apply in this extraterritorial context. In other words, does human rights law 
require that certain procedural or due process guarantees must be observed by 
State agents acting outside their territory when deciding whether the principle 
of non-refoulement applies to a particular situation or individual? From an 
administrative perspective, this processual aspect is crucial since it is not usually 
apparent from a quick glance whether or not any individual should benefit 
from the non-refoulement rule, but rather requires deeper investigation of their 
particular circumstances.
Where potential refoulement arises in the removal context on a State’s own 
territory, international human rights jurisprudence has increasingly adopted 
the consensus that the removal decision must be taken in line with due process 
guarantees (Cantor 2015). The various international human rights systems 
provide different legal bases and rationales for this development. Nonetheless, 
where the risk of refoulement is in issue, all generally require, inter alia, that 
the alien: has access to decision-making by a ‘competent’ national authority; 
independent, individual, rigorous and prompt scrutiny of the issue; automatic 
suspensive effect of the removal measure; a reasoned decision; and often the 
opportunity to challenge it at a higher instance, usually the national courts. 
There is little doubt that these guarantees would apply in the first Al-Skeini 
scenario, where the State effectively continues to act as a State albeit on another 
State’s territory. However, the implications are likely to be much more far-
reaching in the second Al-Skeini scenario where the agent(s) of the State acting 
outside its territory exercise control and authority over an individual. Indeed, 
they would need either to be, or to have recourse to, authorities competent 
to evaluate these cases and take such decisions. Moreover, the requirement to 
do so in accordance with due process standards entails in itself access to a 
considerable bureaucratic (and also likely judicial) infrastructure.
For instance, where boats of migrants are intercepted and pushed back on 
the high seas, do these human rights guarantees require a proper decision-
making process for any passengers who express or reasonably may be believed 
to have a fear of harm? In other words, does the full gamut of procedural 
guarantees applicable to refoulement in the context of removal apply? Recent 
case-law from the European Court of Human Rights suggests this question is to 
be answered in the affirmative, holding that the migrants’ right to an effective 
remedy was breached by the fact that they had ‘no access to a procedure to 
identify them and to assess their personal circumstances’ before they were 
directed back to a territory where they faced possible harm.9 
9 See Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, esp. paras. 196–207.
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If correct, then in scenarios where the extraterritorial act of a State agent 
gives rise to an envisaged future risk of harm sufficient to engage the non-
refoulement rule, it would appear that relatively extensive procedural obligations 
materialise requiring that the risk to be assessed and determined in accordance 
with due process standards. In the migrant boat example, this would suggest 
that access to such facilities must be provided, whether on the intercepting boat 
or by disembarkation at a territory where such procedures are available. From 
the human rights perspective, the exercise of State authority over a person 
brings with it certain inescapable human rights obligations. 
Conclusions: intersections between human rights and refugee law
This brief analysis of extraterritoriality shows that State obligations under 
international human rights law do not stop at its borders nor are they blind to 
events beyond them. Rather, the jurisprudence requires a State to take account 
of the human rights implications of expelling or removing an alien across 
such borders and to comply with human rights obligations when it exercises 
jurisdiction beyond those borders. Both requirements are concerned with 
extraterritoriality but from different standpoints and thus they apply different 
rationales. 
Whereas refugee law pioneered the development of the non-refoulement 
principle, it is largely silent on whether this principle and other refugee 
law obligations apply when States act beyond their own borders. Indeed, 
this ambivalence is amply demonstrated in one of the few such cases to be 
decided on a refugee law basis before the courts: in a 1993 decision in Sale, the 
United States (US) Supreme Court held by a majority that refugee law treaty 
obligations did not apply when the US interdicted boats from Haiti on the 
high seas. Although the decision is much criticised, still it stands against the 
lack of any international tribunal for refugee law where its rationale might be 
challenged.
By contrast, recent jurisprudential developments in international human 
rights law strongly suggest that a State acting outside its own territory remains 
bound by the human rights version of the non-refoulement principle. However, 
of perhaps greater significance than the mere applicability of this principle of 
extraterritoriality are the far-reaching procedural implications that this entails, 
particularly in light of the recent jurisprudential advances in the human rights 
field confirming the existence of robust due process standards in cases where 
non-refoulement may be in issue. In brief, it would seem that the provision of 
access to proper procedures for making such determination is obligatory. 
These findings are significant not only in their own right but also for how 
they bolster refugee law. Thus, in some human rights systems, the relevant 
procedural standards also require that refugee status be determined in 
accordance with the same due process guarantees. In other words, at least for 
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people outside their country and in the hands of a State acting extraterritorially, 
the duty to determine human rights refoulement risk marches hand-in-hand 
with a requirement to determine refugee status. Alternatively, access to 
protection against refoulement on human rights grounds can serve as a backstop 
to refugee status, given the degree of overlap between the two. 
Bibliography
Instruments
American Convention on Human Rights, 1969
Convention Against Torture, 1984
European Convention on Human Rights, 1950
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966
Cases
European Court of Human Rights, 1989, Soering v. UK
European Court of Human Rights, 2012, Othman (Abu Qatada) v. UK
European Court of Human Rights, 2014, Öcalan v. Turkey 
European Court of Human Rights, 2011, Al-Skeini and Others v. UK
European Court of Human Rights, 2012, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy
Human Rights Committee, 1994, Chitat Ng v. Canada
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2014, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14 
on Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration and/or in 
Need of International Protection
Commentaries
Cantor, D. J. (2014) ‘Laws of unintended consequence? nationality, allegiance 
and the removal of refugees during wartime’, in D. J. Cantor and J. F. 
Durieux (eds.), Refuge from Inhumanity? War Refugees and International 
Humanitarian Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff), chapter 14.
— (2015) ‘Reframing relationships: revisiting the procedural standards for 
refugee status determination in light of recent human rights treaty body 
jurisprudence’, Refugee Survey Quarterly 34 (1), pp. 79–106.
Moreno-Lax, V. (2012) ‘Hirsi v. Italy or the Strasbourg court versus 
extraterritorial migration control?’, Human Rights Law Review 12 (3), pp. 
574–98.
Noll, G.,(2005) ‘Seeking asylum at embassies: a right to entry under 
international law?’, International Journal of Refugee Law 17 (3), pp. 542–73.
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN SECURING HUMAN RIGHTS120
Wilde, R. (2013) ‘The extraterritorial application of international human 
rights law on civil and political rights’, in N. Rodley and S. Sheeran (eds.), 
Routledge Handbook on Human Rights (London: Routledge), chapter 35.
17
Rethinking Muslim women’s equal rights: faith, property and 
empowerment1
M. Siraj Sait
The pursuit of gender equality and women’s empowerment, especially in parts 
of the Arab and Muslim world, struggles in the face of several conundrums. 
How can women’s civil and political rights be strengthened without 
corresponding attention to their socio-economic rights and poverty alleviation? 
How could women’s participation in the public sphere be expanded when their 
private and intra-household leverage remains limited? How could Muslim 
women’s rights be sustainable through secular discourse in traditional and 
religious communities? How can innovative formulations of women’s rights be 
transformed into workable tools and embedded in formal systems for practical 
gains for Muslim women in complex environments? Recent developments and 
efforts in the arena of women’s access to resources and property offer some fresh 
approaches to women’s empowerment. 
Among the estimated billion Muslim women across the world, the index 
of rights and empowerment dramatically varies reflecting the diverse political, 
economic, legal and religious systems and contexts. The interconnectedness 
and indivisibility between individual freedoms and economic development 
has been long asserted and established, for example, by Amartya Sen linking 
individual capabilities and economic opportunities (Sen 1999) and is apparent 
among Muslim communities. Most civil and political rights dimensions, from 
the choice of hijab (veil or head dress), to the right to drive, to exercise of sexual 
and reproductive rights, or the ability to be leaders, underpin socio-economic 
rights dimensions. Striking among the issues is the often-limited access to 
property, inheritance and land for Muslim women. Yet, it is acknowledged 
that property and land are vital not only for women’s livelihoods, housing and 
economic opportunity but such rights also enhance their physical security from 
1 This research is a part of research funded by the Global Land Tool Network, UN-
Habitat. 
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violence, consolidates their control over their own resources and choices, and 
encourages their public participation. 
The obstacles that Muslim women generally encounter in acquiring 
property and land are invariably similar to other patriarchal and hierarchical 
societies, but several distinctive aspects of tradition and Islamic law often 
intervene. On the positive side, Islamic law, including the holy Qur’an, 
proposes an extensive range of personal property rights for Muslim women 
that includes the rights to acquire, hold, use and dispose of property and land 
freely in her own name (Sait and Lim 2006, 134). Historical evidence points 
to Muslim women being propertied well before their Western counterparts 
(Moors 1996; Shatzmiller 1995). Yet, Muslim women often inherit only half 
the proportion of shares as their equally placed male relatives, though in some 
circumstances they inherit equally or more. Numerous economic and religious 
explanations abound for this gender discrimination, primarily that women 
have no economic responsibilities toward their family, which is the exclusive 
male role. However, unmarried women, women-headed households, as well as 
wives increasingly working shatter the myth of the exclusive male breadwinner 
with positive implications for gender equality in Muslim communities and 
innovative approaches to inheritance within the traditional framework. 
In contrast to other areas of legal reform in the Muslim world, the gender 
differentiated Islamic inheritance rules have mostly endured. Most Muslim 
women abstain from challenging the apparent discrimination as the detailed 
fixed rules are derived from the verses of holy Qur’an (about 35 verses). Islamic 
inheritance is still widely practiced and a ‘pride’ of the community given the 
famous dictum attributed to the Prophet to, ‘equal one half the sum total of 
human knowledge!’ (Makdisi 1994). David Powers, however, rightly points out 
that rather than static automatic division of shares, Islamic inheritance is a 
broader and dynamic system of multi-stage negotiations and planning rather 
than just a body of technical rigid rules (Powers 1993, 13). A series of estate 
planning strategies as well as post inheritance negotiations and adjustments 
take place. Indonesia provides an example of parallel and simultaneous 
inheritance processes with the formal demarcation through Islamic inheritance 
accompanying a more need-based and equitable allocation in accordance with 
tradition (adat), which is lodged with the local land office. 
While Muslim women are often only entitled to half the male share, there 
is nothing in Islamic law that prevents women from having equal property 
and rights. Muslim women frequently argue that inheritance should be viewed 
holistically through interlinked intra-family and intergenerational property 
flow systems, which compensate their inheritance deficit. There are no gender 
restrictions on women receiving property or land under the wasiya (will) that 
is permissible up to a third of an estate. Women can, and often do, receive 
hiba (gifts) from family and outsiders at various stages in their life including 
marriage and beyond. There are other arrangements such as waqf (family 
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endowments), which can theoretically be entirely for females. Associated with 
marriage are several payments including the mahr, which is payable by the 
bridegroom to the bride, payments as per the marriage contract, additional 
compensation for household work (iwad) maintenance during marriage and, in 
most countries, on divorce (nafaqa). In Iran, for example, women are entitled 
to wages for housework (ojrat-ol mesal). Islamic land laws also create gender-
neutral opportunities to acquire land rights through ‘enlivening’ unused land 
productively (mewat) or preemption (shufa). However, formal mechanisms to 
compensate women for their deficient inheritance rights are yet to be developed. 
Inheriting Muslim women face two broad challenges. First, women mostly 
inherit cash, jewels or movable property while immovable property flows away 
from women generally. This reflects the global female land ownership estimated 
at around merely 3 per cent. In many countries, land is constructed to be a 
male domain and women further are considered as members of their husband’s 
family who would take property away from the family. Fragmentation of land 
due to widespread inheritance thereby impacting on viability and economic 
efficiency of land parcels also targets women (Sait and Tempra 2014). Thus, 
ensuring that women have choice over what they inherit is equally important. 
Second, women often ‘voluntarily renounce’ (tanazul) their inheritance rights 
in ‘exchange’ for other property or to preserve family relationships with more 
powerful family members and retain access to the family home. This custom 
is the focus of legal reforms, for example, in Jordan and Palestine, where 
renunciation is to be registered with witnesses and takes effect only after a 
period. An interesting spin-off argument is that if women can renounce their 
inheritance shares in favour of male relatives, nothing prohibits the reverse to 
ensure gendered equal property rights. 
While inheritance for Muslim women has received considerable attention, 
the denial of marital property to women in most Muslim countries has not. 
While Islamic law is admittedly strong on women’s personal property and 
guarantees inheritance, it is silent on a Muslim wife’s claim to her share of 
marital property – that which is acquired during marriage. For Muslim women 
without adequate savings, uncertain inheritance, swift divorces, inadequate 
dower (mahr) and limited maintenance (nafaqa), denial of their share in marital 
property renders them effectively destitute or reliant on natal family or the 
State. Without an independent stake in marital assets, she retains no property 
rights acquired or accessed or ownership interest in their marital home or land 
(Safwat 1995, 6).
Under a UN-Habitat funded project, research has explored the Islamic 
legal framework of marriage and property to demonstrate that Islamic law 
in itself does not inhibit equitable, if not equal, marital property distribution 
among spouses (Sait 2013a). More persuasively, in over a dozen countries 
where Muslims reside as majority (or in multi-religious countries), community 
property regimes or sharing of marital property is far more widespread among 
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Muslims than assumed. The case studies of politically, geographically and 
jurisprudentially diverse Turkey, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Iran, Maldives, Tanzania, Kenya and South Africa underscore the 
complex but often accommodative relationship between marital property 
doctrines and Islamic principles. Furthermore, they offer opportunities for 
comparative legal reform in other countries. 
Women’s access to land is frustrated by the notion of the male as the head of 
the family. Hence property is legally registered in his name even if the woman 
has contributed directly or indirectly to the acquisition of the property. The 
traditional notion of the male as the head of the family has to be challenged. 
The University of East London produced provocative research showing that 
matrilineal kinship cultures (through the female line) and bi-lineal (through 
male or female) in Muslim communities are extensive (Sait 2013b). Dozens 
of case studies from various parts of the globe including India, Sri Lanka, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand, Algeria, Sudan, 
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Tanzania, Comoros, Mozambique 
and Malawi debunked the idea that Muslim women cannot be co-owners of 
property, if not head of the family. This is reflected in successful joint titling 
(where the names of male and females are registered) in several Muslim 
countries, including Indonesia. Encouragingly, several Muslim countries are 
moving away from the legal concept of the male as the head of the family; for 
example, the Mouduwana family code in Morocco (Aixelà Cabré 2007). 
Several themes emerge from the analysis. Muslim marital property 
regimes are negotiated not merely from religious conceptions, but through 
its intersection with custom, family, kinship and the construction of property 
itself. In Muslim societies, legal pluralism prompts choices over marital 
property regimes between remnants of colonial law, modern constitutional and 
human rights provisions and Islamic, customary and secular laws. The varied 
legal reform methodologies of Muslim matrimonial property regimes include 
secularisation, Islamic re-interpretation, cohabitation of custom and Islamic 
law, and legal pluralism. Advocacy, research and legal reform recast Muslim 
women’s rights but can remain paper aspirations that fail to materialise. 
Women are unable to assert their rights in the face of opaque or corrupt land 
registration systems or skewed land policies. Moreover, in their generalised 
form, women’s property rights fail to support poor women on the specifics on 
how to access and retain land in the face of multiple challengers including land 
mafia, unscrupulous developers, official evictors or family competitors. 
The Global Land Tool Network (GLTN) uses a tool-based approach to 
promote human rights and land security by developing tools that identify 
steps in interventions or mechanisms to deliver the objectives of human 
rights, outputs and outcomes. Through a multi-stakeholder process pro-poor, 
gendered and affordable tools are developed that indicate who does what where 
or when, providing information on substance, process and dispute resolution. 
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For example, in relation to access to marital property, several tools are required, 
such as registration of marriage and marriage contract as well as enabling 
responsive institutions dealing with marriage and divorce. Remarkably, GLTN 
has adopted an ‘Islamic Mechanism’ whereby the Islamic dimension needs to 
be considered and used positively where applicable. 
Land and property rights are not simply about ownership documents with 
female names. They encompass individual, collective and customary rights to 
access, use and manage property within a continuum of rights framework. 
Straddling civil and political as well as socio-economic rights, they potentially 
strengthen autonomy, offset vulnerabilities, increase choices, improve access 
to credit and economic opportunities and facilitate equal participation in all 
walks of life. In view of their significance, property rights are a complex and 
contested arena. Muslim property regimes are negotiated through intersection 
of custom, religion, family, kinship and the construction of property itself. 
Thus, the battles for Muslim women’s equal rights are not merely fought on the 
streets, podiums and protest lines but also inside the homes, through religious 
interpretation and negotiations with all stakeholders. Drawing on comparative 
interdisciplinary studies and rights-based approaches within Muslim discourses, 
the endeavour to develop authentic, context-specific tools continues afresh. 
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Power of the law, power to the people: pursuing innovative 
legal strategies in human rights advocacy
Tanja Venisnik1
The use of legal tools and mechanisms in human rights advocacy can play a 
significant role in the advancement of human rights. Although often difficult, 
complex and time-consuming, using legal strategies, particularly strategic 
litigation, in campaigning and advocacy can influence decision-making 
processes and bring actual changes in legislation, policy and practice. It can 
also help raise public awareness about a particular human rights issue and 
empower communities to claim their rights by involving them in designing 
and implementing legal advocacy strategies. 
However, pursuing legal strategies to advance human rights is easier in some 
jurisdictions than in others. In countries where political space for human rights 
advocacy is limited and the rule of law weak, relying on human rights norms 
tends to be inefficient and can even prove counter-productive. In these cases, 
invoking other legal norms, such as environmental protection laws, can prove 
more useful for the improvement of the human rights situation on the ground. 
Struggles of communities affected by large-scale development 
projects
In this respect, working on human rights issues in South East Asia (SEA) 
presents a particular challenge. There is a lack of openness to human rights 
discourse, and the implementation of human rights norms is weak, even if 
those norms are in fact a part of domestic law.2 The inexistence of an effective 
1 The views expressed by the author in this chapter are her own and are not necessarily 
endorsed by the organisation for which she works. 
2 Most SEA countries have ratified core human rights treaties, such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). However, none of the SEA 
countries have ratified the optional protocols establishing and providing access 
to complaints mechanisms under these two treaties. The only exception is the 
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regional human rights mechanism amplifies these challenges.3 In these contexts 
where the judiciary lacks independence and is painstakingly inefficient, access 
to justice for human rights and environmental violations is often difficult. 
Another element that poses further obstacles to the realisation of human 
rights in the SEA region is poorly regulated cross-border investment. As 
ASEAN is developing its Post-2015 agenda and moving towards regional 
economic integration, cross-border investments in the region will continue 
to intensify, especially investments from more developed countries in Asia 
towards less developed. These investments can bring numerous benefits to host 
countries, however, experience shows that large-scale development projects, 
such as hydropower dams, mines, agricultural plantations and coal power 
plants, bring significant risks to the environment and human rights, especially 
when implemented in countries with unstable economies and weak legal 
regimes, most notably in Lower Mekong countries such as Cambodia, Laos 
and Myanmar. 
The pattern of dispossession is staggeringly clear: in the name of economic 
development, local communities who mostly rely on fishing and small-scale 
farming for their livelihoods face loss of land and other natural resources, 
degradation of the environment, loss of livelihoods and impoverishment. 
They see no or very little economic benefits for themselves and are forced to 
leave their homes and traditional livelihoods behind, further worsening their 
economic situation. Environmental degradation caused by such development 
projects, such as CO2 emissions and water pollution, and the depletion of 
natural resources provoke displacement and violent conflict and can have 
negative implications, both direct and indirect, for the effective enjoyment of 
human rights.4 Despite these recognised threats, many development projects in 
SEA are going ahead without enough attention to their environmental impacts 
(local as well as transboundary) and mitigation measures, prior community 
consultations or transparency and corporate accountability. As the frameworks 
for understanding and establishing extra-territorial obligations of states and 
corporate entities have only recently started to develop, communities lack legal 
remedies and avenues to express their concerns and have their grievances heard 
and addressed. 
Philippines that ratified the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. 
3 The member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted 
the Human Rights Declaration and established the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), however, the Declaration is weak and 
not legally binding, whereas the AICHR remains a toothless body with no mandate 
to receive and investigate individual human rights complaints. 
4 UN Human Rights Council, Analytical study on the relationship between human 
rights and the environment, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, UN Doc. H/HRC/19/34 (16 December 2011).
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Addressing environmental concerns plays an important role in addressing 
human rights issues and obtaining remedies for negative human rights impacts 
of environmentally unsustainable development projects. Despite notoriously 
weak implementation of laws in the Mekong region, lawyers, activists and 
communities are increasingly using environmental protection laws in order to 
support broader human rights advocacy efforts. For example, environmental 
impact assessment laws have been used to demand public participation in 
decision-making processes around development projects, whereas land laws 
have been invoked to address land grabs and protect indigenous peoples’ rights. 
In pursuit of meaningful remedies 
However, seeking remedies in countries where violations occur is often simply 
not feasible nor effective due to lack of legal mechanisms, weak government-
controlled judiciary and prominent vested interests, leaving project affected 
communities with no meaningful remedy. 
In recent years, communities, activists and lawyers in the Mekong region 
have increasingly been using innovative legal strategies. They have been able 
to successfully turn to national human rights institutions (NHRIs) to seek 
redress for human rights abuses stemming from large development projects 
posing threats to local people and their environment. This especially relates to 
transboundary cases, such as the well documented Koh Kong Sugar Plantation 
Case in Cambodia. In 2006, hundreds of villagers in Sre Ambel district had 
their lands illegally confiscated and were evicted to make way for a large sugar 
plantation, operated by politically-connected Cambodian companies and 
controlled by Thailand-based Khon Kaen Sugar Ltd. (KSL).5 Unable to obtain 
remedies in Cambodia, local communities filed a complaint to the National 
Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRCT) against KSL. In its recent 
final report in the case, the NHRCT invoked the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights and found that KSL was responsible for human rights 
violations against the affected communities through the business operations 
of its Cambodian subsidiaries and that the land grab was in violation of the 
right to life, the right to self-determination, including the right to manage 
and benefit from natural resources, and the right to development. Although 
NHRCT cannot issue binding decisions and can only make recommendations, 
its findings are nevertheless important for the overall campaign6 and can also 
5 KSL had an exclusive sales contract with Tate & Lyle Sugars (T&L) in the United 
Kingdom.
6 Koh Kong case is part of a global Clean Sugar Campaign that developed in response to 
rampant land grabs in Cambodia and serious human rights abuses and environmental 
damage caused by the Cambodian sugar industry. For more information about 
the campaign and the case, see Inclusive Development International, Cambodia 
Clean Sugar Campaign, available at http://www.inclusivedevelopment.net/sugar/ 
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be used to support community claims in their litigation against T&L in the 
United Kingdom.7 
Another example comes from Malaysia. In 2014, Cambodian and Thai 
communities filed a complaint to the Malaysian Human Rights Commission 
(SUHAKAM) against a Malaysian project developer, Mega First Corporation 
Berhad, building a hydropower dam in Laos (Earth Rights International 
2014). Due to lack of political space and democratic institutions and legal 
mechanisms to address the issue in Laos the affected communities turned to a 
Malaysian institution. The communities claimed that if built, this dam, would 
very likely cause irreversible harm to regional fisheries in the Lower Mekong 
Basin, seriously affecting the lives, livelihoods and health of millions of people 
in Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam. Yet the project developer did not 
study the transboundary impacts of the project or provide sufficient information 
about its impacts. It also failed to provide a meaningful opportunity to affected 
communities in Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand to have their voices 
heard and to express their concerns about the project.
SUHAKAM initially accepted the complaint and conducted separate 
hearings with Mega First but ultimately concluded that it had no mandate to 
address a transboundary issue and therefore could not proceed further with the 
inquiry. It did, however, make recommendations to the Malaysian government 
to develop policies to monitor Malaysian companies operating abroad in order 
to ensure compliance with international human rights standards and adhere 
to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and establish a National 
Contact Point (NCP) complaints mechanism. 
SUHAKAM’s inability to conduct an inquiry into a transboundary case 
highlights legal difficulties of pursuing transboundary legal cases and the need 
to strengthen NHRIs and create an independent and functional regional 
human rights mechanism with a strong mandate. Despite the outcome, solely 
(accessed 8 Oct. 2015); and Earth Rights International, Case Study: Koh Kong 
Sugar, available at http://www.earthrights.org/multimedia/video/case-study-koh-
kong-sugar (accessed 8 Oct. 2015).
7 In 2013, the affected community filed a law suit in UK courts seeking compensation 
from T&L, arguing that under Cambodian law, the land and produce belonged to 
the Cambodian community and that T&L wrongly took the sugar cane and so 
must compensate the community for the stolen sugar. By following the money, 
the affected community was also able to use the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Guidelines complaint mechanism and 
file a case with the US National Contact Point (NCP) against American Sugar 
Refineries (ASR), as owner of T&L, for its purchase of all of the sugar from the Koh 
Kong economic land concession. ASR withdrew from the mediation proceedings 
following the filing of litigation against T&L. Nevertheless, the US NCP called 
ASR to conduct a corporate human rights policy review process, a statement which 
was useful for other advocacy and campaigning efforts.
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by filing the complaint as part of a broader campaign against this particular 
project as well as against the planned cascade of eleven Mekong mainstream 
dams, the communities were able to raise awareness about the environmental 
and human rights issues of the project and harness international support for 
their plight. 
Unfortunately, even positive decisions by quasi-judicial bodies or even legally 
binding judicial decisions do not necessarily translate into the implementation 
of human rights due to the absence of enforcement mechanisms. National 
and international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies can render numerous 
landmark decisions against states, upholding international or regional human 
rights standards. However, if they are not enforced by states due to economic 
reasons and capital pressures, human rights violations cannot be properly 
addressed and remedied. One example comes from a region that has put in 
place a regional human rights body that can issue binding legal decisions. In 
its landmark 2010 decision in the case of the Endorois indigenous community v. 
Kenya, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) set 
a critical precedent that indigenous populations in Africa are legally entitled 
to collective ownership of their ancestral lands. Despite intensive lobbying 
from the Endorois community and NGOs and recent positive developments 
reflected in the creation of a government task force charged with addressing 
restitution of the lands to the Endorois, compensation for losses due to their 
eviction, and a benefit-sharing agreement, the implementation has been slow 
and more has to be done to achieve full and direct implementation of the 
ruling (Minority Rights Group International 2010; 2014). 
These difficulties with enforcement highlight that relying solely on the law 
or litigation is evidently not enough but it can help lead to positive results, if 
combined with other advocacy strategies and pressure tools.
Law as a tool for building people’s power
As with any advocacy efforts, lawyers and advocates, especially Western 
organisations operating in developing countries, should be very careful to 
make sure that they truly represent the ‘asks’ of the community and that they 
do not employ strategies that they think will benefit them. Obtaining the 
affected community’s support and informed consent, based on consultation 
and community input, is crucial. To that end, victims of human rights and 
environmental abuses need to be educated about their legal rights and legal 
and advocacy options that they can use to advance their demands. Engagement 
with affected communities is indispensable for designing as well implementing 
legal advocacy strategies, making sure that they are the ones driving the process 
and linking legal strategies with grassroots campaigning.
The pursuit of legal strategies in human rights advocacy is more than filing 
lawsuits, complaints and petitions. It is first and foremost raising awareness 
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of legal rights and building capacity of communities to understand decision-
making processes, legal frameworks and legal avenues they can pursue to seek 
redress and protects their rights. Working closely with the affected communities 
on a legal case can lead to community empowerment as the process brings 
together the power of the law and the power of the people and provides an 
opportunity to create people’s movements. Legal advocacy and strategic 
litigation efforts play into larger campaigning actions. Their ultimate aim lies 
beyond winning a particular legal case; it is about building people’s power and 
helping create more equitable societies. 
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Domestic incorporation of the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the Marshall 
Islands
Divine Waiti
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(‘Convention’) and its Optional Protocol were adopted on 13 December 2006, 
and were opened for signature on 30 March 2007.1 It was described as ‘the 
highest number of signatories in history to a UN Convention on its opening 
day’.2 Unfortunately, this was less inclusive of the Asia-Pacific countries: the 
region was considered to have the lowest rate of signatures and ratification 
of the Convention (UNESCAP 2015). Only three countries in the Pacific 
(Australia, New Zealand and Vanuatu ) have signed the convention at the 
time it was opened for signature, while most of the Pacific Islands countries 
became a state party some years later. The Republic of the Marshall Islands 
(‘Marshall Islands’) is the most recent Pacific island state to become a party to 
the Convention on 17 March 2015.
This paper gives an account of the domestic incorporation of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the Marshall Islands. 
It is a personal reflection with some critiques and comments on some of the 
work involved in the process of translation of the Convention into domestic 
law. It first looks at the accession to the international convention; second, it 
reviews the formulation of policy which drives legislative measures and social 
policies; third, it discusses the legislative review and compliance process to fine-
tune the national legislative framework; and fourth, it describes the adoption of 
a comprehensive non-discriminatory law in compliance with the Convention.
1 United Nations Enable (2015), Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
available at http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=150 (accessed 11 Sept. 
2015).
2 Ibid.
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Accession to the Convention
While signing gives a state the expression of its intention to implement a 
convention, ratification legally binds a state to implement the convention. 
Where a state is unable to sign and ratify before the entering into force of the 
convention, accession would be the next process. For instance, the Republic of 
the Marshall Islands expressed its consent to be bound by the Convention by 
depositing its instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations in New York after the coming into force of the Convention on 3 May 
2008.
The ratification of human rights treaties has been an issue for Pacific Island 
countries for many years. Recently, the Marshall Islands, during its second 
Universal Periodic Review, was recommended to implement a number of 
core human rights treaties.3 While some considered it lack of prioritisation 
for implementation, others said it is a matter of resources allocation to which 
most Pacific Islands countries are not prepared to obligate (Thomas 2009, 6). 
The Pacific Island countries, especially the small island developing states like 
the Marshall Islands, have common features of remoteness, smallness in size 
and capacities, limited resources, aid dependency and vulnerability to climate 
change and global economic shocks, and clearly resources allocation is the 
dominant factor.
Another feasibility factor also for the Marshall Islands is the lack of early 
interventions to engage both the government and civil society, especially 
for persons with disabilities, to rally support for ratification. It was in early 
2013 a person was designated to the relevant government ministry to 
develop and implement a national disability inclusive policy for the Marshall 
Islands.4 In 2014, a Disabled Peoples Organization (DPO) was established to 
empower persons with a disability to contribute to the development and the 
implementation of a disability strategy, policy and legislation. Following the 
establishment of the DPO, various consultations on the national policy on 
disability inclusion were undertaken. In a nutshell, there was clearly a lack 
of resources and capacity to build, educate and lobby leaders to ratify the 
Convention at the very early stage of the Convention. It should therefore be 
3 (i)International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocols; 
(ii) the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its 
Optional Protocol; (iii) the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination; (iv) the Convention against Torture and its Optional Protocol; (v) 
the Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers; (vi) the Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; and (vii) the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. UN Human Rights 
Council (2015), Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review; the 
Marshall Islands, UN Doc. A/HRC/30/13 (20 July 2015).
4 Republic of the Marshall Islands National Policy on Disability Inclusive 
Development 2014 – 2018, 9.
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noted that considerable efforts must be taken by donor partners to collaborate 
and engage early, and must mandate inclusive developments to ratify human 
rights treaties.5
Formulation of national policy
Article 4 of the Convention affirms that a Government must protect and 
promote the rights of persons with disabilities in all policies and programmes. 
The Marshall Islands National Policy on Disability Inclusive Development 
was developed in 2014. It sets out a twin-track approach of a long-term 
vision for improving the well-being of those persons with disability, which 
includes the development of legislation and the building of capacity of persons 
with disability, and to promote activities that are inclusive for persons with 
disabilities in areas of employment, education, and health services and other 
social development. The policy was developed with the technical assistance 
of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (UNESCAP)’s Pacific Office, the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat and 
Pacific Disability Forum (PDF). Through this technical assistance, research 
and various consultations with a range of stakeholders, including persons with 
disabilities, were undertaken.6
Because the policy was formulated prior to the acceding to the Convention, 
much of the attention was drawn towards social policies and lobbying and 
supporting the government to accede to the Convention and less focus was on 
the legislative measures and approaches taken for domestic implementation. 
More specifically for the present purpose, an ideal policy must have a clear 
legislative framework that lays out the legislative measures needed for translation 
into law. It must be strongly supported and endorsed by the government and 
the relevant stakeholders. Furthermore, taking ownership and initiatives to 
implement a legislative policy agenda is very critical. In the Marshall Islands, 
the treaty domestication process was often prolonged due to lack of ownership 
and initiatives to drive successful implementation.
The social policy frameworks for inclusiveness of persons with disabilities 
must be clearly outlined as well. The policy must take a ‘critical collaboration’ 
approach (Wilkinson 2009, 18); where collaborative efforts must be ‘between 
5 A similar delay was faced with the ratification and implementation of the UN 
Convention Against Corruption until the UNDP Sub-regional Office was 
mandated to support the Pacific Island countries with their ratification process by 
engaging relevant stakeholders in various consultations and trainings. It was after 
a workshop was conducted for the Members of the Parliaments, that there was an 
overwhelming support to ratify the Convention and domesticate it into national 
laws.
6 Republic of the Marshall Islands National Policy on Disability Inclusive 
Development 2014–18, 9.
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government and civil society and engages people with disability,’ This is 
especially important in the Pacific where traditional languages, cultural beliefs 
and practices are usually not in conformity with the exercise of the rights of 
persons with disabilities (ibid., 18). Moreover, the social policy must have a 
broad-based framework (ibid., 19). Generally, in the Pacific, including the 
Marshall Islands, the social policy is always confined within the terms of 
education, health, employment, housing, or welfare without linkages on how 
each of these impact on the other. The Republic of the Marshall Islands must 
move away from the charity approach of treating persons with disabilities to a 
rights-based policy.
Legislative review and compliance
By acceding to the Convention, the Marshall Islands commits itself to enact 
domestic laws by adopting measures to improve the rights of persons with 
disabilities and to abolish legislation, customs and practices that discriminate 
against persons with disabilities. To ensure that these laws are in conformity 
with the Convention, a comprehensive legislative and compliance review is 
required. At the time the policy was formulated, a legislative review of the 
existing laws of the Marshall Islands was carried out by the Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat prior to the ratification of the Convention. Like other Pacific Island 
countries, the Marshall Islands lacked a comprehensive legislation that adopts 
disability rights measures in conformity with the Convention. This includes the 
Constitution of the Marshall Islands, which guarantees fundamental rights and 
freedoms that equally apply to all persons, including persons with disabilities. 
Only a few pieces of legislation identified provided for specific targeted issues, 
especially for the social areas of health, education, transport, family and other 
social policy matters; for instance, a specific provision in the Motor Traffic Act 
provides for reserved parking space for persons with disabilities.
The legislative compliance review identified several issues that needed 
addressing. First, the lack of comprehensive non-discriminatory legislation for 
persons with disabilities that leads to the development of relevant legislation 
to promote, protect and enforce the rights of persons with disabilities. Second, 
the little piece-meal legislation identified mainly focused on social protection 
and benefit provisions in education and employment, and health services for 
mental illnesses. This is where a paradigm shift is called for in attitudes and 
approaches to persons with disabilities. The focus and approach should shift 
to recognise persons with disabilities having and enjoying the same human 
rights just like any other person. Persons with disabilities should no longer 
be considered ‘objects’ of charity in need of social protection but are ‘subjects’ 
with rights, who are capable of claiming those rights and making decisions 
for their lives based on their free and informed consent as well as being active 
137DOMESTIC INCORPORATION OF THE DISABILITIES CONVENTION
members of society.7 Third, the existing legislation lacks disability friendly 
terminology. While the Convention emphasises the harmonisation of disability 
friendly terminology, the common references to persons with disabilities in 
the laws of the Marshall Islands are ‘insane’, ‘handicap’, ‘disability’, ‘physical 
disability’, ‘mental disability’, ‘person suffering from mental disorder’, ‘mental 
retardation’, ‘mental deficiency’, ‘mental impairment’, ‘mentally or physically 
incompetent’, ‘incompetent’, ‘mental incapacity’, ‘mentally incapacitated’, 
‘physically helpless’, ‘mentally defective’ and ‘disabled person’.8 Article 1 of the 
Convention defines ‘persons with disabilities’ to ‘include those who have long-
term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction 
with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society 
on an equal basis with others’. Such changes to legislative language must go 
hand in hand with public awareness and training on disability neutral language 
and references. Language used in legislation must be used at administrative and 
practical levels.9
The next step in the legislative review is to seek constitutional amendments 
and consequential amendments to the existing legislation that is not in 
conformity with the provisions of the Convention. These processes are 
forthcoming during the writing of this chapter.
Adopting a comprehensive legislation
While the type of legislation each country should adopt depends on the existing 
laws and the particular legal system of a State party,10 the Marshall Islands opted 
to adopt a comprehensive legislation that covers the general provisions of rights 
of persons with disabilities in Article 3 of the Convention and other specific 
provisions of the Convention. The Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPD) Act 
2015 (‘Act’) was introduced to the Parliament (Nitijela) and passed its first reading. 
It was assigned to a Standing Committee on Judiciary and Government Relations 
for public consultations. The committee reported its findings to the parliament 
and the bill was voted on and unanimously adopted on 28 September 2015.
7 The traditional Marshallese approach has been one of caring for disabled family 
members who are regarded as weak; protecting them from harm and from the 
possibility of being teased, bullied or mocked. This is at odds with the current 
approach, which aims to empower persons with disabilities.
8 CRPD Legislative Review (2014), Government of the Marshall Islands with the 
Assistance of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 16.
9 Ibid.
10 The legal system of the Marshall Islands is largely influenced by the US legal system, 
having been a US Trusteeship from 1945 until its independence in 1986, and 
currently being in free association with the US under the 2004 Compact of Free 
Association with the US. The country has a unicameral parliamentary system where 
the Parliamentarians are vested with powers to enact, repeal, revoke or amend any 
law in force in the Republic.
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The two main purposes stated in the Act are (i) to declare, protect, promote, 
fulfill and enforce the rights and freedoms of persons with disabilities on an 
equal basis with others; and (ii) to implement the legal obligations of the 
Marshall Islands as a State Party to the Convention.11 In implementing the 
legal obligations, the Act adopted the principles contained in Article 3 of the 
Convention, in relation to persons with disabilities, which are:
a. respect for the inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the 
freedom to make one’s own choices, and independence of persons;
b. non-discrimination;
c. full and effective participation and inclusion in society;
d. respect for difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities as 
part of human diversity and humanity;
e. equality of opportunity;
f. accessibility;
g. equality between men and women; 
h. respect for the evolving capacities of children with disabilities and 
their right to preserve their identities including the respect for the 
dignity and value of older persons with disabilities, and respect for the 
inclusive community-based features of Marshallese culture. 
Most of these principles listed above underpin the interpretation of substantive 
provisions that are outlined in the Act. The Act also elaborates on the recognition 
given to persons with disabilities to participate fully in all aspects of life including 
the recognition of equal treatment, protection and benefit of the law, the 
recognition for active participation in all decision making processes, policies 
and programs, including those that directly concern them, and recognition of 
the right to voice their concerns including on: approaches to implementing 
development; implementation, monitoring and reviewing of policies; legislation; 
and services to ensure that they effectively meet their requirements.12
One of the cornerstones to any legislation on the rights of persons with 
disabilities is ‘reasonable accommodation’. The Convention stipulates that a 
failure to afford a person reasonable accommodation amounts to discrimination 
on the basis of disability (UN-DESA et al. 2007, 60). In adopting this provision 
of the Convention, Section 2 of the Act defines as follows:
In this Act:
a. “reasonable accommodation” means appropriate modifications 
and adjustments, whether of a rule, a practice, an environment, a 
requirement or otherwise, in order to ensure the full participation by 
persons with disabilities in an activity, on an equal basis with others;
11 Section 3(2) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPD) Act 2015.
12 Section 3(3) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPD) Act 2015.
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b. the nature and limits of the duty to accommodate must be determined 
on a case by case basis and include factors such as the accommodation 
required, the size of the entity involved, and the resources available; 
and
c. the duty must be reasonable and must not impose a disproportionate 
or undue burden.
These provisions take account of the principle that ‘if the accommodation 
required would impose a disproportionate or undue burden on the person 
or entity expected to provide it, then a failure to do so would not constitute 
discrimination’ (ibid., 60). The proposed legislation for the Marshall Islands 
sets out the factors that should be taken into account when assessing the 
reasonable accommodation.
In conclusion, one could deduce from these discussions that the 
domestication of the Convention is an on-going process for the Pacific Island 
countries. So far, most of the Pacific Island countries have signed and ratified 
or have acceded to the Convention. The Marshall Islands, as the most recent 
in the Pacific to become a State party, has taken a step further (as has Australia 
and New Zealand), to domesticate its national laws in conformity with the 
Convention. While some differences may exist in the legal systems of the other 
Pacific Island countries, the pioneering of this piece of legislation and the 
involvements in the domestic process in the domestication of the laws for the 
Marshall Islands, would offer some lessons for other Pacific Island countries. It 
is highly recommended that domestication of the national laws relating to the 
rights of persons with disabilities be accomplished for rest of the Pacific Island 
countries.
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The Inter-American Human Rights System: notable 
achievements and enduring challenges
Par Engstrom
In the teaching, as well as in the historiography, of international human rights, 
regional human rights systems, with the partial exception of the European 
Court of Human Rights, remain marginalised. This is regrettable for a number 
of reasons; not least because the richness of regional experiences with human 
rights offers us a more nuanced understanding of the enduring attraction of 
human rights around the world (as well as a better sense of the diversity and 
contentious political struggles that characterise them), than that prevailing in 
the current literature proclaiming the endtimes of human rights (Hopgood 
2013; Moyn 2012).
Nowhere can this be seen better than in the region of the Americas, 
where the Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS) emerged to play a 
vanguard role in the development of the modern international human rights 
regime. This short piece briefly reviews the current state of the IAHRS, and 
highlights its key achievements, as well as some of the many challenges it faces. 
It should be pointed out, from the outset, that any list of achievements and 
challenges inevitably depends on perspective, the specific yardstick adopted, 
and, in particular, the understanding of what could be reasonably expected 
from the IAHRS.
Achievements
In the interest of brevity, five points serve to illustrate how the IAHRS has 
emerged as the central human rights reference point in the region of Latin 
America, in particular. 
First, in terms of rule-making, both the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights perform a 
crucial function in the development of human rights standards. The Court 
has developed progressive human rights jurisprudence through its rulings. 
The Commission also serves an important function in this regard through its 
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thematic reports and development of policy guidelines, for example, in such 
diverse areas as freedom of expression, rights of detainees, and land rights. The 
IAHRS has become increasingly ambitious not only in terms of the types of 
human rights challenges it deals with, but also in terms of what it demands from 
states. In particular, the Inter-American Court’s evolving policies of reparations 
now span from monetary compensation to victims, symbolic reparations 
(e.g. memorials), to demands for state reforms and criminal prosecutions of 
individual perpetrators.
Second, another important function of the IAHRS concerns monitoring 
and evaluation of state practices. From its institutional origins as a ‘classical’ 
intergovernmental regime, the IAHRS has evolved into an institutionally 
robust and autonomous system. Its legal and institutional architecture is today 
dramatically different from the one originally set up in the immediate period 
following the adoption of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties 
of Man in 1948. An independent court and commission are invested with 
the mandate to respond to individual claims by judging whether domestic 
legislation, policies and particular actions or omissions violate international 
state commitments.
Third, the IAHRS has established itself as an important advocacy actor 
in its own right. The Commission, in particular, has developed a fairly 
comprehensive set of tools in addition to individual cases that range from public 
diplomacy in the form of press releases, public hearings, onsite visits, interim 
measures (precautionary mechanisms), to behind the scenes negotiations with 
state officials and individual petitioners. The IAHRS also performs a significant 
indirect advocacy role by providing an important platform for human rights 
NGOs, some of which have been very adept at integrating the IAHRS into 
their advocacy strategies in order to bring pressure for change in their domestic 
political and legal systems.
Fourth, the IAHRS performs important accountability functions; though we 
should not exaggerate their relative robustness. Various mechanisms have been 
developed by the IAHRS to hold states accountable for human rights violations: 
Court rulings, compliance reports, etc. True, these are weak accountability 
mechanisms in the sense that there are no enforcement mechanisms in place 
to hold states responsible for implementation. For example, there is no clearly 
mandated political compliance mechanism, as assumed by the Committee of 
Ministers in the European system. Still, accountability can operate through 
various channels, including primarily domestic accountability mechanisms – 
e.g. in the form of mobilisation of public opinion around specific cases, raising 
awareness through media strategies, and domestic litigation processes.
Finally, the focus on domestic politics highlights the ways in which the 
IAHRS has become increasingly inserted into domestic policy and legislative 
debates on specific human rights issues across the region. This signals a gradual 
move away from a dominant focus on contentious litigation of individual 
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cases to attempts to settle cases through friendly settlement procedures. This 
‘change of paradigm’ in human rights activism also reflects the increasing 
use of individual cases to promote broader government policy changes and 
institutional changes.
Challenges
The achievements of the IAHRS are considerable when considered against the 
often inhospitable regional conditions prevailing throughout the Americas. Yet, 
these institutional successes contain the seeds of the many challenges facing 
the IAHRS. Two particularly important challenges stand out, concerning 
accessibility and ‘impact’, on the one hand, and the politically contested status 
of the system, on the other.
First, does the system ‘matter’ to those mostly in need, however conceived? 
This is, in part, a question of access and participation. Individuals and groups 
in the Americas may submit complaints of human rights violations to the 
Inter-American Commission, and the Commission may refer cases to the Inter-
American Court if the country involved has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction. 
Indeed, individual access to the human rights regime has strengthened over 
time as the system has evolved into a judicial regime with a procedural focus 
on the force of legal argumentation and the generation of regional human 
rights jurisprudence. The system institutionally legitimises and discursively 
encourages civil society participation, and it formally empowers citizens to 
bring suit to challenge the domestic activities of their own government. No 
longer, therefore, a mere quasi-judicial entity with an ill-defined mandate 
to promote respect for human rights in the region, today’s IAHRS offers 
important opportunities for human rights activists to bring pressure for change 
in their domestic political systems. 
We should not, however, overstate the general accessibility of the IAHRS 
to individual petitioners. The capacity of actors to access and to mobilise the 
IAHRS is highly unequal. Successfully accessing the IAHRS requires a high level 
of legal and technical expertise. In practice, this means that the vast majority of 
petitions that actually gain traction in the system – i.e. proceed beyond initial 
submission phase – are advocated by NGOs. Nonetheless, engaging in the 
process of litigation before the IAHRS involves very lengthy proceedings that 
imply a significant drain on already limited resources for NGOs that pursue 
litigation. The process before the System is also highly unpredictable and partial 
state compliance with IAHRS decisions is often the best outcome petitioners 
can realistically hope for. Still, the Commission receives an increasing number 
of petitions, which has led to a significantly increased case-load, and back-log 
of cases, for the system.
Another aspect to note in this regard is that individuals and groups do not 
have direct access to the Court. The Commission only has the mandate to bring 
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cases to the Court. In practice, this means that Commission lawyers have been 
delegated the responsibility to act on behalf of individual petitioners. This also 
often means that professional human rights NGOs bring cases representing 
individual victims or group of victims. The structure of these dynamics is 
such that potential problems of representation and legitimacy may arise, with 
NGOs pursuing interests and objectives that are not necessarily aligned with 
the needs and interests of individual victims; e.g. devising litigation strategies 
that may that seek to leverage individual cases to bring about broader policy 
and legislative changes. 
Even more crucial, however, is the limited capacity of the IAHRS. The 
system is able to process only a small number of the petitions submitted. Given 
the vast human rights challenges facing contemporary societies in the region, 
moreover, only a miniscule proportion of the violations committed on a daily 
basis are presented to the IAHRS. This reality raises, once again, several thorny 
yet important questions concerning the accessibility of the system, particularly 
for marginalised and vulnerable individuals and groups in the region, who, 
arguably, are those most in need of the system’s support for the realisation of 
their human rights.
A second challenge to the system concerns its future, in light of political 
changes in the region, as well as broader global shifts that may increasingly 
challenge the international human rights regime. The IAHRS is subject to 
some very significant legitimacy and authority challenges. From the perspective 
of the users of the IAHRS, as already highlighted, the system can appear fairly 
inaccessible. The internal functioning of the system also raises questions 
concerning its perceived legitimacy and efficacy. For example, one common 
criticism is that the Commission is not transparent in its selection of what 
cases to accept. The length of proceedings also undermines claims that justice is 
rendered even in cases that result in a Court ruling. Doubts are regularly raised 
concerning the competence, independence, and motivations of individual 
members of the Commission and the Court.
Moreover, there is significant regional variation with regards to the 
formal adherence to the system. This is reflected in the uneven adoption of 
regional human rights instruments by OAS member states. Indeed, one of the 
contentious issues surrounding the IAHRS is precisely its uneven ratification 
record. While most Latin American states demonstrate a high degree of formal 
commitment to the IAHRS, the US, Canada, and most of the English-speaking 
Caribbean have not ratified the American Convention on Human Rights 
(1969) and have not accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. In addition, states 
are regularly questioning the authority of the System; some are withdrawing 
their diplomatic and financial support. Trinidad and Tobago’s withdrawal from 
the American Convention following its continuing commitment to the death 
penalty took effect in 1999; Venezuela announced its withdrawal in 2012, 
and the Constitutional Court of the Dominican Republic ruled in 2014 to 
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withdraw from the Inter-American Court’s jurisdiction (Engstrom 2015). This 
raises the problem of having one system seeking to apply general principles of 
law in a regional context characterised by considerable heterogeneity between, 
and within, countries.
Indeed, the significant political tensions surrounding the IAHRS in recent 
years highlight that processes of institutional development are not necessarily 
progressive, nor unidirectional. True, there may be a basic recognition of certain 
fundamental human rights principles in the Americas. Beyond this basic 
normative consensus, however important it may be, recent debates within the 
OAS concerning the scope and direction of IAHRS reforms suggest that some 
states question the institutional direction of travel of the IAHRS. Trenchant 
criticisms in recent years from several member states may suggest that the 
IAHRS is on the verge of overstretching its institutional mandate. Efforts by 
states to constrain or rein in the IAHRS may need to be seen, moreover, in the 
broader context of an uncertain future for the global human rights regime in 
light of the wider implications of shifting global power balances from which 
the Americas as a region is not immune. As power shifts globally, as well as 
regionally in the Americas, competing understandings of sovereignty that 
emphasise sovereign equality may reassert themselves challenging the demands 
and expectations of human rights advocates. Indeed, debates within the OAS 
in the context of the recent IAHRS reform process reflect an enduring and deep 
disquiet towards external monitoring and sanction of the human rights record 
of governments. From this perspective, it may be argued that it is precisely the 
institutional development of the IAHRS, in ways that have escaped the control 
of states, which has prompted significant pushback by certain groups of states 
within the OAS.
Without doubt, it is important to recognise the very real limitations of the 
IAHRS and to be sober about the many challenges the system is facing. Yet, 
there continue to be reasons to be cautiously optimistic about the future of 
the IAHRS. Despite its institutional weaknesses, the IAHRS performs many 
important functions as outlined above. As reflected in steadily increasing 
petitions to the Commission, the system continues to be turned to by those 
who have been denied justice at home. The demand from victims and their 
relatives, and human rights organisations across the region, remains, in other 
words, robust and growing.
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